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Faculty of Law and
Social Sciences



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RESEARCH CENTER

PROCEEDINGS OF STUDENT CONFERENCE ON LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Kaskelen 2025

**MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE
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SDU UNIVERSITY

**PROCEEDINGS
of the Student Conference on Law and Social Sciences**

**Құқық және әлеуметтік ғылымдар бойынша
студенттік конференцияның
МАҚАЛАЛАР ЖИНАҒЫ**

**СБОРНИК СТАТЕЙ
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Осы жинақта SDU Университетінде (Қаскелең, Қазақстан) 2024 жылдың 21 қараша күні өткізілген студенттік конференцияның материалдары қамтылған. Жинаққа бакалавриат және магистратура білімгерлерінің құқық және әлеуметтік ғылымдар бойынша жазған мақалалары енгізілді.

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
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Central Asian Research Center

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Foreword

It is with great pleasure that I write this foreword for the proceedings which is an output of the Law and Social Sciences Student Conference 2024, organized by the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at SDU University. I would like to extend a warm welcome to all distinguished keynote speakers, faculty members, organizing team, guests, young researchers and students who contributed to this conference.

This is the first-ever student conference hosted by the Central Asian Research Center (CARC) since its establishment in 2019. During the one-day event, more than 70 students delivered presentations across three disciplines: Law, Journalism, and International Relations. All articles included in this proceedings volume have been presented in one of these disciplines. Each article is peer reviewed and approved by the organizing committee, which confirms that this publication is an accurate description of the conference's review process.

The aim of this conference is to provide a medium for both undergraduate and graduate students to share their research findings and engage in discussions with discussants and audience. The conference covered a diverse range of interesting topics in law, international relations and journalism. In Law session, students discussed constitutional rights, financial fraud, corruption, public administration reforms, and juvenile delinquency as well as the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in legal regulation, among other topics. International Relations and Political Science session explored regional diplomacy, migration, soft power and economic dependencies, including Kazakhstan's foreign policy and cases in regional governance. In Journalism session, students explored how media shapes public discourse, impact of AI on news production and ethical challenges in journalism in the tech-driven era. Diversity of themes and ideas presented by young researchers is a powerful reminder of how emerging challenges in law, media and politics shape our societies today and require interdisciplinary approach.

Particularly outstanding papers in the conference were nominated for 'Best Paper Award' by attending faculty, with the top three receiving awards in their respective disciplines. We congratulate these students in each section for their exceptional performance and recognition.

In addition to student presentations, the conference also featured three keynote speakers in the morning session. The first speaker, Dr. Sergey Sayapin (KIMEP University), discussed the development of international law in Central Asia; the second speaker, Dr. Karlyga Myssayeva (Al-Farabi Kazakh National University), explained the evolving landscape of journalism in the digital era; and the third speaker, Dr. Galym Zhussipbek (SDU University), challenged the audience to consider the vital role of research in advancing universal human dignity. Through their lectures, guest speakers provided a thought-provoking and interdisciplinary perspective on the broader field of social sciences.

Many people contributed to the organization of the conference. We would like to thank the management of SDU University for their support of research activities. We are also grateful to Dr. Madiyar Saubayev, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, and Mehmet Tash,

Acting Dean of the Faculty, for their generous assistance in organizing this event. Finally, special thanks go to the members of the Organizing Committee and all authors, whose hard work and commitment ensured success of this conference. Without their dedication and participation, this inaugural student conference would not have been possible.

We believe that these proceedings will serve as a valuable record of student research that combines a diverse collection of ideas and discussions. We also hope that this compilation will not only provide young researchers with a useful reference book but will also inspire future exploration of the topics covered in the conference.

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April 2025

Comparative Analysis of School Language Policies during Soviet Era versus Contemporary Kazakhstan

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Abstract

This study helps us to understand how different language policies have evolved during the Soviet period era and compares that framework to today's Kazakhstani world and educational system. This research shows us how centralised the use of Russian language was, in terms of day to day activities all the way to even making it to official and administrative settings. We get to see how different communities of various ethnic backgrounds could survive communicating in a language that was neither any of theirs but they turned this opportunity into a gift by progressing their lives in this new direction. All of this was of course at the cost of the diminishing of their own mother tongue that was eroded gradually during the years of occupation. Although Kazakh language was seen as almost dead the country made efforts in reviving it after years of subjugation through different language policies that were adopted in schools all over the country and although we can see a positive outcome it is still being hindered by a couple of challenges that are discussed in detail inside the article. By highlighting the different policies that existed in both time frames, we can make a sound comparison between the two as to which policies were more effective in making the language dominant in the country.

Introduction

Language policies are very important especially in a school setting because this is where a whole generation is trained and equipped for the future. School's language policies will eventually determine how a nation's people will grow and what sort of system they will be part of and how communication will be organized in that system. As we know schools during the Soviet Union were Russian medium alone. This was a strategy to create a lingua franca that would be used all over the Central Asia USSR and beyond so that communication channels and order of hierarchy would be cohesive and easy flowing. Through this process we can see that the Russian Language became the superior language and was mainly used in urban areas. In terms of Kazakhstan in detail this situation was not all that different as Russian was the main language of work and practicality and was seen as the "new best thing" as it was so efficient. Kazakh became the language of the past and was only used in Rural areas of Kazakhstan and was seen as backwards and signs of uncivilization. Although Kazakh was the main source of ethnic identity, we can see that the suppression and harsh rules made people change from this perspective and

move on to a different lighting and the people themselves accepted this for a fact and decided it was the best for them at that time.

It was not until Kazakhstan gained independence and even after all of that we can see only until 1997 was a new law passed by the new Kazakhstani government of using Kazakh as the State language and Russian still in offices and official settings “Law on languages in the republic of Kazakhstan” (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "About languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan", 1997). After this law was adopted it was curated in the sense that Kazakh should be encouraged and the people taught about its fluency in all aspects of society including schools.

This paper helps us see the distinct variations and contrasts of schooling systems in terms of language policies during USSR era and comparing it to modern day era so we can see what has changed, what has remained the same and what can we do to improve the already existing situations that we have so we can always better our society and new generations that will come in the future by analysing our past and history.

Literature review

During the USSR times ranging from 1922-1991, language policies in the USSR region including Kazakhstan have been curated in the sense of broadening the goals and promoting the Russian language as the new lingua franca across the nations that they have colonies in. The USSR central government implemented russification policies that always prioritised the Russian language in administrative setting, schooling and education as well as normal day to day life. Brubaker (1996) covers the topic that the USSR purposefully Implemented all of this so that the prominence and essence of other existing native cultures and language would not outshine the Russian language that was being widely spread at that time. We could see these specific instances in schools whereby there was wide spread of Russian as the medium of study and instruction, for Kazakhs and Russians alike. This in turn led to a drastic decline in Kazakh language fluency and proficiency among the younger generation (Dave 2007).

On the other hand, post independence and modern times, we see the opposite trend happening as it has been precisely explained by famous authors and researchers. We have scholars like Fierman during his seminal work Language Planning and National Development; The Uzbek Experience (1991), which helps to give us a basic analysis of Language Planning in Central Asia, highlighting the parallels of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan efforts of de-russification and promoting their indigenous ethnic languages. In his work Fierman put emphasis on schooling systems that are central to these efforts but he also notes that there will be challenges transitioning away from Russian Language since its dominant in most urban and metropolitan cities of Kazakhstan.

Secondly, in Aneta Pavlenko's book: *Language Revival and Survival* (2008), the author focuses on the Bilingual system adopted by Kazakhstan and multiple other states around the world. She argues that while it is nice that schools are starting and trying to elevate the status of Kazakh language and even including it as part of the curriculum, Russian language is simply more prominent considering the amount of pragmatism Russian language holds by being assimilated into the system from a very long time ago.

Lastly, Madina Smagulova provides a more focused point of view in her book "Language Policies of Kazakhstan: Symbolism and Pragmatism" (2012). Smagulova studies the generational contrasts in perspectives and attitudes of younger Kazakhstanis and noting the fact that, Kazakh Youth that are educated under post soviet era are more likely to view Kazakh language as a sign of National identity while still continuing to use Russian as a more practical and pragmatic language. Her work reveals the duality of the younger kazakhstanis and the dual role that schools play to offer these two languages to the children.

Together all these works provide an in-depth and cohesive idea to me as the researcher and give me a scope to work with as well as a concrete grasp of the main ideas. Therefore, we learn how schooling language policies influence young children's sense of identity and belonging.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative analysis approach whereby it uses historical content analyses to examine how different language policies existed in Kazakhstan during the USSR period and after when the nation gained independence. The historical piece's analysis acts as the basis of comprehension to decipher the ideological and political views underscoring the use of Soviet era policies that existed between 1917-1991 when it finally collapsed. This study employs extensive research on documents such as archives used during that time, official government statements, relevant educational policies and even propaganda tools that were deployed by the USSR government. Sources include but not limited to: Central government initiatives and policy documents that prioritized the usage and promotion of Russian language as the superior spoken and written language and the systemic curbing of Kazakh and other indigenous languages.

As for the post Soviet era that is 1991-present, this study examines current policy structures, a few examples being the law passed in 1997 that was "Law on Languages of the Republic of Kazakhstan" as well as the law of the "State Program for the development and Functioning of Languages" (Gov.Kz, 2019). Supporting documents include specific government releases, academic research work by top universities as well as analysis reports provided by non-governmental organizations in the republic of Kazakhstan that center around linguistic reforms and changes as

well as societal norms that currently exist. This study also takes a look at existing schooling curriculums that are being employed by a majority of schools in Kazakhstan and compares those to schooling curriculum in Soviet period times. These works are then magnified to understand their stated goals and objectives, their implementations and how society reacted to them in order to assess how they addressed historical inequalities and what their version of a balanced linguistic environment looks like.

Qualitative analysis that this study exploits is used to strategically identify patterns and trends in our given data. The given policy documents and archived paperwork are coded in a certain way that they are able to capture recurring patterns such as dominating language, how well the culture was preserved and even how society developed a national identity off of this. This way we can ensure our approach gives us a comprehensive and somewhat total look at the apparent shifts in educational systems that were running under different language policies and what kind of students such schooling systems will produce.

Discussions and Argumentations

This study observes a dynamic evolution in Kazakhstan's linguistic policies that show quite a contrast to the homogenic Soviet-era policies that come with a plethora of approaches that were adopted after the collapse of the USSR.

With that being said, Soviet ideologies looked at language through a keyhole that showed unity and ideological oneness among the colonised states. It was then established that the Russian Language was the Lingua Franca not just in Kazakhstan alone but throughout the entire Soviet USSR. All commencing education systems now prioritized Russian while Kazakh and other ethnic languages were reduced to a secondary, non-elementary role (Smith, 1998). This way the Soviet government reduced the usage of ethnic languages while promoting theirs through processes like compulsory schooling, media outlets and even professional settings (Fierman, 1991). Although the government did recognize Kazakh as the state language, all of this was just on paper and nothing was ever implemented in practice like they said they would. The recognition given to any ethnic language that was not Russian lacked concrete support to back it up.

The USSR had developed a unique schooling curriculum to ensure the Russian language's prowess through multiple means, the first and most obvious being Russian as the main language of instruction in all schools across the country. As schools transitioned to these policies core subjects such as arithmetics, all sorts of sciences and even skewed history was taught in Russian in ways that benefited Lenin and even Stalin's rule. Schools employed the use of Russian Literature and culture that went hand-in-hand with the Soviet core principles, building a nationalistic sentiment among students in these schools (Rather & Abdullah, 2019).

Specialized teacher training institutes mainly focused on training their educators in these same fields and even going to the extent of teaching ethnically Kazakh teachers Russian by deploying them to Russian-only speaking regions in the USSR so that their fluency could increase. All pedagogical schemes and curricula had to align with Marxist-Lenin point of view in order for it to be aligned with the nationalistic values and the future ultimate goal of uniting the whole territory. Teacher's training included initiation and indoctrination services whereby they were introduced to the Soviet mindset and made to see Russian language as the "Language of interethnic unity and friendship" all across the shared lands and territories. (T. A. Il'ina and V. I. Mišin, 1971).

The impacts of all of this was observed as Russian being completely used all over these countries and the people being completely assimilated. We can also see a confusion as during the soviet period Joseph Stalin introduced the concept of double assimilation whereby he insisted that Russian be used as the main Interethnic language while promoting the natives to uphold their mother tongue that was Kazakh. (History from One Student to Another, n.d.) Hence people did not understand and realize what was expected from them. Rather they went ahead with the safest option that was being fluent in Russian so that their careers can progress in that colonial time frame. Another apparent effect was the major marginalization and stigmatization of rural Kazakh speaking educators and people from the rural areas. Since they majorly spoke in Kazakh they were often viewed as backwarded and uncivilized with the majority of them not being able to land jobs in the Russian speakers' concentrated towns. (Voices on Central Asia, n.d.)

On the other hand, a few years after Kazakhstan has gained independence, the dynamics start to shift in a more positive way albeit not too much for the country. Let us take 1997 for instance when the country passed a new law to be in effect that directly addressed the declining Kazakh language problem that was titled "Law on Languages of the Republic of Kazakhstan". This specific law highlighted a period of enlightenment all across the country as the President declared Kazakh as the state language and Russian as the official one (Law on Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1997). During the same year Kazakh was reinforced and made as a compulsory language in all schools across Kazakhstan, even the Russian medium ones. At the same time Russian remained as a required subject which showed the readiness of the country to make a steady and gradual change instead of a rapid one. In 2004, the government mandated the specific subject "History of Kazakhstan" be taught as a required mandatory subject in schools all over Kazakhstan including higher studies like secondary schools and Universities. As a matter of fact, all foreigners in Kazakhstan are mandated to learn History of Kazakhstan even as students of a private, English speaking institute but that did not excuse anyone from not learning the subject as it is a must on every student pursuing their education in

Kazakhstan no matter the nationality or major (Law on Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2007).

During the years that ensued after 2010, the Kazakh Language became a mandatory general course in higher education especially universities, even in Russian medium universities. Again this does not matter what major or nationality the student is, it is just a general must. There was a revised version of the “State program for the development and Functioning of Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan” law that was initially passed in 1998 with the new version in 2011 all the way to 2020 whereby the government strived to make Kazakh as the dominant language in fields such as education and administration while at the same time maintaining the bilingual state of the country. (State Program for the Development and Functioning of Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1998).

With all of this being said, we can still notice some disparities in the country whereby urban areas prefer to keep using Russian while marginalizing Kazakh speakers more than necessary. The effort of the Kazakh language trying to dethrone Russian and take its rightful place as the linguistic hierarchy is a socio-lingual concept that has been studied a lot. This view coincides with Bourdieu’s 1991 concept of linguistic capital, where he says that Kazakh trying to elevate itself is seen as a cultural and social resource by many. However, more than one analyses have come to the conclusion that Kazakh and Russian Languages cannot coexist on the same hierarchy without disparities and tensions erupting. The major consensus is that Russian still remains as the dominating language in academic fields, whereas as much revitalization has been made to Kazakh, its usage in practical fields has remained limited.

Conclusion

To conclude, this study observed the evolution of language policies across eras in Kazakhstan, dealing with language reforms that affect the native language Kazakh and the interethnic language that is Russian. The study of these eras give us a glimpse of how the nation has strived and propelled itself towards a future where it can reclaim its cultural identity in full while at the same time keeping itself at par with global linguistic policies of the world. Because Kazakhstan’s native language is suffering to begin with, they have no option but to depend on other languages to curb that distance and showcase themselves proudly to the world. While the country is trying to balance out the bilingual nature of the state, we can observe challenges arise as these regional disparities continue which prompts the country to forge more inclusive policies that will be easier on the people to follow.

Future work that researcher might suggest to be done on this work might include but not limited to: longitudinal studies later in time to show how different society is adapting to the ever changing world now that a new language has been

thrown into the midst of the country that is English, making Kazakhstan not a bilingual country anymore but rather trilingual. This can be observed in the NIS Nazarbayev schools where English is held as a priority and sciences are even taught in English. It would also be very interesting to see how the government will deal with this by introducing new schooling policies as a nation is made or broken according to how well educated its nation is. This way we can now come to a more comprehensive and total idea of the readiness of Kazakhstan in uniting its people while at the same time marking its stance at a global stage.

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Turkey's Call for the Recognition of TRNC: The Potential Answers from Russia and Kazakhstan

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Abstract

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), created in 1974 with the support of Turkey, acquired the observer status along with internationally recognized countries like Hungary and Turkmenistan within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Moreover, the strengthening strategic relationship between Turkey and Russia and¹ Turkey's presence through its Turkic-related projects in Central Asia has prompted the question of the possible recognition of the independence of this quasi state¹. This article explores the possibility of Russia and Kazakhstan's recognition of the independence of the TRNC in the face of aforementioned developments. The article utilises the "recognition" to refer to the "de jure" principle and therefore this term implies an official and legal independence recognition of the TRNC by the sovereign governments of Russia and Kazakhstan. Drawing from various sources, such as media reports, academic articles, political leaders' speeches and statistics, the paper tries to formulate the official responses of the two respective countries and interpret their stances towards the question in hand. By doing so, this study contributes to the existing literature about the geopolitical importance of TRNC, the complex balance of power relationships of great powers in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and the possible political and economic implications of TRNC's independence recognition for Russia and Kazakhstan.

Keywords: TRNC, OTS, Eastern Mediterranean region (EM), the EU (European Union), independence, recognition.

Introduction

The bicomunal and federal solution, aimed at solving the Cyprus problem, proposed by the Annan Plan has come to the deadlock mainly due to the failure of negotiations between Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus (RC), and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In other words, despite AKP (Justice and Development Party) Turkey's efforts to solve the Cyprus issue by committing to the Annan Plan in exchange for Turkey's membership into the EU and TRNC's positive response in the referenda (conducted for the acceptance of Annan terms), the current RC's negative voting outcome in the referenda prevented the UN efforts for solving this question via Annan Plan (Barış Gülmez & Buhari-Gülmez, 2008). The EU was also blamed in this

¹ Quasi state- the political entity that is not fully sovereign, and not recognized as an independent country on its own and thus as an official state member of the international community.

matter, since it was willing to grant RC an EU membership, with or without a solution on Cyprus, whereas it required Turkey to actively solve this problem before its acceptance into the union (*Kıbrıs'ta Referandum Sonrası Yeni Dönem Hakkında Yapmış Oldukları Basın Toplantısı Metni*, 2004).

Following this, TRNC backed by Turkey, proposed a new version of solution named “two state solution” at the 5+UN informal meeting in April 2021 that secures the inherent sovereign equality and equal international status of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 2024). However, the EU has consistently opposed this proposal and gave its support to the bicomunal, federation version mainly owing to its member’s interests (RC and Greece). According to Turkey, the EU's attempts to obstruct the call of the UN Secretary General and thus hinder the TRNC people to become a member of the international community reveals the EU’s biased support of national interests of the RC and Greece. (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Turkey, on the other hand, is a sole country, which recognized the independence of the TRNC and the main security and economic guarantor of the TRNC because of common ethnicity and culture.

Moreover, the EU membership of RC and Greece and Turkey’s common roots with the TRNC are not the only reasons for their firm current positions. Recently, new oil and gas reserves have been discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean region (EM). This occasion also exacerbated the existing political battle between RC and Turkey, adding the dimension of competition for drilling rights. The international community sees the oil and gas reserves on Cyprus island as a part of the exclusive economic zone of the RC. For that reason, the drilling activities of Turkey on the island have been condemned by the RC and the United Nations (UN). However, Turkey claims that the exploration right has been granted by the TRNC and it is merely trying to defend the rights of the TRNC people (Turner, 2019). This factor of the conflict indicates that Turkey and Cyprus are pursuing their economic interests in the region and that it is another dimension for explaining Turkey and RC’s attempts to maintain their strong presence in the island.

TRNC as a country created in 1983 and recognized by Turkey exclusively, was cut off from the outside world due to its unilateral proclamation of independence following Turkey’s military intervention. Examples can be seen in the absence of direct flights to it, refusal of international organisations to do business with it, and the absence of economic relations with the rest of the world, except with Turkey (Safa, 2024). Nonetheless, the TRNC has been granted an observer status within the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) and the strategic relationship between Turkey and Russia has strengthened recently. Furthermore, Turkey has increased its efforts to get international organisations and countries’ recognition of the TRNC independence. This can be seen in the speech of Foreign Minister of Turkey Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who tweeted: “We will stand with the TRNC everywhere and every time

and step by step the TRNC recognition will happen” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2022). In the light of these events, the paper explores the possible recognition of the TRNC by two particular countries, namely Russia and Kazakhstan. Drawing from this, the paper aims to answer the following research questions: “Is there any possibility that Russia and Kazakhstan would officially recognize the independence of the TRNC and declare it to be a fully sovereign country?” and “If it was the case, what kinds of political and economic implications would this development have for both Russia and Kazakhstan?”. This paper argues that there is a possibility of Russian positive response to Turkey’s call for independence recognition of the TRNC. Moreover, the paper demonstrates that Kazakhstan is less likely to recognize it due to its commitments to international law and multilateral diplomacy.

Methodology

The article relies on the neo-realist approach and employs this theoretical framework to explain the competing national interests and geopolitical competition nested in the EM region. Indeed, the possible consequences of the recognition of the TRNC can pose some threats to the national considerations of Russia and Kazakhstan, since the region is a hotspot for the geopolitical interests of RC, Greece, Turkey, and even the EU. Moreover, newfound and existing oil bases of the EM region (specifically the TRNC territory) demonstrates that Turkey and RC are not only concerned with the political matters, but also their committed pursuit of the national and economic self interests.

The method of content analysis enables scholars to quantify and analyse meanings of and relationships between certain words in a given context (Columbia Public Health, 2023). For that reason, it has been used to identify the subtle purposes and goals of public figures’ speeches and to derive the implications of media reports and conference proceedings. This method allowed the article to predict the possible outcomes of political proceedings by analysing formal speeches and news articles. Moreover, the article has utilised systematic analysis to interpret the findings and contexts of academic papers and to formulate the research questions. Because it includes the tools for analysing the selected articles’ concepts and results (Science Direct, 2023). Finally, chronological analysis has been a good use to identify the sequence of policies and policy outcomes, since it allows us to connect historical events with contemporary events (*Chronological Analysis & Interpretation - the Digital Hub* | Colorado State University, 2023).

Russia’s potential recognition of the TRNC

Russia and the RC have been practising a strong politico-economic partnership for a long time owing to the mutual interests and common Slavic-Orthodox identity. In this regard, the “golden visa” or “the sales of passports” policy programs of RC

have given citizenship or residency to whoever invested more than 2 billion euros into the RC economy (Brillaud, 2019). Because of this policy, in 2018, 40% of Russia's total outward FDI stock was based in Cyprus (United States Department of State, 2023a). However, this solid relationship was weakened due to the European stance of the RC in condemning Russia for its ongoing activities in Ukraine since 2022. Furthermore, the USA has lifted the arms sales embargo on the RC for fiscal year of 2024 mainly thanks to the latter's compliance to the conditions of the former and a rapprochement between them (United States Department of State, 2023b). Here, the RC's strengthening strategic partnership with the US would pose a threat to Russia's military and political presence on the island. This weakening relationship with the RC could trigger Russia's recognition of the TRNC independence. Also, if Russia recognizes it, then it can extend its Tartus Syrian naval base in the Mediterranean Sea to the north and north-west of Cyprus, challenging the presence of NATO and the U.S. military base there. Additionally, it is worthy to mention that Russia could gain an uplifted position in challenging the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean region by recognizing the TRNC, since it has been under the sanctions imposed by the Union due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (Lambert-Deslandes, 2024). Turkey, on the other hand, has recently consolidated its military cooperation with Russia, despite the fact that it is a NATO member country. For example, Turkey was excluded from the United States' F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, since it bought the S-400 air defence system from Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, 2019). These developments showcase the strategic rapprochement between the U.S. and RC and between Russia and Turkey and the changing balance-of-power trajectories in the EM region.


There has been speculation about the possible establishment of the Russian Consulate in the TRNC, which confirms the potential Russian official recognition of this quasi-state. The ambassador of Russia to the RC, Murat Ziyazikov, announced that Russia would open its Consulate in the near future and found strong support from the side of the TRNC President Ersin Tatar (KKTC Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 2023a). According to the TRNC, this step is a win-win game both for Russia and the TRNC and a necessary step because of the growing presence of the Russian population in the TRNC (KKTC Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 2023b). In addition, Moscow has been in talks with both TRNC and Ankara on the possible flight path- direct flights between Russia and the TRNC. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also expressed that he would be "pleased" if direct flights were put in place (Sofuoglu, 2022).

Turkey, as a single supporter and guarantor of the TRNC, has been actively calling upon the international community to recognize the sovereignty of this quasi-state. It can be seen in the recent speech of the Turkish President during the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, which called on countries to

recognize the TRNC and establish diplomatic, political and economic relations (*Turkish President Erdogan Urges International Community to Recognize Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, n.d.-b). Considering Turkey's efforts, this article looks at the consolidating relationship between Turkey and Russia to further demonstrate that Russia's recognition of the TRNC is plausible.


The economic interactions between Turkey and Russia have witnessed excessive levels of growth in the last couple of years. This upward trend was caused as a result of the Western sanctions imposed against Russia and subsequent Russia's turn to Turkey as an alternative to its former trading western partners. Indeed, Turkey, in turn, has not supported these sanctions and continued increasing its trade volume with Russia. This can be observed in the drastic increase of about 51% in Russia's exports to Turkey from 2021 to 2022. Also, the volume of all exports from Russia during the 9 months of 2024 contributed \$32.5 billion (Table 1). Turning to Turkey's exports to Russia, it gradually surged by 52,3% (between 2021-2023) and hit the top of \$10.9 billion (Table 2). It should also be mentioned that Russians have become the top foreign buyers of Turkish homes, since it opposed the sanctions and opened its door to Russian migrants and tourists (Hayatsever, 2024).

Table 1. The trends in the overall trade volume between Turkey and Russia



Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri, 2024

Table 2. The developments in terms of the trade exchange between Turkey and Russia



Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri, 2024

Turkey, a first NATO country doing so, has officially applied for the membership of BRICS (an informal grouping of countries mainly concerned with investment and trade relations) on 2 September, 2024, during the BRICS Summit in Russia (English, 2024). Even though it is less credible that Turkey would join the grouping, it is worth explaining Turkey's prime interests behind joining mainly Russian dominated and allegedly the balancing grouping against the West in the international system. As mentioned earlier, Turkey's long-term efforts to join the EU as a member were not successful and the rapprochement between the RC and the U.S. have played a significant role in Turkey's bid for BRICS. In other words, it is seeking alternative partners to strengthen its position in the EM region and Russia, which has always had substantial interests in the region, can be the most suitable alternative. This implies that Turkey might use Russia to solve its disputes and problems with the EU, particularly concerning TRNC. However, this application could be merely because of an excessively increasing trade relationship with Russia. All in all, this case might specify the fact that the question of TRNC can be brought to the discussion table by Turkey soon and Russia would probably recognise its

independence in the wake of long-lasting and comprehensive relationships with Turkey.

Kazakhstan's possible response to the recognition call

The TRNC has first been an observer member within the Turkey-initiated Economic Cooperation Organisation in 2012 along with other institutions, such as Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States and International Energy Charter (Economic Cooperation Organization). Some current participant countries of the OTS, including Kazakhstan, are full members of this organisation too. In addition to this, the OTS granted TRNC an observer status/member during the ninth summit held on 11 November 2022 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan (“Samarkand Declaration of the Ninth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States,” 2022). Furthermore, Ersin Tatar, President of the TRNC participated in the Extraordinary Summit of the Organization of Turkic States along with other heads of states, including Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of Kazakhstan (“Ankara Declaration of the Extraordinary Summit of the Organization of Turkic States,” 2023). Moreover, the tenth official summit's document, which was held in Astana, Kazakhstan, the TRNC has been mentioned as an integral part of the Turkic World, at Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA), and the Union of Turkic Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TCCI) (“Declaration of the Tenth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States,” 2023). However, no representative of the TRNC participated in this summit, which was held on 3 November 2023 and the EU mentioned that it took note about this, particularly because of its concerns about Kazakhstan's possible recognition of this quasi-state, following “observer status” (Parliamentary Question, European Parliament). This summit, hosted by Kazakhstan and included no representative of TRNC, pointed out that Kazakhstan's recognition of TRNC in the near future is implausible. Also, regarding this, the EU Parliament even submitted a parliamentary question labelled as “Kazakhstan's almost-recognition of the occupied territories of Cyprus to the Commission”. There, it stated that Turkey together with Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Hungary had accepted the so-called “TRNC” as an observer, indirectly recognising this political construct as a state entity and attempting to put it on an equal footing with any recognised state (Fourlas, 2024). This submitted question indicates that the Commission was tasked to consider this issue and undertake possible actions to prevent the members of the OTS, especially Kazakhstan, from recognizing TRNC. Following this, Ersin Tatar also attended the Informal Summit of the OTS Heads of State in Azerbaijan and said that with the membership of TRNC, the gateway between the Turkic world and the Mediterranean has been constructed (*Presidency of TRNC - President Ersin Tatar Addresses the Organisation of Turkic States Summit in Shusha, Azerbaijan, 2024*). Drawing from these events and non-participation of TRNC in Astana Summit, the

conclusion can be made that TRNC can participate in summits being held in Turkey and Azerbaijan, but not in Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan. However, the recent visit of Ersin Tatar to Kyrgyzstan to participate in the dinner organised for the heads of state and government has broken the aforementioned tendency (*Presidency of TRNC - President Ersin Tatar Participates in the Dinner Hosted in Honour of the Heads of State and Government in Kyrgyzstan, 2024*). This recent development showcases that OTS members started to put TRNC on an equal status with other internationally recognised political entities.

Another factor that validates the argument that Kazakhstan's recognition of TRNC is less plausible is a comprehensive strategic partnership between the EU and Kazakhstan. Indeed, the EU is Kazakhstan's greatest trading partner, as the importer of 37% of total Kazakh exports and representor of 27.9% of the country's total trade (*EU Trade Relations with Kazakhstan, 2024a*). Furthermore, the EU is the largest foreign direct investor in Kazakhstan, contributing to Kazakhstan's digitalization, infrastructure and economic development. For instance, it provided €54.8 billion of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Kazakhstan in 2022 alone (*EU Trade Relations with Kazakhstan, 2024b*). In light of these facts, it appears that Kazakhstan would face devastating economic and political consequences, in the case it had recognised the TRNC independence against the official stance of the EU on the Cyprus issue. It is less feasible that Kazakhstan would take such risks, damaging its national interests, even in the face of its active involvement in the OTS activities.

Moreover, Kazakhstan has intensified a comprehensive relationship with the RC, noticeably in the fields of business and tourism. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Konstantinos Kombos mentioned that he would sign together with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Roman Vassilenko, a memorandum of cooperation in the tourism field. Also, according to Mr. Kombos, this initiative would facilitate the establishment of direct flights between two countries (*The Cooperation Possibilities for Cyprus and Kazakhstan Are Enormous, 2023*). Additionally, more than 390 companies with RC's capital have been registered in Kazakhstan by 1 January of 2024 (Bulatkulova, 2024a). Moreover, the RC is intended to open its official diplomatic mission in Astana and this plan has been met with a huge support and encouragement by the Kazakhstani side. In terms of political relations, during the meeting with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on 25 March 2024, in Astana, Mr. Kombos restated RC's support for the bi-communal federation solution model on the Cyprus issue. And he thanked Kazakhstan for its commitments to the international laws of "territorial integrity" and "sovereignty", and to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (Bulatkulova, 2024b). Nonetheless, it is worthy to mention that Kazakhstan has started business interactions with the TRNC. Examples can be seen in the Kazakhstan Business Women Cooperation Association delegation's visit to the TRNC and meeting with

Ersin Tatar, where he, one more time, asserted that the TRNC was the door of the Turkish world to the EM region (Cyprus & Cyprus, 2024).

Since Kazakhstan has not recognised any of the Russian recognised quasi states, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia so far despite the fact that Russia is the biggest partner of Kazakhstan in terms of imports and one of the most important strategic partners, it is logical to conclude that it would not also recognise Turkey recognised TRNC. However, it is considerable to not forget that none of the Russian recognised quasi states has gained an observer status/member within Russian dominated institutions, such as Eurasian Economic Union (EEC) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), to which Kazakhstan is a full member. Whereas, Turkey recognised TRNC as having acquired that status within Turkey dominated OTS.

Conclusion

This study has aimed to analyse Russia and Kazakhstan's possibility of independence recognition of the TRNC in the face of recent developments' speculations. In doing so it has emphasised the importance of studying this question by considering the acquisition of the TRNC an "observer status" within the OTS and enhancing strategic partnership between Russia and Turkey.

It has concluded that Russia is more likely to recognise the TRNC due to its increasing military and economic partnership with Turkey, deteriorating relationship with the RC, the opening of new geopolitical opportunities to challenge Western dominance in the EM region, Turkey's bid for the membership of BRICS, speculations about the opening of Russian Consulate in the TRNC and the establishment of direct flights between Russia and the TRNC. However, considering the long-lasting and still strong cooperation between the RC and Russia and volatile historical relationships between Turkey and Russia, it is considerable to remember that Russia's current support for the TRNC might be conditional and subject to change. This possibility leaves a scope for further analytical research on this topic.

Moreover, the article has argued that Kazakhstan is less likely to officially recognise the TRNC, since it would worsen strategic relations with the EU. Notwithstanding TRNC's active participation in the OTS activities, Kazakhstan has not recognised any Russian quasi states because of its commitments to principles of "territorial integrity" and "sovereignty". TRNC's observer status within the OTS and Kazakh business delegation's visit to the TRNC might simply indicate Kazakhstan's active exercise of "multivector diplomacy".

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Content Analysis of President Tokayev’s Annual Addresses to the People of Kazakhstan

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Abstract

This paper is dedicated to a detailed analysis of President Tokayev's annual addresses to the people of the Republic of Kazakhstan, aiming to identify the key themes, frequently recurring rhetoric in each address, as well as shifts in emphasis over time. The research employs a quantitative content analysis of President Tokayev's addresses from 2019 to the present day. Python programming language was used to conduct the quantitative content analysis of seven presidential addresses delivered on the following dates: September 2, 2019; September 1, 2020; September 1, 2021; March 16, 2022; September 1, 2022; September 1, 2023; and September 2, 2024. This article, therefore, provides a comprehensive analysis of all the presidential addresses delivered by Tokayev since his election as President up to the current period. To identify evolving points of emphasis, the study also employs a comparative analysis method. The texts of the presidential addresses were obtained from the official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The findings of this study indicate that Tokayev consistently adheres to ideas focused on a state-centric vision and the concept of a Just Kazakhstan. The practical and academic value of this work lies in demonstrating the potential of quantitative content analysis for examining political leaders' speeches — a method that, despite its advantages, remains underutilised in political discourse studies.

Keywords: Content analysis, quantitative analysis, comparative analysis, Presidential address, President Tokayev, Kazakhstan, Just Kazakhstan.

Introduction

In the contemporary world most governments have representational democracy, meaning that people cannot interact with public policy directly (Van Der Velden & Loecherbach, 2022). General public hardly communicates with politics, but learn about it through the media (Van Der Velden & Loecherbach, 2022). Politicians present themselves to the masses through media and this phenomenon is

called mediatization of politics (Strömbäck and Esser, 2014). This term described by Strömbäck and Esser (2014) in their work “Mediatization of politics: transforming democracies and reshaping politics” explains how media has increased its influence and dominate the politics. That makes political communication one of the most important tools in terms of developing political interests, its entry into force, and justification of decision-making (Donges and Jarren, 2017, as cited in Blassnig, 2023). Political communication, in the case of self-presentation, could be a strong means to affect public policy and their picture in front of the public.

Nursultan Nazarbayev was the President of Kazakhstan till March 19, 2019, when he terminated his powers as the current President ahead of schedule. Then, as Senate Chairman, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev took up the position of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2019 (Nazarbayev, 2019). During his duties between 2019-2024, he has addressed to the people of Kazakhstan 7 presidential messages. Presidential message is an annual address of the President to the people of Kazakhstan, dedicated to the situation in the country and the main directions of domestic and foreign policy (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2022). Presidential messages are a part of this research that is oriented on content analysis of President Tokayev since 2019 to the present days.

In this research, the method of quantitative content analysis was employed to examine the speeches of President Tokayev in order to identify key trends contained in his political rhetoric. This approach allows for a systematic analysis of the content of the speeches, revealing the most frequently addressed topics and tracking the dynamics of changes in priorities that represent the political climate. The research questions of this study is: what policy orientation does President Tokayev adhere to based on the analysis of his speeches. We argue that President Tokayev sticks to state-centred policy with an economic approach from the beginning of his Presidential duties to the present days with a shift to the Just Kazakhstan rhetoric after the January events in 2022.

Literature review

In the course of our research, we reviewed the works of several authors who conducted studies in the field of political communication, self-presentation, and employed quantitative methods of content analysis. Analysis of political communication has long roots that lead to the ancient time of Aristotle, who has defined three types of political actors’ speeches: Ethos, Pathos, and Logos (Sheafer et al. 2014, as cited in Blassnig, 2023).

Blassnig (2023) provides an analysis of political actors' self-presentation in the field of political communication. The study highlights how political figures strategically shape their public image using various tools, including traditional media, social media platforms, and direct communication methods such as speeches

and press releases. The research particularly emphasises content analysis as a dominant methodological approach in studying political self-presentation, noting its evolution from classical rhetorical studies to contemporary computational methods. This work is highly relevant for researchers conducting content analysis of political speeches, as it provides a solid theoretical framework and methodological insights into the study of self-presentation strategies in political discourse.

Nur et al. (2024) conduct an in-depth analysis of deixis in political discourse, focusing on the speeches of Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin. The study applies Yule's (1996, as cited in Nur et al., 2024) theory of deixis within a pragmatic framework, examining how political figures use person, spatial, and temporal deixis to construct meaning and engage with their audiences. Using a qualitative content analysis approach, the authors categorise deixis elements in speech texts and explore their significance in shaping political narratives. This research contributes to the field of political pragmatics by demonstrating how deixis functions as a rhetorical tool in political communication. The study also underscores the role of deixis in strategic identity construction, persuasion, and audience alignment in political discourse. These findings are particularly relevant for scholars analysing political speeches, rhetorical strategies, and discourse in conflict settings, providing insights into the linguistic mechanisms that shape political narratives.

Smagulov, Santaeva, and Bulanov (2017) present a quantitative content analysis of the presidential addresses of Kazakhstan delivered between 1998 and 2012, covering the period between the adoption of Strategy-2030 and Strategy-2050. The study identifies important political, economic, and social concerns across time by analyzing 15 of President Nursultan Nazarbayev's yearly speeches. The authors use WordStat and QDA Miner software to measure the frequency of terms and theme shifts in presidential rhetoric. They also use historical and comparative methodologies, content analysis, and a systematic approach. This study is significant to academics studying political discourse and communication because it sheds light on how presidential rhetoric affects public expectations, policy direction, and national identity.

Having reviewed the relevant literature, we have concluded that both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis are widely applied in the study of political communication. However, the use of content analysis in this field is not as prevalent. Furthermore, the research area lacks sufficient studies and analyses of the political self-presentation of the current President of Kazakhstan, Tokayev. The practical and academic value of this work lies in demonstrating the potential of quantitative content analysis for examining political leaders' speeches — a method that, despite its advantages, remains underutilized in political discourse studies.

Methodology

To conduct our research, we have decided to choose a method of content analysis with a quantitative approach and provide comparative analysis of results of content analysis. The choice of methods of this research is conditioned by purposes, namely to analyse Presidential addresses, identify trends that the President is adhered to through years, and define reasons for these policies. To identify the main ideas of these messages we have to analyse a big amount of data and in these terms the most capable method that can solve this question is quantitative content analysis (Neuendorf, 2017). Content analysis is widely continually used in the sociology, corporate sphere, psychology (Neuendorf, 2017) and analysis of speeches, presentations, and articles in mass media (Pashinyan, 2012) but it is underrated and lacks experience in analysis of political communication. In terms of deficiency of usage content analysis method in socio-political research our work is valuable for this field.

The dataset used in this study can be found online on the official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (<https://www.akorda.kz/ru>), and it contains all seven President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's addresses from 2019 to 2024 yy. To continue, the following features are used in this analysis:

1. Text – the context of the address
2. Date (GMT+5) – the date of the President's address in live broadcast

The first step in dataset processing was to read the file that contains the context of the address. After importing the dataset, its context (text) is extracted. During the preprocessing stage, certain noise in data that could wrongly affect the analysis, was removed. Before removing unnecessary words, the whole text was converted to lowercase. Some of the things that were removed are common Russian stopwords (“конечно”, “весь”, etc), punctuation marks (“.”, “,”, “?”,”!”, “:”, “;”, ...). Words consisting of alphabetic characters were left and grouped together different inflected forms of the same word.

In this paper, both data preprocessing and processing is implemented using Python programming language. More specifically, Python libraries used for these purposes are:

1. spacy – for working with text data and natural language processing.
2. collections (Counts) – to count the frequency of the elements.
3. seaborn, pandas and matplotlib – for data visualisation and analysis.

After the dataset preprocessing, the next step was to calculate the frequency of words and sort them by decreasing order. After that, tables were created with their top 30 words for each of the addresses separately. Based on these tables, a Document Term Matrix (DTM) is created, where each row represents a word and each column represents a document. The "Average" column has been added, showing the average

value of the word frequency in all documents. The cells in the matrix were colored depending on the frequency of the word.

After collecting all the data, a mixed analysis of each address is conducted. First, the context in which the President addressed the nation is examined, followed by the identification of the most prominent features of each address.

Limitation and outlook

The basis of secondary data for our research include transcripts of President Tokayev's addresses sourced from the official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan akorda.kz in Russian language. Tokayev delivers his addresses in a mix of Kazakh and Russian languages. Due to technical limitations, we have decided to use Russian-language transcripts as the foundation, because of the availability of more comprehensive databases for conducting content analysis. Details concerning the technical aspects of the quantitative analysis are provided in the project's methodology section.

The first address on September 2, 2019: Constructive Public Dialogue – The Foundation of Stability and Prosperity of Kazakhstan

In 2019 Nazarbayev resigned his Presidential duties before the schedule, then Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as Senate Chairman took the position of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on March 19, 2019 (Nazarbayev, 2019). In Summer 2019 President Tokayev conducted snap presidential elections on June 9, 2019 (Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan, 2019) to prove that people of Kazakhstan recognize him as a rightful President of Kazakhstan.

Graph 1 illustrates the most frequently used words in the first message that Tokayev addressed to the people of the Republic Kazakhstan as the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Several words will be given attention as the first two most frequent words are “year” and “government” because they play a *functional* role. Looking ahead we should mention that the words “year” and “government” will take one of the first places in the top-30 frequently used words repeatedly through all of these messages and there is a reason for this pattern. President Tokayev in his messages addresses not only the people of Kazakhstan but to the government too and he often summarises past years and talks about the future plans. As we explained this pattern authors will not mention it while explaining other Presidential messages.


Exploring the graph 1 you can notice that words that entered the top-30 frequently used words in the Presidential message in 2019 can be related to several themes: state-centred rhetoric and economic oriented.

Words that tell us about state-centred rhetoric in the address of the President Tokayev are: country, citizen, state, state (adj.), national. This means that reforms, changes, and projects are aimed to develop Kazakhstan's economy and its citizens'

well-being. About the economic approach of development, we can know by a lot of words in the message: development, job, business, tenge, means, economy.

The word “social” entered the top-5 words and tells that the President does care about social parts of state’s life too and solve problems in this field with an economic approach. Other words as question, problem, new, level, system, solution, measure, target, entrust, promotion, task, next, quality, support, and time could be considered as “functional words” and used in terms of delegation authority, assignments for the government, and voicing statistics related to economic and social indexes.

Graph 1: Frequently used words in Presidential message on September 2, 2019



Source: Authors


The second address on September 1, 2020: Kazakhstan in the New Reality: Time for Action

The World Health Organization first learned about Coronavirus (COVID-19) on December 31, 2019 (n.y.a). Then, on March 13, 2020, COVID-19 pandemic came

to Kazakhstan and President Tokayev immediately issued a decree declaring a state of emergency in the country on March 15, 2020, in terms of COVID-19 epidemic (Tokayev, 2019). This pandemic has affected the global economic and international healthcare policy (The World Health Organization n.y.b) and certainly affected Kazakhstan too.

The graph 2 illustrates the most often used words in Presidential message addressed on September 1, 2020. In this address we can highlight the following topics: state-centrism and socially oriented policy (we will call it “Just Kazakhstan rhetoric” later). Such words as citizen, state, state (adj.), country, national, and Kazakhstan demonstrate continued state-centred rhetoric. In 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic Tokayev’s address acquired a social character that is proved by presence of the following words: citizen, society, human, social. The word “human” appears at the top for the first time that emphasises socially oriented policy and importance of caring for people due to the agenda of this address.

Graph 2: Frequently used words in Presidential message on September 1, 2020




Source: Authors

The third address on September 1, 2021: Unity of the People and Systemic Reforms – A Strong Foundation for the Prosperity of the Country

The 2021 address titled "Unity of the People and Systemic Reforms – A Solid Foundation for the Prosperity of the Country" emphasizes the importance of societal unity and systemic reforms. Frequently used words such as "citizen", "state", "national", and "development" highlight the continued focus on state-centric rhetoric. Additionally, the presence of words like "new", "level", "system", and "solution" indicates an orientation toward modernization and improvement of governance structures.

Graph 3: Frequently used words in Presidential message on September 1, 2021



Source: Authors


The fourth address on March 16, 2022: New Kazakhstan: A Path of Renewal and Modernization

The President addresses the people of Kazakhstan once a year (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2022) but the message on March 16, 2022 was

addressed out of schedule because of riots that happened in January 2022 (Zakon.kz, 2023). The unrest started in Mangystau district when people were resented by the rise in gas prices. The scale of this unrest has rapidly spread throughout the country and turned into riots in Almaty city. The protesters' demands were initially focused on decreasing gas prices but later became politically motivated with demands to send the government into resignation (Zakon.kz, 2023). These events forced an emergency action from the President of Kazakhstan and firstly he accepted and agreed to the demands of the protesters and sent the government into resignation (Tokayev 2022a). However, the continued riots had begun to pose a threat to civilians and Kazakhstan's statehood and Tokayev declared state of emergency in Kazakhstan (2022b, 2022c, 2022d, 2022e, 2022f, 2022g, 2022h, 2022i, 2022j, 2022k, 2022l, 2022m, 2022n, 2022o, 2022p, 2022q, 2022r). In this regard, this message is significantly different from the previous and future ones.

The first difference that can be noticed is that the word "year" did not take the first place in the frequently mentioned words in this message, unlike the previous ones because this message was not addressed traditionally and addressed out of the schedule. On the graph 4 you can see that on this address such words as “country”, “Kazakhstan”, “citizen”, and “state” took high positions in the top-list that say about concerns on national security and ongoing state-centred policy. Following words such as “people”, “society”, “human”, “public” tell us about concerns about society. Several words such as “region”, “city”, and “local” appeared because January disorder was mostly located in certain territories starting unrest in Mangystau district dramatically escalated in Almaty and continued expansion in other regions (Zakon.kz 2023).

Graph 4: Frequently used words in Presidential message on March 16, 2022




Source: Authors

The fifth address on September 1, 2022: A Just State. A United Nation. A Prosperous Society.

This message was the second of its kind in 2022. In this regard, it can be noted that the word “year” traditionally occupies the first position in the most frequently used words in the Presidential message on September 1, 2022, as shown in Graph 5. The events of January of the same year inevitably had consequences, reinforcing the state-centred policy, which is evidenced by the presence of the following words in the top rankings: “state”, “country”, “citizen”, “state (adj.)”, “Kazakhstan”, and “national.” Moreover, the rhetoric of Just Kazakhstan first appearing in this address will continue in the following ones.

Graph 5: Frequently used words in Presidential message on September 1, 2022




Source: Authors

The sixth address on September 1, 2023: The Economic Course of a Just Kazakhstan

In 2023, Kazakhstan's GDP grew by 4.9% compared to the previous year (*Bureau of National Statistics, 2023*). The graph 6 shows the most frequently used words in the address on September 1, 2023 and underscores the strong economic approach of this message. The 2023 address highlights economic growth and improving living conditions. Frequently used words such as "economy", "economic", "development", "job", "project", "industry", "domestic", "market", "business" and "state" illustrate a focus on economic stability and prosperity. The presence of "citizen", "new", and "system" indicates a continuation of reformist policies and modernization efforts. There is a clear emphasis on initiatives aimed at ensuring social and economic stability. Moreover, this address sticks to continuing Just Kazakhstan rhetoric relying on economic growth and stability.

Graph 6: Frequently used words in Presidential message on September 1, 2023




Source: Authors

The sixth address on September 2, 2024: A Just Kazakhstan: Rule of Law, Economic Growth, Public Optimism

The last address in 2024 maintains a focus on justice and sustainable development that could be notable with graph 7 that illustrates the most frequently used words in the address on September 2, 2024. Frequently mentioned words like "citizen", "Kazakhstan", "state", "new", "state (adj.)", "law", "society", "human", and "reform" highlight a continued emphasis on the country's development through modernization and reform with Just Kazakhstan rhetoric. The appearance of "law" underscores the importance of strengthening the legal foundation to support institutional progress. Economic approach of development is noticeable with the following words: "economy", "job", "business", "means". Word "akim" (mayor position in Kazakhstan) first appeared at the top of the most frequently used words indicating an increased emphasis on local governance to promote better socio-economic development in the regions.

Graph 7: Frequently used words in Presidential message on September 2, 2024



Source: Authors

Discussion

There is a heat map 1 that illustrates the frequency of words that we have found interesting to review through all of the addresses from 2019 to 2024.

In the annual addresses, the word "year" consistently ranks first on the list, as these addresses are delivered annually and serve the purpose of summarising the past year and outlining plans for the future. The only exception occurred in the address of 16 March 2022, which was extraordinary and did not aim to summarise the previous year.

The second most frequently mentioned word is "country," reflecting President Tokayev's state-centred policy. This word appeared most often in the March 2022 address, which plays a crucial role in reflecting on the January 2022 events—an event of significant importance for Kazakhstan and its independence.

The third most frequently mentioned word is "citizen," further indicating the state-centred policy and the focus on the population and citizens of Kazakhstan,

emphasising the importance of the concepts of a Just Kazakhstan and a Listening State.

Ranking fourth in frequency is the word "government." Its prominence is linked to the fact that annual addresses aim to summarise the past year, plan for the future, and assign tasks to the government. This word consistently appears among the most frequently mentioned, except in the March 2022 address. As noted earlier, this address differs significantly from others, as it was not an annual one, and no government directives for the following year were issued.

The word "Kazakhstan" ranks sixth among the most frequently mentioned words, further illustrating President Tokayev's state-centred policy. It is particularly prominent in the address dedicated to the January events, as this tragedy represents a pivotal moment in the modern history of Kazakhstan's statehood.

The frequency of the word "society" was notably heightened during periods of crisis, specifically in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic and in March 2022 following the January events. A similar pattern can be observed for the term "person," which ranked among the top 30 most frequently mentioned words in 2020, 2022, and 2024, reflecting the rhetoric of a Just Kazakhstan.

Heat map 1: Frequency of selected words in Presidential messages from 2019 to 2024



Source: Authors

Conclusion

In conclusion, quantitative content analysis allowed us to identify the political trends of President Tokayev by examining his annual addresses to the people of Kazakhstan from 2019 to 2024. We analysed the frequency of words in each of the seven addresses, determined the possible reasons behind the content analysis results, and identified recurring trends over the years. This analysis revealed that President Tokayev adheres to a state-centred policy with an economic focus. Following the January 2022 events, the concept of a Just Kazakhstan and a "Listening State" has been further developed, emphasizing the value of individuals and citizens, upholding the principles of the rule of law, and maintaining a commitment to socio-economic development and stability.

For further research on political communication in Kazakhstan, including President Tokayev's addresses, we recommend to scholars utilize the following types of analysis: daxis analysis, count total amount of words in addresses, sentiment analysis, discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis, and narrative analysis.

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Understanding Western Concerns about Sanction Evasion by Russia via Kazakhstan

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Abstract

This study examines the growing concerns of Western countries regarding Russia's circumvention of sanctions through Kazakhstan. The central research question focuses on analysing how trade relations between Kazakhstan and Russia have changed during the sanctions. Additionally, the paper explores how Russia's use of Kazakhstan as a conduit to bypass sanctions has impacted its diplomatic relations with Western nations. The study observes the economic and political relationships between Russia and Kazakhstan from 2019 by 2024 as a case example. It employs theories of international trade and economic sanctions to analyse potential mechanisms for sanctions evasion. Data on trade and financial flows between Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as official documents and statements from both governments, are utilized to provide insights.

The methodology includes secondary data analysis and case study related to sanctions evasion, incorporating the reactions of Western countries to these incidents. The findings of this study aim to shed light on how Kazakhstan may be implicated in sanctions circumvention and to offer recommendations for strengthening controls and preventing such practices. The results will also contribute to a better understanding of how to anticipate and address loopholes in sanctions enforcement, enhance the effectiveness of sanctions, and promote international security and stability from the perspective of Western countries.

Keywords: sanctions circumvention, Kazakhstan, Russia, Western concerns, economic relations, sanctions enforcement, diplomatic relations.

Introduction

It is no secret that after the start of Russia's military actions towards Ukraine from 2022, and even earlier in 2014, the West introduced a huge number of sanctions (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014). Kazakhstan also has its place in this situation, and not the small one. Unfortunately, precisely because of the place this country has, the Kazakh government cannot be confident in future relations with other countries, especially Western ones. To understand why the West is недоволен хитростью России and how this will affect Kazakhstan, firstly, we need to understand what sanctions are, how they work, and secondly understand кто такие the "West" is, and whether they have so much power. Understanding the system plays an important role in finding a problem, and subsequently in finding a solution to this problem.

What are sanctions? According to the Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.), a sanction is “an official order, such as the stopping of trade, that is taken against a country in order to make it obey international law”. Another definition of sanctions was given by Putz (2023). She says that sanctions are a tool used in international relations to try and force a country to change its behaviour. The aim is political, not economic. This distinction emphasizes that while sanctions have economic impact, their initial goal is to achieve political compliance without resorting to military force. In addition to stopping trade, countries imposing sanctions can also use asset freezes, visa bans, arms embargoes, restrictions on access to financial markets (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014). There are two mechanisms by which sanctions work: the “stick” approach and the “elite coercion” approach (Portela & Kluge, 2022). In short, the stick approach aims to inflict significant economic suffering on the population of the target country, thereby inducing citizens to put pressure on their government. In contrast, the “elite coercion” approach has a different target. As the name suggests, powerful elites within a country are targeted, making it more difficult for them to benefit financially from their association with the ruling regime (Portela & Kluge, 2022). Deducing the specific effects of sanctions is difficult because they often coincide with other economic difficulties. For example, sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 have been accompanied by a significant drop in oil prices and a depreciation in the value of the ruble, making it difficult to attribute economic changes solely to sanctions (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014).

Who is the West? In the context of this work, the term “West” refers to the set of countries that are located from the west to Kazakhstan. The main players in the West are the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU). Other authors, for example, as McNeill (1997) notes, that the West includes not only the US and the EU but also other democracies that are committed to the rule of law, human rights and market economics. These countries often act together in the international arena, which gives them advantages and strength. They do this to shape and maintain global norms and standards, especially in the context of international politics and security. The term "West" is increasingly seen as a separate entity in contrast to Russia and its allies, especially China (Assenova et al., 2023; Dreyer & Popescu, 2014; Dumoilin, 2023; Jones, 2023; Moens et al., 2023). The war in Ukraine has deepened the geopolitical division between these blocs, forcing countries to choose sides. Kazakhstan, a Central Asian country that shares borders with both sides, finds itself in a difficult position. Additional to this is the multi-vector policy of Kazakhstan, which is “a diplomatic strategy based on building relations with the international community in general and with the neighbouring states in particular on a pragmatic and balanced basis”, also played a role in the entire current situation (Yuneman, 2023).

The purpose of this work is to study and analyse the concerns of Western countries, in particular the USA and the EU, about Russia circumventing sanctions through Kazakhstan. The study aims to assess the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of international policy and understand the broader implications of Kazakhstan's role in this process for its diplomatic relations with Western countries. Ultimately, the main goal is to contribute to the broader discourse on international sanctions, economic policy, and global diplomacy, offering insights for policymakers and researchers on how to improve the effectiveness of sanctions and overcome the challenges associated with circumventing them.

For a more accurate analysis of the problem, the study was divided into two parts, each answering a specific question. The first part answers the question "What are the concerns of the West and how do they affect the effectiveness of sanctions?" She studies the problems of Western countries and their concerns about Russia circumventing sanctions through Kazakhstan. The second part answers the question "How has Kazakhstan's role in circumventing sanctions affected its diplomatic relations with the West?" It analyses how these concerns affect Kazakhstan's diplomatic relations with Western countries. The study provides a detailed understanding of Western concerns, their impact on sanctions and implications for Kazakhstan.

Understanding Western concerns about Russian sanction evasion via Kazakhstan involves examining multiple facets of their economic and political relationship. Kazakhstan's deep economic ties with Russia, coupled with certain vulnerabilities, make it a key route for Moscow to circumvent Western sanctions.

One critical aspect is Kazakhstan's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with Russia, which results in open borders and free trade (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023; Jones, 2023; Putz, 2023). This arrangement complicates efforts to monitor and control the flow of goods. The situation is further exacerbated by Russia's legalization of "parallel imports," which allows goods to be imported without the trademark holder's permission (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023; Putz, 2023). This has led to unusual increases in exports from Kazakhstan to Russia, particularly in sectors like washing machines, which may be listed as dual-use items due to some system items that can be used to create weapons. Those cases indicate the movement of sanctioned goods (Putz, 2023). Corruption within Kazakhstan further undermines its ability to enforce sanctions effectively. Russian money transfers services in Kazakhstan make it easy and cheap to transfer a huge amount of rubles, which could be used to buy sanctioned goods. Large Russian marketplaces, such as OZON, investing in Kazakhstan's logistics infrastructure, raise further concerns about their role in facilitating the movement of goods to Russia (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023).

Western officials have expressed concerns that Kazakhstan's actions, even if unintended, could be exploited by Russia to equip its military (Chazan, et. al., 2023). This understanding is critical as it highlights the central argument that Kazakhstan's deep economic ties with Russia, coupled with certain vulnerabilities, make it a key route for Moscow to circumvent Western sanctions. The US has been actively warning European allies and providing detailed information on the methods Russia is using to evade sanctions, particularly the acquisition of dual-use goods. This information sharing includes identifying "red flags" for potential sanction evasion, such as falsified documents, concealed ties to Russia, and frequent changes to end users or payees (Chazan, et. al., 2023). While sources acknowledge Kazakhstan's efforts to curb sanctions evasion, like the crackdown on parallel imports in 2023 (Putz, 2023), they also express concerns about the country's capacity and political will to address this issue in an effective way (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023; Dumoulin, 2023).

The potential for retaliation from Russia, particularly targeting Kazakhstan's economy and political stability, complicates Astana's ability to take decisive action (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023). For example, Russia could suspend the operation of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a critical export route for Kazakhstan's vulnerability to Russian pressure (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023; Jones, 2023). Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova (2023) also stress the need for Kazakhstan to strengthen its statehood systematically by diversifying its economy, transportation infrastructure, and information environment to reduce this vulnerability. Kazakhstan's role as a backdoor for Russia to access battlefield goods, particularly from China, is a growing concern for the West, prompting calls for stronger action, including secondary sanctions (Leong & Lin, 2024). However, the EU has been cautious about imposing such measures on significant trade partners like Kazakhstan due to potential economic and political repercussions (Moens, et. al., 2023). Despite these concerns, the EU has been engaging with Kazakhstan to address sanctions evasion while seeking to preserve the broader bilateral trade relationship (Putz, 2023). Thus, the West faces a delicate balancing act: curbing the flow of goods aiding Russia's war effort without alienating a key partner in Central Asia and inadvertently pushing it closer to Russia or China.

Literature review

The concerns of Western countries about circumventing sanctions through Kazakhstan are very diverse and multi-layered. The US has expressed concerns to its allies in Europe about Russia's efforts to circumvent sanctions, particularly through the acquisition of dual-use items such as optics, electronic components and voltage and power measurement equipment (Chazan, 2023). The US has also warned allies about other methods Russia is using to conceal its involvement in sanctions

evasion. Such as falsification of transport documents, concealment of end users and frequent change of payers (Chazan, 2023). At the same time, the United States has publicly acknowledged that some countries opposed to the war in Ukraine are not taking sufficient measures to prevent their companies and banks from being used to obtain military equipment (Chazan, 2023). Although Kazakhstan is not mentioned in these US statements, they still imply concern for countries with close economic ties to Russia.

Chazan also mentions in his work that Central Asia is seen as an important channel for circumventing sanctions. The US and its G7 partners are focused on closing sanctions loopholes and are making efforts to target countries suspected of exporting technology and equipment to Russia. These countries include Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states (2023). The EU has also expressed concern about sanctions circumvention. A senior EU diplomat has proposed expanding the criteria for restrictions to further limit Russia's ability to finance war (Moens, et. al., 2023). As part of these efforts, EU Special Envoy for Sanctions David O'Sullivan visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to discuss sanctions circumvention (Chazan 2023). The EU has also proposed a measure to restrict the sale of sensitive goods by European companies to countries neighboring Russia if there is evidence of circumvention (Moens, et. al., 2023). However, the proposal faces opposition from some EU countries concerned about the potential impact on trade with other countries. Such as China and Türkiye (Chazan, 2023; Moens et al., 2023).

Kazakhstan plays a central role in circumventing sanctions. Although China and Türkiye are also significant players in this process, the EU's initial focus is on Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Moens, et. al., 2023). Under the new EU proposal, these countries are seen as the most likely first targets due to their close ties to Russia and role in the transit of goods (Chazan, 2023). One of the researchers in her work, Putz, mentioned that in February 2024, the United States imposed sanctions against two companies in Kazakhstan for supporting Russia's military efforts. These companies were registered after the start of the war, highlighting concerns about possible sanctions evasion (2024).

Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova (2023) identified several ways to circumvent sanctions. First, parallel imports are one of the key factors contributing to Western concerns. Kazakhstan is a major source of parallel imports, which includes goods imported into Russia without the permission of the trademark owner. These imports are legal in Russia, but raise concerns about the possibility of importing sanctioned goods. Second, Kazakhstan, being a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with Russia, does not have customs posts on the common border, which makes it difficult to monitor the flow of goods and implement sanctions (Putz, 2023). Third, corruption in Kazakhstan also facilitates sanctions evasion by facilitating the transport of prohibited goods across the border (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova,

2023). In addition, the political elite of Kazakhstan is afraid to take measures that could be perceived as hostile from Russia, fearing possible measures (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023).

Despite Kazakhstan's statement that it will not allow its territory to be used to circumvent sanctions (Dumoulin, 2023; Putz, 2024). The US has expressed concern about the flow of dual-use goods through the country (Putz, 2024). Although Kazakhstan has reduced re-exports of some goods potentially used in Russian military equipment, the increase in exports of other products is a cause for concern. (Putz, 2023). The situation remains difficult, and Kazakhstan will have to balance its economic ties with Russia and its obligations to the West to prevent sanctions circumvention (Dumoulin, 2023).

Methods

Since the topic includes not only diplomatic relations between countries, but also economic ones, mixed-method analysis will be used for this study. As part of the quantitative analysis, a statistical analysis of trade data with Kazakhstan's partners were conducted, focusing on changes in trade volumes with Russia after the introduction of sanctions. This will reveal patterns and anomalies in trade flows. The author also analysed economic indicators to assess the degree of Russia's dependence on Kazakhstan in obtaining sanctioned goods or services. This data will help to understand and see how Kazakhstan is a critical channel for sanctions.

Qualitative analysis will include the use of secondary sources such as official statements, press releases and sanctions implementation reports. In addition, academic research on Russia's attempts to use Kazakhstan as a backdoor for sanctions were reviewed. As part of this analysis, the author will conduct a documentary analysis of Western political reactions and public statements of Kazakh officials. This will allow us to understand how different parties perceive and respond to the problem of sanctions evasion.

Such an integrated approach will help better understand the mechanisms for circumventing sanctions and the role of Kazakhstan in this process, which, in turn, will allow us to develop effective measures to prevent similar violations in the future.

Results and Discussions

The first part of the analysis will consist of analyses of Kazakhstan's trade relations with partner countries in order to identify growth trends and with whom this is happening. Data from Table 1 provides us with how much was earned from the export and import of Kazakhstan and Russia in millions of dollars. Data was taken for 6 years, starting from pre-war times. As you can see, exports from 2019 increased by 4,539.4 million USD, and imports by 3,939.94 million USD. One can notice a big difference between exports and imports, but what interests us is an

increase in exports in 2022, the year when war started. Interesting how this number decreased for 6.47% the next year. However, with the decrease of export, there is a big increase in imports in 2024. The final number of imports is almost twice as big as export's.

Table 1. Trade partnership of Kazakhstan with Russia (mill. USD)

year	export	import
2019	5,670.9	14,312.1
2020	5,007.1	13,768.2
2021	7,018.70	17,605.50
2022	9,091.40	17,880.60
2023	10,207.40	16,847.00
2024	9,546.5	18,252.04

Source: own design based on Stat.gov (2025)

The reason for the sharp increase in exports in 2022 and 2023 is parallel imports to Russia (Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, 2023). As it mentioned before, this is a phenomenon in which goods are imported into Kazakhstan and then re-exported to Russia. Many of these parallel imports include dual-use items that have both civilian and military applications (Leong & Lin, 2024). These goods often come from China, and based on the data in Figure 2, it is clear that China is one of the main import partners. In China itself, these products are sometimes produced by large American companies (Leong & Lin, 2024). Leong and Lin cited examples of dual-use goods, including American computer chips and components that can be used in tanks and other military equipment. For example, shipments of computing devices from a Chinese subsidiary of IBM were sent to a merchant in Kyrgyzstan and then ended up in a blacklisted Russian enterprise. Similarly, transistors manufactured by Vishay Intertechnology were sold to a Kazakh company and were found in Russian reconnaissance drones and satellite communications stations on the front. Also, Kazakhstan, not being a major manufacturer of drones, imported unmanned aerial vehicles from China in the amount of 5.9 million USD in 2023, of which 2.7 million USD was exported to Russia (2024).


Other researchers, namely Abdurahmonov & Zhumagulova, have identified factors that facilitate the flow of parallel imports. First, this is a customs union between Kazakhstan and Russia. The absence of customs posts on the common border allows one to avoid checks. Second, free currency conversion between the Russian ruble and the Kazakh tenge. This gives Russia easy access to the Kazakh foreign exchange market. Third, and most problematic, is corruption. Since

Kazakhstan ranks 101st out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index, there is a high likelihood that this plays a role in the supply of parallel imports (2023).

The EU and the US have expressed concern about the use of Kazakhstan as a workaround for sanctioned goods entering Russia (Chazan, 2023; Moens et al., 2023). While they acknowledged Kazakhstan’s decision not to join the sanctions, they warned that such a practice could harm Kazakhstan's reputation and discourage foreign investment (Putz, 2023). The US has already imposed sanctions on several Central Asian companies, including two based in Kazakhstan (Putz, 2024).

Despite such large figures in exports with Russia, as shown in Figure 1, Italy has become the largest export partner for 2024. China is in second place and Russia is only in third. This export structure indicates the diversity of Kazakhstan’s foreign economic relations and its desire to expand markets beyond traditional partners. This may also indicate that Kazakhstan is able to reduce relations with Russia and, conversely, increase trade exchange with other countries.

Figure 1. Export partners of the Republic of Kazakhstan for January-September 2024 (out of total 100%)




Source: Stat.gov 2024

As shown in Figure 2, the main partner countries for Kazakhstan’s imports are Russia and China. Together they make up 55% of all imports for January-September 2024. Russian News Agency “TASS” listed things of Kazakhstan’s trade for 2024: “the largest product groups that Kazakhstan imported from other countries in 2024 were passenger cars (3.8% share), aircraft (3%), medicines (2.8%), telephones (2.7%), and vehicle bodies (2.3%). The republic exported mainly oil and oil products (52.5%), radioactive chemical elements and isotopes (5.6%), copper and copper alloys (5.1%), ores and copper concentrates (3.9%), ferroalloys (3%)”

(2025). The fact that Russia occupies first place in this list may cause some distrust. Firstly, this means that Kazakhstan has a close trade partnership with Russia. There are many paths for goods to arrive and go out, and these paths are used frequently. Secondly, Kazakhstan is highly dependent on Russia. Western countries may fear that Kazakhstan may inadvertently help prop up the Russian economy.

Figure 2. Import partners of the Republic of Kazakhstan for January-September 2024 (out of 100%)



Source: Stat.gov 2024

The second part of the analysis will focus on Kazakhstan's position. The Kazakh government is taking several steps to prevent its territory from being used to circumvent international sanctions. The country's parliamentarians expressed strong opposition to Russia using Kazakhstan for such purposes. Although Kazakhstan has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, its officials have said they are committed to preventing their territory from being used to circumvent sanctions (The Moscow Times, 2024).

A good example of this position was released by the editorial office of Arbat Media. This was the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Mukhtar Tleuberdi, in December 2022, that Kazakhstan would not assist Russia in circumventing sanctions. This statement caused a reaction in the Russian media, where some commentators, such as State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman, questioned the sincerity of Kazakhstan's position. Wasserman suggested that Kazakhstan's actions regarding sanctions were likely influenced by Chinese interests, given the close economic ties between the two countries (2022).

However, Kazakhstan's commitment to complying with international obligations and preventing sanctions circumvention was further emphasized by Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vasilenko in October 2024. In an interview with

the Polish agency RAP, he repeated that Kazakhstan will not allow its territory to be used to circumvent sanctions, emphasizing that this position is clear to all parties, including both Russia and the West (The Moscow Times, 2024). This position became final for Astana, because the republic “does not want the introduction of secondary sanctions.”

These statements by Kazakh officials, as well as recent actions to restrict exports of certain goods to Russia, demonstrate a clear effort by Kazakhstan to balance its economic interests with its adherence to international norms. However, as mentioned earlier, the close economic and political ties between Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as the challenges posed by joint membership in the EAEU, will make it difficult to eliminate sanctions circumvention. This issue is likely to continue to be a source of tension in Kazakhstan's relations with Russia, the EU and the US.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Kazakhstan faces serious challenges in preventing Russia from circumventing sanctions through its territory. The main reason is the country's weakness, which limits its ability to effectively control trade flows and resist pressure from Russia. Despite the measures taken, Kazakhstan continues to remain a transit route for parallel imports, which causes concern among Western countries. The best solution is to strengthen relations between Western countries and Kazakhstan. Active cooperation, investment and diplomatic support from Western countries can help Kazakhstan strengthen its anti-sanction evasion measures. Of course, for this, both parties must provide a guarantee that all conditions will be met. Support and investment will help strengthen infrastructure and improve control mechanisms, allowing Kazakhstan to more effectively cope with the challenges associated with sanctions. Improving relations with the West will also help Kazakhstan reduce its economic dependence on Russia and diversify trade ties. In the long term, this will create conditions for stable and independent economic development of the country. Thus, cooperation between Kazakhstan, the EU and the US can be a key factor in efforts to prevent sanctions circumvention and strengthen international security.

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Advancing Financial Inclusion through Inclusive Education: The Role of Public Administration in Bridging Gaps in Fintech and the Banking System

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Abstract

Financial inclusion, as a fundamental factor in the development of the modern financial market, is limited by the low level of financial and digital literacy among the vulnerable population. This study aims to examine the role of public administration in the promotion of financial inclusion through the expansion of inclusive education, thereby reducing the gap between the traditional banking system and the rapidly developing fintech sector. The report employs the method of secondary research and analyses of existing data from articles on financial inclusion. Research work is valuable for financial institutions, fintech companies that adapt services to the needs of vulnerable groups, as well as for government regulators who can consider and implement effective financial education programs in educational institutions. Research question: How can public administration promote financial inclusion through inclusive education?

Keywords: financial inclusion, inclusive education, fintech, access, financial literacy.

Introduction

In response to significant global shifts, modern political reforms and public economic policies have increasingly emphasized the importance of financial inclusion. Financial inclusion is defined as the equitable access of people across all socio-economic groups to essential financial products and services, including bank accounts, debts, insurance, and investment opportunities. This focus aims to ensure that every member of society can participate meaningfully in the financial system, thereby fostering economic resilience and reducing inequality. Among the most vulnerable populations are people with disabilities, and low-income individuals who encounter difficulties utilizing financial instruments. Residents of these regions and consumers facing credit discrimination also witness inadequate access to essential economic tools and a lack of regulatory protection. Consequently, most of them remain in a constant state of financial isolation. This affects the significant gap in income of the population, impeding the economic progress of the state. Public Administration's policies, E-Learning gamified approach and partnerships with Fintech companies may significantly contribute to the field and assist to resolve the disparity.

Literature review

Inclusive education is a system that provides access to quality education for all groups of society of different socio-economic status, including low-income individuals, people with disabilities, or rural communities. Special attention is paid to accessibility, equality, and the elimination of systemic barriers. Inclusive education plays an important role in improving access to financial services. It involves all marginalized groups of the population and provides them with all the necessary financial and digital literacy skills that increase participation in the economy. Education tailored for vulnerable populations can bridge knowledge gaps in financial management.

Large fintech corporations like Visa and Mastercard have played a fundamental role in the active promotion of financial services by optimizing and digitalizing these offerings. For example, the Biggest Financial Company in the World - Visa, provided payment accounts to another 500 million people who didn't use banking services as part of the World Bank's call for Universal Financial Access by 2020 (James, 2020). In competition with traditional financial organizations, fintech developers recreated a large number of technological start-up projects. The advent of mobile technologies and online platforms facilitated the process of providing most of the population with an active economic life.

Nevertheless, the potential expansion of financial inclusion by fintech services due to advanced developments is still impossible. There is a rise in the need for individuals to master basic financial literacy and digital competence skills. According to statistics, only 33% of adults are financially literate, which indicates that 3.5 billion adults globally don't understand model financial concepts (Sirtaine, 2023). In this case, the development of inclusion ensures education can play a key role in empowering all vulnerable segments of society and providing them with equal access to knowledge regardless of personalized financial resources efficiently.

These outcomes can only be achieved through enhanced public administration policies. With efficient personalized regulation, all required conditions for the sterling development of inclusive education will be established. Effective educational measures such as the implementation of specialized financial literacy programs will enhance the level of financial inclusion as well as significantly reduce the gap between the traditional banking system and the successfully advancing fintech sector.

Since equal access to financial services directly depends on the level of financial literacy of the population, the availability of financial services and inclusive personalized closely about Vulnerable groups of the population are most often economically marginalized due to limited financial knowledge. The practice of universal design in education, partnerships with fintech companies, and the introduction of financial technologies and digital learning tools can ensure that

financial literacy reaches all groups of society. Public administration, in turn, should also take a leading role in integrating financial education into inclusive curricula, promoting sustainable economic growth, and reducing financial disparities worldwide.

Methodology

This study employs a secondary research methodology, concentrating on the collection and analysis of existing data sourced from academic literature studies, government reports, and industry publications. The analysis is based on studies on Inclusive Education, Financial Inclusion and Literacy, and Fintech Development. The methodology provides a comprehensive understanding of the role of public administration in promoting financial inclusion through inclusive education.

The secondary research approach is constrained by the availability and reliability of existing data. While it provides a strong foundation for analysis, the incorporation of primary research methods, such as surveys and interviews, could greatly enhance the depth and relevance of the findings. A notable limitation is the scarcity of research on topics closely related to this study, which may impact the comprehensiveness of the conclusions drawn.

Contribution of fintech companies

Global Findex, which tracks financial inclusion in the global market, has released its latest results for 2021. According to the World Bank's Global Database, the past decade has encountered significant socio-economic investments. For example, in 2021, 76 percent of the world's adults had access to financial institution accounts, comprising a notable 25 percent increase from 2011, (East Ventures, 2022). COVID-19 made an essential contribution to the adoption of digital financial services by expanding digital trade transactions in developing economies. Almost one in four of the adults who made loans to retail companies during this period did so for the first time due to the pandemic (East Ventures, 2022).

Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) have made noticeable progress in the dynamics of financial integration. From 2017 to 2021, the number of adults opening banks increased by 13 percent, surpassing the average indicator for developing countries of 71 percent, including the vulnerable population (Gateway, year)


Among them, the rapid progression of economic inclusion in modern Kazakhstan has become feasible owing to collaborations between fintech companies and banks. Kaspi.kz is the largest fintech firm in the state, offering consumers innovative digital services. It also operates as the largest Payments, Marketplace,

and integrated consumer-focused Fintech Ecosystem in Kazakhstan. The mobile application has 8.5 million monthly active users, while the country's population size is 18.7 million. In the third quarter of 2020, it reached 68% year-on-year growth in monthly active users (Gateway, (n.d.)).

Due to the rapid pace of digitalization, fintech firms have displaced traditional banks from their dominant position in the global market. Digital upgrades have covered a larger consumer circle, including vulnerable groups, and provided quicker, more convenient, and faster services. Their policy differs from traditional banking in its individual approach to clients, fast processing of requests, accuracy, and the use of artificial intelligence. On the contrary, the banking landscape's return on equity (ROE) has fallen from an overwhelming 1 financial 2007 to a meager 9% in 2017 (Grant, 2024). The high cost of services and loans, limited access for residents of rural areas, and strong dependence on infrastructure are the main barriers hindering the development of traditional financial services.


Financial Inclusion plays an essential role, providing individuals and businesses with access to affordable financial programs and services that address their requirements in terms of transactions, payments, spending, and insurance. Accessibility of these services reflects the level of socioeconomic equality within the region and has a crucial effect on its overall development state. It may empower low-income individuals, promote innovations, contribute to women's economic empowerment, and boost economic growth through entrepreneurship, all possible income-generating activities. A lack of access to basic, financial, services results in significant financial disadvantages, limiting certain payments, leading to higher fees charged for basic services such as electricity, and enabling people to make purchases models lacking easy payment options (7, 2024) This creates significant gaps between population groups based on their level of education, place of residence, physical abilities, age, and gender.

Figure 1. Comparison of the gender gap personalized usage (2014 & 2021) Made or received digital payments (%).



Source: Ozili, 2021

Figure 2. Rural and urban account ownership Account, age 15+ (%), personalized (Ozili, 2021).



Source: Ozili, 2021

Importance of financial education for vulnerable groups: Other country's practices

In 2022, a study on the state of financial inclusion development was carried out in Indonesia. Perception survey of East Ventures – Digital Competitiveness Index (EV-DCI) 2022 revealed that companies evaluate offline and online financial access points as relatively low. It was figured that the main obstacle hindering credit access in Indonesia is a low level of financial literacy. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of respondents are concerned about financial products, and management may boost the further increase of financial inclusion. According to the authors: "Hence, financial education to improve personalized financial literacy will also further enhance financial inclusion" (Merry, 2023). In this regard, several effective practices have been applied to educate the public.

A leading asset management and trading platform, Bibit and Stockbit, which launched the Bibit Academy and Stockbit Academy programs in 2021, has provided more than 100 free educational programs to the public in both urban and rural areas. Against the same backdrop, ALAMI, Indonesia's largest Sharia-compliant financial technology company, recently founded Fajr Academy, a training and apprenticeship program specialized in financial programs with the knowledge and skills to meet the needs of the specialized financial industry. Additionally, the subject of financial literacy has also been introduced as part of the educational program, starting in 2016, after which it moved to all implementations in 2021 (Merry, 2023).

Fundação Banco do Brasil (FBB) promotes social and digital inclusion through innovative social technologies designed to drive social change. One such initiative involves the creation of approximately 1,000 telecenters throughout Brazil that will serve as hubs for promoting local knowledge and content creation. This initiative aims to bring together people from different areas by providing education that emphasizes content creation while providing a supporting technological framework (Mello, 2012) (Stacey, 2024). A specialized web platform, "Knowledge that Changes," complements the to be adjusted or cemented by including financial literacy as a key aspect of information and communications technology (ICT)-mediated education (Stacey, 2024).

A study conducted in Bangladesh in 2022 similarly highlighted the importance of the financial education of the population in attaining comprehensive financial inclusion. The research work primarily analyzed the state of financial literacy and socioeconomic independence of rural residents and individuals with poor educational backgrounds. Research authors concluded that "A comprehensive and long-term education program should be introduced broadly to the rural population to make a big stride in financial inclusion, a key driver of poverty reduction and prosperity boosting" (Birochi, 2016). According to the final

predictions of the researchers, enhanced financial education will encourage rural consumers to participate in financial services and manage their resources effectively. Moreover, they will be equipped with the knowledge of appropriate financial protection. This practice can similarly benefit the growth of financial inclusion for other dependent groups. To cover a larger segment of the vulnerable population, appropriate reforms in the field of inclusive education should be implemented.

Many finance study programs are based on an approach that frequently does not consider people with special learning needs. However, Inclusive education through adaptive learning tools, Universal Learning Design (UDL), and targeted financial literacy curricula ensure that vulnerable groups receive efficient, personalized financial education.

Financial inclusion through Digital literacy in Inclusive Education settings

The majority of financial services are available online owing to the progressive investments of fintech companies. Although this creates alternative approaches and enhanced accessibility for vulnerable groups, there is also a growing need for these individuals to master fundamental digital literacy skills.

A good example is the partnership between the Idaho Department of Vocational Rehabilitation (IDVR) and Boise State University, which developed a unique digital literacy curriculum. The curriculum focuses on college and career readiness because it can be used by teachers in the classroom, individual students, or even IDVR counselors with clients, providing a flexible, diversified solution for educating individuals with learning disabilities (Hasan, 2021). The curriculum is composed of two main tracks: one concentrated on digital literacy skills for employment and one focused on college readiness. To better respond to the needs and support diversity of this target audience, the curriculum was designed to be taught in a classroom (with guidance) or self-paced, anytime, anywhere.

Concerningly, Draffan, and Wald (2010) examined digital inclusion in higher education about digital agility. They concluded that with the right support, students with disabilities can have digital literacy skills that are on par with those of non-disabled students. In another study, Park and Nam (2014) compared the digital literacy skills of people with and without disabilities in South Korea; they concluded that “people with disabilities are as capable as everyone else of becoming digitally literate when technological barriers are overcome” (Hasan, 2021). Similar results can be attained by introducing managing financial digital instruments into the schedule.

Solutions

Public Administration's Role in Advancing Financial Inclusion

Policy Implementation and Regular programs of The Ministries of Education should develop a specialized financial literacy program for the curriculum of schools and colleges, with specialized (UDL) modules for students from rural areas and with special needs. For example, Brazil's National Strategy for Financial Education (ENEF) established a government initiative to promote financial literacy at all levels of education. Implementation of the Universal Design for Learning (UDL) instructional framework is an excellent approach to addressing most barriers. This evidence-based strategy facilitates the accommodation of individuals with special learning needs. UDL essentially aims to respond to the requirements of all students by eliminating and lowering barriers to self-realization (Place, 1991) (Hasan, 2021). Furthermore, UDL illustrates a growing set of design concepts focused on supporting learners while combining digital learning and non-digital environments (Hasan, 2021). The abilities or disabilities of the students do not need adjustment, but rather, the design of the curriculum and learning environment. For this reason, the government and educational centers for students with special needs should establish a reform on the implementation of mandatory Digital Financial Literacy subject to the curriculum. A great example is South Korea, where the mandatory school curriculum includes financial literacy lessons. This in turn increases the level of digital skills among the population, including a large proportion of rural residents and people with disabilities.

Australian Curriculum could be the best fitting role models. An important development within the Australian Curriculum has been the inclusion of specific illustrations that focus on access and participation for students with disabilities. This encompasses elaborations, work samples, and examples of personalized learning, along with reasonable adjustments across various learning areas. The framework also features work samples and examples of personalized planning that integrate elements of differentiation and universal design, catering to a diverse range of learners (Price, 2021).


This approach reinforces the importance of the teachers' role whereby they need to:

1. Plan dignified teaching and learning programs that are respectful of their students' age. For example, teaching high-school students credit responsibility.
2. Use knowledge of students' individual needs, strengths and interests to ensure access to the teaching and learning program. For instance, to tailor financial lessons.

3. Provide personalized learning in relation to curriculum, instruction and the environment. Provide accessible teaching materials.

4.

Figure 3. An Australian Curriculum that includes diverse learners: the case of students with disability



Source: Price, 2021

Similarly, following the Australian Setting, financial literacy training programs can be individualized using adaptive learning strategies so that all students, including those with disabilities, can fully master basic and complex financial concepts. For example: the creation of multi-level modules for improving financial literacy, in which students with different abilities can learn how to budget, save and invest using special programs.

Using visual infographics and videos to explain banking and budgeting will only strengthen the educational process. The addition of interactive classes (digital banking modeling, role-playing games for financial decision-making), as well as the

use of assistive technologies (speech-to-text conversion, screen readers) for students with disabilities will ensure high-quality accessibility.

Partnerships with Fintech companies

Collaboration between FinTech companies and educational institutions in non-metropolitan areas can significantly enhance access to financial services. This practice will facilitate the delivery of banking and financial products directly to students and teachers thereby eliminating barriers associated with the physical location of branches. Through mobile apps and online platforms, people in remote areas will be able to access a wide range of financial services, making them part of financial inclusion.

Similar partnership practices have been implemented and successfully integrated in India. The country's student loan default rate has witnessed a sharp increase from 7.67% in March 2019 to 9.73% in March 2020 (THC-Pod, n.d.). In non-metropolitan areas, students often face challenges in financing their education. Fintech partnerships have developed customized financial solutions that meet the specific needs of students in these areas. The system included low-interest student loans, flexible repayment options, and scholarship programs. Fintech platforms also used to data-drive insights to innovate scholarships and financial aid (THC-Pod, n.d.). In this way, fintech companies not only finance and provide their services but also can contribute to the advancement of inclusive education through the integration of innovative initiatives. Collaboration efforts that involve big companies, educational administrations, and government can provide innovative Improving financial inclusion through educational avenues. Collaboration with fintech companies can provide real-world financial simulations. It may lead to creation of accessible digital banking platforms where special students can easily practice virtual budgeting. This refers to gamified financial literacy tools that will engage students with different learning abilities.

E-Learning and Gamified Solutions

Online platforms and game-based content can increase learners' engagement and facilitate the educational process. This approach is supported by constructivist learning theory, which states that learners acquire knowledge most effectively through active participation in practical, real-world tasks. Researchers have found that students with disabilities have been more motivated while using digital tools, especially tablets. It was explained by more personalized instruction over traditional classroom activities. Aside from that, it gave students opportunity to have more freedom to explore content independently (Hodis, Hattie, & Hodis, 2017) (Hasan, 2021). Developing game tools to teach financial concepts such as saving, budgeting,

and using mobile payments can improve financial literacy. Moreover, additional collaboration with fintech companies to create user-friendly financial apps tailored to the needs of learners in inclusive classrooms can also contribute to this initiative.

Conclusion

Access to financial services and inclusive education are different concepts, but they are closely interrelated. Inclusivity in education creates a foundation by providing greater access to financial services. This happens by providing people with the basic knowledge and skills to use financial services confidently and freely. Without inclusive education, significant gaps in financial literacy remain, which leads to the economic isolation of individuals with special needs. Therefore, the priority task of the State administration is to focus on policies that include financial education within the framework of inclusive education to ensure the expansion of financial opportunities in the long term. Modern national school curricula should include financial education while ensuring that educational materials are adapted to different needs. This can be achieved by:

1. Training teachers specialized in UDL to conduct affordable financial literacy courses.
2. Using digital tools, especially gamified financial applications suitable for students with disabilities.
3. Cooperation with fintech firms to provide real financial education for students from marginalized segments of the population.

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Assessing the Effects of Growing Economic Connectivity Between Central Asia and Afghanistan on Regional Stability

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Abstract

After the 2021 Taliban takeover, Afghan attempts to interact with the outer world can be easily traced, while the human rights abuse and radical ideological elements hurdle the obtainment of international recognition and greater reach to other states. Due to such developments, major powers such as the US, China emphasized the strategic importance of Central Asia (CA) engaging with Afghanistan. Even if there is a growing positive dynamic of economic partnership between CA and Afghanistan, it may not necessarily expand into greater regional agreements and security concessions between them. While several CA states, namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan demonstrate great motivation to cooperate economically for the strategic reasons of primarily sustaining regional security accompanied by desire to reach new markets and solve transboundary issues, the other 3 countries are characterized with different levels of economic partnership intensity with Afghanistan.

This paper will examine the relationship between the economic partnership of CA states and Afghanistan and stability in the region through analysis of the news, policy papers, strategic documents, reports and position outlines of international organizations. Moreover, each of 5 CA states will be utilized as a case study to assess the individual CA states' capacity to pressure and use economic leverage as an instrument to neutralize the associated risks.

Keywords: Central Asia, Afghanistan, economic connectivity, regional security, economic leverage.

Introduction

After about 2 decades of war in Afghanistan, the Doha deal between the US and Afghanistan became a landmark of the greater crisis in. As a result, in 2021 the US troops withdrew from Afghanistan leaving Afghan people with the imminent danger in the form of the Taliban regime, the collapsing economy and insurgent forces present inside the country. In August 2021, Taliban forces captured Kabul, the capital city, meaning the triumph of the Taliban in acquiring political power. The overthrow of the Islamic Republic government drew some diverse reactions from the world community. The UN following the proceedings of the Doha meeting has claimed the rejection of recognition of the Taliban led regime in Afghanistan, citing the continuous gruesome violations of human rights and security threats emanating from the militant elements. Following, new sanctions packages were activated

against Taliban, such as freezing the assets in the US, the individual bans against the primary actors in Taliban government and many more. Especially economic sanctions such as freezing the foreign reserves equated to \$9.5 billion or the suspension of the foreign aid by several European countries made a huge shock to the Afghan economy (Pe'er, 2021). According to the World Bank, Afghanistan GDP contracted by about 20 %, further deteriorating by 6 % in 2022 (World Bank, 2024). Despite the heavy dependence on external aid and a dwindling economy, Afghanistan's import level in 2023 increased by 23 % reaching \$7.8 billion (World Bank, 2024). According to Zelin (2022), about 34 countries expressed some levels of interest in sustaining political or economic involvement with Taliban as of 2022. Central Asia is no exception, all 5 member states out of overall 17 countries have the embassies in Taliban Afghanistan. Additionally, this article will examine several factors making Central Asian states deepen cooperation with Afghanistan. Moreover, the article attempts to investigate how trade and economic projects between Central Asia and Afghanistan will play a role in providing regional stability in the region.

Research questions:

1. What levels of cooperation exist among CA states and Afghanistan?
2. How far the increasing economic cooperation with Afghanistan could provide a ground for regional security in CA?

Methodology

First of all, this article is going to explore the economic cooperation and trade news between CA and Afghanistan. The information observed is retrieved from international and local news agencies and independent online newspapers alongside with the reports from International and regional organizations like UN, CSTO and SCO. Due to the recent character of the before-mentioned phenomenon, analysis was conducted in the timeframe of 2021-2025. Article involves 5 CA states as separate case study in order to adequately understand and compare the dynamics of economic connectivity. For the purpose of finding the relationship between economic connectivity and security advances, there are 2 situational cases involved in the second part of the article.

Literature review

According to Laruelle (2013) Central Asian states and Afghanistan have a similar historical and regional experience which allows them to sustain strong bilateral relations with each other. The Caspian Policy Center Report (2020) found that extremist threats alongside Chinese expansive influence and Russia's desire to

sustain the regional hegemony in the region make these nations cooperate. However, the changing realities after Taliban takeover in 2021 and war in Ukraine could have played a major role in altering cooperation patterns between those two. In the 1990s, trade was limited between Central Asian states and Afghanistan, economic relationships returned only in the 2000s up until 2014. Despite the fact that Pakistan and Iran were historical trading partners, such states as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan turned to be big actors in providing the electricity, food and transportation (Laruelle, 2013). Although data is very limited, positive trends in trade relations between CA countries and Afghanistan can be indicated through comparison of pre-Taliban takeover and after. As an illustration, according to the ministry of trade and integration of Kazakhstan trade between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan in 2021 amounted to \$346 million while in 2023 Afghanistan became one of the top 10 trading partners.

The Taliban government is trying to re-obtain its historical role as economic hub using the most out of their transit potential linking the route between Central Asia and South Asia, according to the Central Asia Institute for Strategic Studies analysis. Their desire to do so is hugely limited by several challenges, such as regional entities' attitude towards the country, strong commitment to their ideology and ties with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. The attitude towards Afghanistan can be reaffirmed by the joint Declaration of the Heads of Central Asian states and 2023 Consultative meeting, where leaders highlighted their dedication to the development of Afghanistan as 'safe and prosperous country with respect to fundamental human rights of their citizens' (Akorda, 2024). The idea of re-engagement with Afghanistan can be traced in the U.S. Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025. One of the primary objectives in this document was the connectivity between Central Asia and Afghanistan for economic and trade connection and transfer of the governance of "multi-ethnic, Muslim Majority" states of CA to Afghanistan. Same message can be seen in the Chinese stance regarding Afghanistan, stressing the Chinese adherence to the respect, non-interference and territorial untouchability of the country, further highlighting the hope for deeper "friendly engagements with neighboring countries".

Sakhi (2022) claims that the leaders of the states utilize the cost-benefit analysis in order to assess their decisions on engagement with Taliban, which, in turn, drives uncertainty about the stability in Afghanistan and in the region of Central Asia. The levels with which each Central Asian country interacts with the Taliban government are motivated by the idea of regional stability although somewhat dispersed.

The Taliban ideological stance creates the biggest hindrance on the way of gaining international legitimacy and enjoying greater connectivity with the outer world. The question stands of how long Taliban can stick to their principles despite

their need for economic stabilization. However, there is a lack of analysis on the possible change in the destructive behavior of Afghanistan as a result of economic cooperation between CA and Afghanistan.

Polachek (1980) explained that states are less likely to initiate the conflict fearing to lose the economic gains associated with the trade. **Tanious (2018)** found that economic interdependence doesn't fully eradicate war but may play a major role in lessening the conflict's intensity. Keohane further explains 2 forms of economic relationships, interdependence as the state of mutual vulnerability of actors, while interconnectedness entails weak links among states. The exact phenomena of positive economic dynamics in the context of CA and Afghanistan is not coined nor researched. In this paper we assume that dependence on infrastructure projects development, commodity products which are characterized by the heavy imports in regard to the miniscule level of export of Afghanistan cannot constitute for economic interdependence rather interconnectedness which has weak application on the regional security level because of the little economic instruments to socialize Afghanistan. For the purpose of the article, the relation between economic connectivity and regional stability is to be proved by observing data regarding 1) reduction of the border clashes and 2) dynamics in the number of shared treaties and norms.

Progress of cooperation / Current trends of cooperation

Uzbekistan

Dr. Anvar Yoldoshev in his interview with Daryo, emphasized the need to engage with Taliban as to not “remain at sidelines” in relation to the positive dynamics seen in Russia and Kazakhstan. In August 2024 both states signed bilateral investment treaties equating to \$2.5 million, the result of the 35 MoU formed between 2 governments (Putz, 2024). Another important step in cementing the economic cooperation between 2 governments was the finalization of a \$1 billion treaty giving the rights to Uzbekistan to develop the Tuti Maidan gas field and construct a thermal power plant. Afghanistan minister for mines and petroleum emphasized that this deal will allow to meet the domestic consumption needs (Teshabaev, 2024). In 2021 Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan agreed to extend the Trans-Afghan Railway.

More concrete developments followed in September 2024 when Uzbekistan informed about opening the Airitom free economic zone in the border city called Termez. Apart from business spaces dedicated to business people from both countries, the plans are to build hospitals and other infrastructure. According to Imamova (2024) the zone once fully ready will generate \$1.2 billion in trade. President Mirziyoev has instructed for 30% of all projected jobs given to

Afghans. This demonstrates that Uzbekistan has been a major proponent of reconciliation in Afghanistan. Apart from business treaties, there haven't been any formal measures initiated between 2 governments, only informal discussions and security promises such as the one given by the Ministry of Border and Tribal affairs of Afghanistan on "not allowing insurgent groups to use Afghan land against their Uzbek counterparts" (Daryo,2023).

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstani expert, D. Satpayev claimed that Afghanistan wasn't a key direction in Kazakhstan's foreign policy for a long time. The readiness, expressed by the President of Kazakhstan, in establishing contacts to stop the humanitarian crisis in credentials receiving ceremony in Akorda in 2021 could be an indicator of Taliban's changing status (Satubaldina,2021). Nurlan Kulbatyrov, deputy general director of Qaztrade identified 3 pillars of bilateral relations: trade with shared benefits, humanitarian aid and transport connectivity (Sakenova, 2023). According to the Ministry of Trade and Integration, the first Kazakhstan-Afghanistan business forum hosted in Astana on 3 August 2023, provided both sides with \$190 million export agreements. It has been predicted that two countries might magnify their bilateral trade to reach \$3 billion.

Trilateral meeting in April between Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan marked the plan of building a logistics hub in western Afghanistan (Yawar and Greenfield, 2024). The private sector has been also encouraged to participate in joint projects. In April 2023, Kazakhtelecom signed a deal to provide fiber-optic Internet in Afghanistan. Moreover, the visit to Kabul indicated the intention to enhance the cooperation not only through trade, but through social ties such as such plans as sending 30 Afghan children to the summer camp in Kazakhstan or establishing direct flights (Borangaziyev, 2024). It demonstrates the positive spillover to the social realm, while security dialogues and informal arrangements, if any, are still the only sources of security cooperation.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan followed Kazakhstan in the decision of September 2024 to remove Taliban from the banned list. The President of Kyrgyzstan as his regional counterparts, using the platform of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, made a speech regarding the need for more aid and attention to Afghanistan. The change of attitude is reasoned by several factors: ethnic Kyrgyz in small and Big Pamir and potential benefits from infrastructure projects like CASA-1000 which aims to export the surplus energy from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to South Asian states (Karimov, 2024). This year, Kyrgyzstan delegation was sent to Kabul to unveil trade and economic opportunities between the two. According to the National

Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan, the first half of 2023 saw growing trade operations amounting to about \$13million. If export from Kyrgyz is characterized majorly by agricultural and consumer products with petroleum products, the import was defined by the large acquisition of aluminium (\$ 1million 700)

Turkmenistan

Political expert Fabio Indeo warned in 2021 that the constant instability along Afghan-Turkmen borders will “stop or delay” the economic projects thus limiting the economic cooperation between countries. Against this perspective, Turkmenistan President expressed its support to 3 energy transportation projects as Aqina-Andkhoy railway under the Lapis-Lazulli corridor; TAPI Gas pipeline and the provision of fiber optic cable from a region in Turkmenistan to Aqina in Afghanistan (Indeo, 2021). To address the security risks, both sides signed the Concept of Security for TAPI project in 2021. To address the security risks, both sides signed the Concept of Security for TAPI project in 2021 which could be one of the few formal security related documents with Taliban fully backing up the implementation and security of this gas project as well as other developmental projects in the territory of Afghanistan.

We can observe further intensification of cooperation from 2 visits from the Taliban foreign minister to Turkmenistan and the business forum hosted in Turkmenistan (Gusseinov, 2024). Such developments are stimulated by pragmatic considerations regarding the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI) which is still under the process starting from 2015. This year has seen yet another dynamic in continuation of this project in the form of arrival of Turkmen specialists and apparent loan from Turkmenistan - 9 to 10 billion dollars for the project realization purposes. Economic expert Rahman Ahmadi claimed that the TAPI will promote economic growth in 3 to 5 years as the project has the potential to deliver transit fees of \$400 million in a year.

Tajikistan

Out of 5 Central Asian states, Tajikistan is the most critical of the Taliban regime due to instances of military standoffs and border security measures. Despite the historical antagonism, we can observe the positive dynamics in their relationship. The Representative of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce said that in the first 7 months of 2024 the trade turnover between these two amounted to \$30million with imports 3 times higher than export from Afghanistan (Qooyash, 2024). Tajikistan exported 5% more of electricity in 2024 compared with the last year. It was reported that Afghanistan cleared its debt to Tajikistan and the energy supply agreement yet again was renewed (Eurasianet, 2024). The World Bank officially approved

Tajikistan the grant of \$11 million for the completion of remaining construction of CASA-1000 (World Bank, 2023). Additionally, in regard to Uzbek local media, transboundary markets located in border villages between two states started to actively operate. According to the source, it has positive effect on citizens from both sides (Bakozoda, 2023). The adequate level of economic interactions is sustained in order for Tajikistan to lessen the possible security risks associated with the Afghan-Tajik border instability exemplified by 2022 clash between Tajiks and the claimed members of ISKP.

According to Tajik experts, Tajikistan has no other choice than coming into geopolitical cooperation, accounting for proximity, security threats and economic benefits. Some see the possibility of China and Kazakhstan convincing Tajikistan to foster interactions with the Taliban.

By analyzing the news from international and local sources we could observe different levels of interaction with each of the CA states. It can be observed that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the most active players, while 3 other states follow the trend. Aforementioned 2 states are the ones who promote deeper economic integration, involving free zones or financial systems. Uzbekistan's such engagement can be derived from the proximity and the constant competition with Kazakhstan in obtaining the 'regional leadership'. Moreover, the investments coming from them are not for mere pacifying Taliban, rather Uzbeks have various means of influence on Afghanistan such as the supply of both humanitarian aid that transits through Uzbekistan and electricity which provide enough leverage over Taliban. Kyrgyzstan is majorly and Tajikistan is more or less led by economic considerations on such infrastructure projects like CASA-1000. Turkmenistan, despite its positive neutrality, through his recent actions made sure of mitigating the security threats along with the shared economic pragmatism prone to the region as the desire to diversify gas export routes.

Through economic connectivity to regional security?

According to Sullivan (2022), all CA states are afraid of the spread of radical ideas and terrorist threats from the Afghanistan. The intensity of the situation can be proved by the changing context between Afghanistan and its major ally Pakistan. Parkin etc. (2022) wrote that Pakistan Prime Minister supported Taliban takeover initially while now heavily struggling with the radical elements and heavy migration flows.

In early 2022, UN estimated that fighting under Taliban reduced to 18% of the previous levels (UN, 2022). According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event data project, the average number of battles, explosions reduced from 256 (2021) to 53.5 (2022). Political violence from non-governmental movements like Afghan National Resistance Movement and Islamic state was reduced by 62% in

2023. This shows the establishment of Taliban control and weakening of resistance of former government propagators. We can somehow claim that it may not have been the direct result of the commitment by the Taliban regime to CA leaders, but Afghanistan's desire to continue the cooperation thus projecting itself as a legitimate and responsible actor. In the recent parliamentary committee meeting (2025) of CSTO, Taliban's spokesperson yet again noted their commitment to the security promises they had given as obligations and called out the security concerns of CSTO members baseless (Ariana News, 2025).

According E. Sridharan (2005), common projects create economic integration that may motivate mutual concessions over security issues between and among states. In order to analyze whether Afghanistan is ready for security concessions, we should take into account the benefits associated with larger cooperation with CA. First of all, Central Asia is a key direction of cooperation for the purpose of diversification of the trade and cutting down the reliance on Pakistan and Iran. One example could be the energy supplied by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan which accounted for 85% of electricity imports in 2021 (Abdurashidova, 2024). The Taliban even have sought to explore agreements with Russia for diesel and gasoline. In this regard, Afghanistan can use the economic connectivity with Central Asia to reach a partnership with Russia. Mohammad Asif Stanikzai, Afghan economic analyst, highlighted the need to engage with their primary neighbors and the possibility of CA countries becoming the prospective markets for them (Qadiry, 2025). In reality such words have not been applied into practical use due to several cases where Taliban actions constitute a threat or source of suspicions for CA. We are going to explore 2 recent cases: 1) the progression of relations with Al-Qaeda and 2) Qosh-Tepa canal.

According to Kawa Amin (2024), Taliban are constructing base and residential settlements for Al-Qaeda in Malekuddin, while 3 of the buildings are being built for Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in several locations. The religious schools are being built near those settlements driving suspicions regarding the real intent under which this school is claimed to be a training center. The former head of Afghanistan National Directorate for Security asserted that Al-Qaeda has control over Taliban ministries where Al-Qaeda figures take prominent positions. This case highlights the fact that the Taliban still have huge links with terrorists. On the other hand, it could indicate the establishment of a coalition between Taliban and Al-Qaeda, thus binding the latter to the shared decision-making.

Even though the genuine desire for economic development and legitimization of their power can be evident, the same clarity cannot be determined for regional security at least until they abandon involvement with armed radical groups. The fifth report to the Security Council mentioned the Taliban's ongoing financial and

recruitment support towards terrorist's network can be the evidence of the former assumption (Kawa, 2024).

Despite Taliban's ambiguous policies, another sphere of cooperation between CA and Afghanistan, namely transboundary cooperation should be uncovered in order to sustain the peace in the region. CA states are in less privileged position, especially riparian states. Therefore, the transboundary security considerations should have been or is highly likely to be affected by economic connectivity program of CA states under the assumption that interstate cooperation in one field spills over to other areas. In order to find the developments in the transboundary security sphere, we could analyze the case of Qosh-Tepa canal which Taliban apparently plan to complete while international and regional concern has been peaked by the prediction that a third of Amudarya will be transferred to the interior of Afghanistan. This situation has been also discussed at the time of Uzbek delegation visit to Kabul. The Taliban representative highlighted after the meeting that Uzbekistan was prepared to cooperate in construction of the canal, while the statement about this issue has not been issued by Uzbeks. Head of the transboundary rivers division at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan underscored that Uzbekistan request for talk is positive step in promotion of regional water cooperation. According to Ibraimov B. and Fawad Ali (2023), Uzbek official told that even though there are negotiations, they have no guarantees regarding the future after Qosh Tepa canal is finished. According to recent news from TOLONews (2024), Afghanistan is entering second phase of the construction determining it with increasing job opportunities and self-sufficiency in field of wheat production. This, in turn, could diminish the dependence on wheat imports from Kazakhstan which takes up 80% of the total exports to Afghanistan (Seilkhanov, 2024). Defense of the Aral and Amu Darya expressed the imminent danger to Turkmenistan as 70% of the water from AmuDarya flows through Turkmenistan. During the visit of the Taliban delegation to Asghabat the statement was issued regarding the talk about bilateral cooperation on water management. However, the results are ambiguous as neither side initiated a common treaty, yet a more detailed set of actions (EurasiaNet, 2024).

Limitations

The limitation of this article might have been insufficient attention given to the regional great powers dynamics especially in the light of the recent request of Taliban government for membership in organizations like SCO, BRICS and EEU (Известия, 2024). Charge d'Affairs of Afghanistan in Moscow Jaman Nasir mentioned the necessity of greater economic integration to provide for infrastructure projects, railways and energy cooperation. Taliban as a future member of such an organization will surely have an impact on regional dynamics and balance, characterized by obvious risks related to more exaggerated illegal movements and

illicit trade. China and Russia position, at least now, demand the 3 aforementioned requirements in order to gain international recognition which in turn will fulfill the jurisdictional base for Afghanistan to guarantee their membership. However, it didn't stop their involvement with them, as China negotiated a 25-year energy agreement authorizing Chinese companies to extract oil in the north of the region in January 2023 (Madhok et al, 2023). The active presence of China and Russia may provide security reassurance for CA states to some extent. Such programs like the CSTO interstate program to strengthen Tajik-Afghan border cannot go unnoticed in relation to the security realm. The role of great powers in regional security cannot be underestimated and more research should be conducted in order to precisely predict their impact on the socialization of Afghanistan and economic connectivity programs initiated by CA.

Conclusion

This paper found that CA countries do not have one regional policy regarding Taliban, but all of them agree on the inevitability of facing the Afghans for the regional security as stipulated by the assignment of mission to engage them into the region by major powers even though vulnerability of CA states to such issues as proliferation of radical ideologies, narcotics, terrorism and illegal migration limit the scope of their interactions.

According to before mentioned positive economic connectivity, we could come to the conclusion under a theory of economic dependence that open trade and other economic relations may open broader ways to solve the security issues and provide CA states with larger instruments of negotiations. As was indicated in the article, the cooperation patterns cannot be determined fully in the nexus of transboundary issues and counter-terrorism measures. On one hand, given assurance in Doha agreement in 2021 and the supporting statistics in reduction of the violent activities inside of Afghanistan, on the other hand, the examined existing links with terrorist networks and apparent financial provision give off quite an ambiguous link between economic re-engagement efforts and the hope for regional stability. Therefore, it can be confidently stated that the economic cooperation between 2 entities did not reach the level of economic interdependence due to the absence of clear evidence in changing the Taliban or strengthening the regional security. It can be argued that it is early to provide the clear relationship between the growing economic interactions and regional stability amid systemic constraints as the absence of international recognition, while the probability of such a development cannot be discredited in long-term range.

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Did Social Media Bots Skew the Public Perception of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?

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Abstract*

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a testament to the role of social media in shaping the international narrative. With the development of artificial intelligence technologies such as OpenAI, automated accounts now serve as a powerful tool in influencing online conversations. The aim of this paper is to offer an evaluation of bot activity on X in the framework of analyzing the impact of Israeli-Palestinian conflict on social media discussions. It employs data and content analysis to breakdown the human to bot engagement ratio, as well as to compare patterns in their expressed opinions. Drawing from methods used in previous studies, bot accounts were identified in a small sample of X users that were found engaging with posts of political nature. The results of this research offer a new perspective on the assessment of automated accounts as a tool in political discourse, demonstrating how bot accounts severely warp the authenticity of public opinions. In so doing, it explains how bots are employed by state actors, specifically Israel, in order to amplify false narratives and manipulate the public discourse.

Introduction

This research paper will evaluate the influence of social media bots on the online perception of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The outbreak of the war between Israel and Palestine in October 2024 has been a culmination of the tension building up ever since the Israeli state came into existence. The public's perception online of this conflict has been difficult to assess ever since the phenomenon of social media bots. In this study, social media bots refer to automated accounts, trained on a particular algorithm for a certain goal and operating with little to no human interference. Although automated accounts have always existed on the internet, they have become especially sophisticated and complex in their design with the recent developments of the OpenAI framework (Ali et al. 2024). There have been multiple cases of social media bots on the X platform, formally Twitter, deliberately spreading misinformation and propaganda. For example, whole bot networks were created to advance false political statements during the first Republican debate (Graham and Fitzgerald 2023). Bots have even been found supporting U.S. politicians to fund Israel's military, according to Frenkel (2024). Therefore, this

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particular study will assess the authenticity of the engagement with posts in support of Israel, examining the role of automated accounts in creating false opinions.

The primary research question of this paper is: Did social media bots skew the public perception of the Israel-Palestinian conflict? Specifically, the following issues will be addressed:

1. What is the average ratio of human-bot engagements on an X post?
2. Do human users get more engagements than bot accounts on X?
3. What are the patterns that differentiate human and bot opinions?
4. Can bot accounts manipulate public opinion?

It is beyond the scope of this study to encompass the entire situation of social media bots, given the obvious time constraints and financial concerns. With regard to the research methods, some limitations need to be acknowledged. Firstly, the small sample size is insufficient to correctly generalize the results. Secondly, X's newest updates to the platform make it unable to get accurate results. In particular, X API, formerly Twitter Developer API, is no longer free. Instead, it is integrated into the aforementioned X Premium subscription. The Twitter API was an easily available way to get statistical information about social media trends, but it has been discontinued since February 2023. This has subsequently stopped Botometer X's activities, as it is currently in archival mode due to the aforementioned X update. It runs on prerecorded data before May 2023, meaning there is no data for accounts made after the cutoff. To cover for this limitation, it was best to identify bot activity on accounts relying on several measurement values. Finally, the accuracy of the measurement values and the manual labeling results are ambiguous due to the limitations of my own human judgement. Thus, more research is needed in order to evaluate the larger role and influence of automated accounts on online political discourse.

The author has completed the Self-Assessment Form of the Research Ethics Committee of SDU, which showed that she does not need to apply for an Ethics Review and therefore can continue with the research.

However, official X developer terms state: "Academic researchers are permitted to distribute Post IDs and/or User IDs solely for the purposes of non-commercial research on behalf of an academic institution, and that has been approved by X in writing, or peer review or validation of such research." Since the author does not have such permission, measures were taken to anonymize each user. Each account was assigned a random string of letters and numbers, and any identifiable information has been omitted when using individual posts for illustrative purposes.

Literature review

There is a large volume of published studies describing the role of automated accounts on social media, particularly in the political context. One well-known study that is often cited in the research on pro-Israeli bots is that of Frenkel (2024), who described the usage of social media bots in targeting U.S. lawmakers. These actions were said to be organized by the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, suggesting that the involvement of automated accounts in the Israeli-Palestine war has become a key characteristic of Israeli foreign policy.

Graham and Fitzgerald (2023) undertook a major project of analysing bot activity on X during the first Republican primary debate, which identified 1200 automated accounts spreading false information across the platform, as well as a separate bot network of 1305 accounts. The networks also feature verified accounts with blue verification checkmarks, which were previously used to distinguish accounts made by real individuals. Currently, the blue checkmarks and the subsequent verification are a monthly subscription feature, bringing into question the validity of existing accounts. The study concluded that Twitter doesn't have a reliable strategy against disinformation and lacks the much-needed moderation, which became worse with new updates.

A good summary of the behaviour of bot accounts on X has been provided in the work of Baydoun and Semaan (2024). In describing how bots imitate human behaviour, they examined how bots reply to posts by using OpenAI's text generation tools. The contents of the targeted post are used to provide a prompt to tools like ChatGPT, which will generate a response in a short amount of time. To further imitate human behaviour, bots often repost viral or random content unrelated to politics.

Additionally, one of the key findings in the research done by Wojcik, Messing, Smith, Rainie & Hitlin (2023) indicated that a small number of highly active bots share a significant amount of links to popular news and media sites, illustrating the prominent role of automated accounts on X. They have employed Botometer X to identify bots, and their methods were subsequently used in this current study.

These studies clearly indicate that there is a relationship between social media bots and online political discussions, and support the notion that Twitter has a consistent bot problem.

Methodology

For this study, a mixed research methods design was adopted, specifically the explanatory sequential design (Wipulanusat et. al. 2020). It consisted of two stages: quantitative, which used data analysis, and qualitative, which involved content analysis.

Twitter was chosen as the primary social media platform because of its existing bot framework. Twitter API (Application Programming Interface) lets users outside of the company create programs that could integrate with the platform. Bots have been on Twitter since its creation, but they were utilized for non-malicious means, such as helping users navigate the website more efficiently (Ali et al. 2024). As the platform developed, the variety of bots started increasing too. Because Twitter had a publicly available API, users were free to create their own bots. Although the update for February 2023 discontinued the free access leading to the discontinuation of many automated programs, bots remained a large part of the platform (Wojcik et al. 2023).

Studies of Twitter posts have traditionally employed the usage of search terms in order to find relevant data (Kim et al. 2013). After a brief overview of the posts related to the topic, the search term "IDF soldiers" was chosen to be used. Since the author wanted to specifically collect users who replied to a post made by a bot account, a purposive sampling method was chosen (Nikolopoulou 2023). Because of the expected difficulty in obtaining and analysing large quantities of data, a small sample size was selected. Using the "Advanced Search" function, the author searched for posts from June to August 2024, which had at least 200 replies, 1000 likes, and 500 reposts.

The author chose a post from an automated account as the primary data source. The account has been found interacting with the official Israel account, and it currently has over 22 thousand tweets. It also has a blue verification check mark, indicating a subscription to X Premium, which pushes a user's tweets into the algorithm. It ensures that the viewership of a tweet will increase in number, taking precedence over non-verified user tweets.

The post says: "The way the boy hugs his leg is speechless. Even the Palestinian children know that the IDF soldiers are there to protect them.". The attached video shows IDF soldiers giving food to a Palestinian child.

The significance of deliberately choosing a post from an automated account lies in the attempt to discover whether posts made by bot accounts can influence human opinion. The usernames of each account that has replied to this post were manually collected. The data was collected in roughly 3 days, starting from the 6th of October. The cleaned data was analyzed over the course of 12 days, starting on 6th November and finishing on 18th November. Out of 248 comments, 220 accounts were identified. Further data cleaning, which included removing banned and deleted users, left the author with 209 accounts.

Many researchers have utilized Botometer X in order to identify potential automated accounts. Botometer X was developed by Kai-Cheng Yang and Sarah Beverton in the Observatory on Social Media, a research center at Indiana University (Yang et al. 2022, pp 1511–1528). Botometer X measures bot activity as a value out

of five that is then assigned to a user. It was chosen as the most appropriate tool for detecting Twitter bots. It uses a random forest machine learning algorithm, which merges multiple decision trees in order to reach a singular result. The decision trees use the information extracted from each account, such as follower count, activity, username, etc. A major advantage of the algorithm is its ability to learn non-linear decision boundaries, which makes Botometer X flexible in detecting automated accounts. For this research, the author will specifically refer to the methodology developed in the study by Wojcik et al. at the Pew Research Center (2023). Because Botometer X specifically measures the likelihood of a user being a bot, a threshold is needed to determine whether an account was automated or not (Yang et al. 2022, pp 1511–1528). According to Wojcik et al. (2023), after a series of tests, the most appropriate score for determining the status of an account is 0.43 or higher.

However, Botometer X's weakness is its data cutoff: it hasn't analyzed any accounts past May 2023. After the initial usage of the tool, manual labeling was needed in order to ensure that the remaining accounts were identified as accurately as possible. To identify the likelihood of automated accounts, the following parameters were used:

1. The authenticity of engagement with other users (coherency of their replies);
2. High frequency of posting (more than 5 posts a day);
3. High frequency of repetitive and generic content (reposting their previous content, usage of AI-generated pictures);
4. The amount of shared links (bots usually share links to sites not connected to X);
5. Suspicious ratio of followers to the amount the account is following back (for example, bot accounts can follow a large number of accounts and not have many followers in comparison);
6. Unusual username patterns (nonsensical quantities of numbers and letters);
7. High number of reposts (more than 5 reposts in a day).

If any of the accounts met at least 4 of these criteria, they were classified as automated accounts.

The number of posts and the duration of the account's existence were also taken into account when looking at the recent activity. Examining the user behind the tweet used as a data source in this study revealed that the account was created in March 2023 and currently has about 22800 posts. As of 27th November 2024, the account has existed for 638 days. This means that the user would have to post approximately 35 times a day to reach the current amount of posts. Because this factor was highly dependent on the other measurement parameters, it was not included as a separate criterion.

Although the referenced research study (Wojack et al. 2023) includes a ‘blue checkmark’ verification as a valid verification measure, it is no longer considered as such. The blue checkmark was previously a well-established verification feature on the website, being given to accounts via a legacy system. After 2024, the checkmark is a part of a paid subscription, which can be obtained by any user. Users with blue checkmarks automatically get their tweets boosted in the algorithm, which means more people can see their posts. Thus, the blue checkmark was not included in the list of valid measurement criteria.

Moving on to the second, qualitative stage of analysis, the author chose the two most-liked replies from both human and bot accounts. Their engagement metrics were recorded to possibly link them with the results of the content analysis. Content analysis was done in order to gain a deeper understanding of the message expressed in the comment, examining the intentions of the user behind the comment (Alafwan et al. 2023). Then, the identified patterns from the two replies were compared.

Results

Out of 209 accounts, Botometer X identified 100 bots and 17 humans. The author has recorded the most recent Botometer scores given to the each of 117 accounts. The results of Botometer X left the author with a total of 92 accounts made after the data cutoff. Manual tagging was performed to approximate the likelihood of bot activity on the remaining data. Overall, there is a 61 to 148 human-to-bot ratio. The differences between the results of Botometer X and manual labeling are highlighted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Comparison of Botometer and manual labeling results



Source: Own design based on Botometer X and manual labeling results

For the qualitative analysis, the two most liked replies to the original post were identified. The following are their contents:

Human-generated comment: “Weak propaganda. Theres plenty of photos of Jewish children being sweet to Nazi soldiers who give them treats”. There is an attached screenshot of an article by Kelly Burke, “The Jewish boy who became a Nazi mascot: the extraordinary story of Alex Kurzem.”

Bot-generated comment: “This is the difference between us and them.”.

Table 1 showcases the comparison of their respective engagement metrics.

Table 1: Engagement of the two most liked comments as of November 25, 2024

Comments	Replies	Retweets	Likes	Views
Human-generated	3	14	52	950
Bot-generated	9	3	46	1200

Source: own design based on the data of the comments

Discussion

What is interesting about the collected data is the higher probability of bot accounts compared to human users. It is difficult to explain this result, but it might be related to the fact that Botometer X's threshold was developed to mostly get an average estimate of the bot accounts (Wojack et al. 2018). The recommended threshold was between 0.5 and 0.7, so yielding such results at a threshold lower than that was quite surprising.

Closer inspection of the results obtained from the manual labeling of 92 accounts shows a more equal number of bot and human users. A possible explanation for this might be that the method for manual labeling largely differs from the data-driven decision-making process of an algorithm.

Furthermore, what stands out in the Figure 1 is the dominance of automated accounts over human users. Although the manual labeling results are more even in terms of the human-to-bot ratio, the number of bots is still higher. This might imply that posts made by bot accounts are likely to attract engagements from other bots, not human users.

Thus far, a number of studies have identified that Israel has been using fake accounts to spread pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian messages during the Gaza conflict (Frenkel 2024; Ali et al. 2024). Multiple security updates from Meta and OpenAI elaborated on removing several Israeli-based networks from their platforms (Nimmo 2024). They ultimately link back to STOIC, an Israeli-based political marketing firm that generates anti-Palestinian, anti-Muslim, and pro-Israeli messages. In May 2024, a threat report by OpenAI specifically elaborated on the Zero Zeno case, which targeted Canadian and American audiences (Nimmo 2024). The accounts used the

OpenAI model to actively generate a variety of content: articles, links, images, bios, etc. The content was also cross-posted across multiple Meta platforms.

As the Table 1 illustrates, the human-generated comment overall has more likes than the bot-generated one but has fewer views. This suggests that the expressed opinion by the bot account was not as supported despite the larger amount of views. In turn, the bot-generated comment also has more replies, which may be due to the fact that the bot account has more followers and thus a higher chance for engagement.

The most liked human-generated comment expresses that the original post is a propaganda attempt, and proceeds with a clearly structured argument against the sentiment expressed by the original poster. In comparison, the account behind the second most-liked comment has been directly identified as pro-Israeli. The implied "Us versus Them" narrative is present in the message and indicates the agenda-driven motivation of the reply. The lack of a personal message, combined with the clear presence of a political agenda, is something that differentiates the two replies.

Taken together, these results suggest that social media bots are used to boost both the engagements and messages of pro-Israeli posts.

Conclusion

The aim of this investigation was to assess the role of automated accounts in influencing human opinions. The results of the study provide a new perspective on the assessment of bot accounts in online political participation, adding to a growing body of literature on social media bots in political contexts. These findings suggest that the information spread by agenda-driven automated accounts is inefficient to fully influence public opinion. Furthermore, the collected data implies that bot accounts are more likely to engage with other bots, mutually boosting their social media presence. This study also strengthens the idea that the patterns expressed in bot opinions do not have enough authenticity to meaningfully engage with a human audience. Future research could be conducted to determine the effectiveness of bot influence in spreading political narratives and subsequently impacting political discussions online.

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Exploring the Causes of Brain Drain in Kazakhstan: Insights from ‘Work & Travel’ Program Participants

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Abstract

In recent years, it can be observed that intellectual migration is a global problem in many countries and Kazakhstan has also been subjected to the brain drain effect. Young people and highly qualified professionals often leave their native country in search of better opportunities such as recognition of talent, high salaries and to see the world. For the purposes of the study, interviews in online and offline formats were used. Interviews were conducted with 12 participants who gained work experience abroad due to the ‘Work and Travel’ program, many of whom returned home, and some stayed abroad. This study examines the factors why youth in Kazakhstan leave the country. The findings reveal that the primary motivations for intellectual migration include low salaries in Kazakhstan compared to other countries for young highly qualified specialists, expanding the horizon and experiencing new cultural environments. Moreover, the research highlights the impact of the ‘Work and Travel’ program on the brain drain problem in Kazakhstan and the media artists that motivate the young generation to leave the country.

Keywords: Brain drain, intellectual migration, Kazakhstan, Work and Travel

Introduction

The paper shows the influence of brain drain on young people and how it affects Kazakhstan's political and economic spheres. Consequently, the research question is ‘What are the causes of brain drain among the youth in Kazakhstan?’ Brain drain or intellectual migration is the process of emigration of highly qualified specialists from the state (Young, 2024). Brain drain (intellectual migration) is one of the main problems in Kazakhstan. Many highly qualified specialists or students prefer to live abroad. Conditions in Kazakhstan, unlike in more developed countries, can also play a big role in the choice of young people. Corruption, low salaries, and disrespect for working staff are key problems.

There is also the popularity of the ‘Work and Travel’ program, which gives students a high chance to get a visa, travel and stay abroad. The ‘Work and Travel’ program provides international culture exchange and gives young people job opportunities. Students get a chance to earn more money in the same job that they can work in Kazakhstan. Jobs such as waiter, dishwasher can earn in a week in the USA as well as for a month's work in Kazakhstan. Especially with the help of the media and advertising on social networks, we can also observe how students are becoming more and more inspired by programs from major universities in

Kazakhstan that have had experience with this program. Some participants returned to Kazakhstan and shared their experiences, and some stayed and told their reasons and the pros and cons of living abroad.

The Kazakhstani government is gradually trying to combat this problem, but so far this problem remains relevant and at this rate, the state will lose more and more young talents every year.

Table 1. Statistics of people who left for 4 years

Year	Total number of residents who left Kazakhstan	% of people with higher education
2021	25,322	36.2%
2022	26,581	36-38%
2023	27,980	38-40%
2024	29,449	42.1%

Source: Askhat, G. “Causes and consequences of Kazakhstan’s brain drain,” 2024, *The Diplomat*

Literature review

A key aspect of this research concerns the brain drain and how it influences Kazakhstan's politics, economics, and social spheres. There is currently no single definition of brain drain. The term "brain drain" first appeared in a 1962 report of the British Royal Society and denoted the emigration of scientists, engineers, and technicians from Great Britain to the United States (Dunker & Humblot, 2020).

Before long, it started to be utilized all over. Since that time, the global brain drain has risen considerably and impacted the economies of nations (Sulakshin, 2012). While developing countries are struggling with brain drain, recipient countries are receiving an influx of labor and an improvement in the demographic and economic sector at the expense of migrants (Cavallini, 2018). Intellectual migration (brain drain) is also a part of global migration and can further develop the process of globalization (Rapoport, 2012).

In 1990, the crisis began in Kazakhstan and the unemployment rate increased, and in order to find any job during this period, people often left their homes to look for a better job (Abazov, 2010). In the current period, residents of Kazakhstan are already trying to improve their financial situation using such programs as 'Work and Travel'. It can be said that the current reason for emigration was not the need to find a job, but the search for more favorable working conditions for workers. Nowadays, we can observe how developing countries with more improved economies are trying to create more favorable conditions for immigrants within the framework of migration policy (Kapyshev, 2021). According to Ledeneva (2014), brain drain can be viewed in a broad sense as 'migration flows of qualified personnel working abroad for more than one year', as well as in a narrow sense as 'migration of scientific and technical specialists and creative intellectuals' (Stryabkova, 2021). Researchers concur that the migration patterns of highly skilled professionals are shaped by their professional goals and the socio-economic and political conditions of both their origin and target countries (Scott, 2007; Gesing & Glass, 2019).

Kazakhstan's economy has long been considered one of the most promising in Central Asia due to its abundant natural resources and advantageous position. In Strategy Kazakhstan-2050 (2012), the main strategic document of Kazakhstan now, it is written that the Kazakh nation has 'a great opportunity to capitalize on our human capital and rightfully position ourselves in the world' (Part II, Section 2, para. 4). However, one of the country's main problems is the preservation of a talented workforce. According to recent research, a significant proportion of the country's youth, especially those with higher education, are increasingly seeking to move to countries with more developed economies such as the United States, the EU and Russia. According to Milyutin (2019), a Kazakh deputy of Mazhilis, three times more doctors, four times more teachers, and five times more technical specialists left Kazakhstan than in 2019. As well as the outflow of young people from the country, the scale of which is now close to critical. 'This is a continuation of the decline in the level of human capital, the quality of life of Kazakhstanis, confidence in the future and the lack of affordable education in the country,' the deputy said, voicing the request of the faction of the People's Party of Kazakhstan. In 2020, 54.3% of the people who left were highly qualified people with higher education and emphasized that there are many talented and educated people in Kazakhstan (Milyutin, 2020).

Still, if conditions do not improve, Kazakhstan will continue to provide talented people to Russia and the whole world (Zhanmukanova, 2021).

One of the main mechanisms promoting emigration is the ‘Work and Travel’ program offered by the US government. Young people often use this program to get a visa to the United States and then stay there after the program ends. This program allows young people to get the opportunity to work in the United States and experience life overseas. Although the ‘Work and Travel’ program allows young professionals to gain international experience, earn money and immerse the culture of another country, the long-term consequences of their departure are serious. In the January-March 2024 period, the number of high professionals who left the country was 3785 (Ashkat, 2024). Since 2023 the number of civilians who left Kazakhstan increased by 42.1% (Ashkat, 2024). It does not consider people studying or working abroad, because no one can guarantee they will return home (Ashkat, 2024). Furthermore, a lot of talented young people in Kazakhstan cannot get a chance to prove themselves and get an opportunity. Some of the most famous examples are popular media artists who have achieved dizzying success in Russia such as Scriptonite, Mdee, Deguinne, etc. As well as Imanbek and Dimash Kudaibergenov, who became world stars (Zhanmukanova, 2021). Such popular personalities can motivate young creative people to leave Kazakhstan, as these personalities have ideally shown that if you are not recognized in your country, then you can succeed in another country.

The influence of brain drain can lead to some consequences and ruin the image of the country. This review shows significant gaps in the literature regarding the impact of the ‘Work and Travel’ program and how it affects young people. Further study of this problem will help to understand the decision of young people to leave and stay abroad. A deeper study can create strategies that will reduce the level of brain drain in the country and improve conditions for young people. According to the Concept of Migration Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017-2021 (2017), Kazakhstan can face the problem of an increase in the outflow of qualified personnel and talented youth (Section 2). ‘In order to solve this problem, different strategies, that will create new migration policies, will be used. For instance, it is planned to develop the human capital of Kazakhstan by attracting foreign workers on short-term and long-term projects’ (Concept of Migration Policy, 2017, Section 2). According to the Concept of the Migration Policy for 2023-2027 (2022), The EU member states are facing a growing labor shortage in key industries. In 2023, Kazakh nationals held twice as many valid residence permits for employment in Poland (3943 vs 1673) and Hungary (1,103 vs 450) compared to 2021 (Concept of Migration Policy, 2022). According to the UNHCR (2023), 11277 people from Kazakhstan applied for asylum. Key strategic documents such as the ‘Kazakhstan-2050’ Development Strategy and the Strategic Development Plan until 2025 focus

on strengthening human capital and improving the quality of life, including for those involved in migration. In his 2021 address, President Tokayev emphasized the significant impact of migration on the labor market where Migration Policy Concept 2023-2027 plays an important role (Concept of Migration Policy, 2022).

However, if there are no changes, Kazakhstan will continue to provide talented and highly qualified specialists to the world.

Methodology

In total, twelve interviews were conducted with students of Kazakhstani universities who worked abroad thanks to the 'Work and Travel' program. Some interviews were conducted in Almaty in person as an informal conversation in October of 2024, but most were conducted online due to the fact that some respondents were based either in Astana or in the US. The participants were recruited using a convenient sampling method. At first, the contact information of some participants was found through the author's acquaintances and social networks. The respondents represented different regions of Kazakhstan such as Almaty, Atyrau, Aktau, Aktobe, Astana, Kaskelen and Taraz. However, many of them at the time of the interview lived either in Astana or in Almaty, the two largest cities in Kazakhstan, with some exceptions to the respondents who lived in the United States. They represented various universities such as SDU University, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (ENU), Narxoz, and KIMEP. Their subject areas included economics, politics, pedagogy, engineering and linguistics. Russian was the language of the interview, and the respondents answered in Russian and Kazakh. The average interview time was 15-30 minutes. Some of the interviews that were conducted offline were conducted using a voice recorder. Notes were recorded online to identify the dominant patterns associated with the participants' perception of work and life opportunities abroad and the 'Work and Travel' program. The platform for online meetings was social messengers, such as Instagram, Telegram and Discord, as it was easier and more convenient for the young generation to discuss various topics using these platforms. The author received SDU University ethical clearance. The interviews were conducted from October to early November. Some interviews during the September period were similar to an informal dialogue with representatives as the author had friendly relations with some participants. Coding and transcribing

In general, it was not difficult to find a set of participants for this project, as many participants of the 'Work and Travel' program published information about the program on their social networks and many participants were happy to share their experiences. Some participants were unable to participate due to work and difficulty finding time for interviews. The topic is also sensitive for Kazakh society, especially since it can be highlighted that older generation do not support young people abroad

because of a conservative view. To cope with this growing problem, follow-up questions were asked to learn more about the program in more detail and give participants a wider range for answers. Despite the small number of participants in the interview, we were able to identify key aspects that united the participants and showed more individual solutions.

Findings

Not all participants returned after the program, there were participants who still wanted to stay abroad. The participants were asked three questions, for the participant who stayed abroad, the questions were changed but left a similar meaning.

- 1) Why did you decide to come back? Why did you decide to stay?
- 2) Why do you think the youth want to leave the country?
- 3) Are you planning to move abroad or stay in Kazakhstan? Are you planning to fly back to Kazakhstan or stay in the US?

Among the data obtained, several reasons can be identified as to why students want to leave their homes for the opportunity of a better life abroad. Among them are low salaries in Kazakhstan in comparison with other countries for highly qualified specialists and a high level of corruption. One of the participants mentioned that 'It is hopeless to work in Kazakhstan since you can be fired not even because of bad work, but because some 'Bake/Sake' (relative or friend with high status) needs to push his son through and the youth, of course, do not like such an outcome'. Also, participants praised the 'Work and Travel' program, which provides an opportunity to expand the horizon and experience new cultural environments. Although life abroad sounds good, many participants are students who have not completed their bachelor's degree and they return to Kazakhstan to get a diploma. This does not negate the fact that the interview participants plan to apply for a master's degree abroad. Some participants believe that they will be able to change the system in Kazakhstan and improve the standard of living like in Europe and the USA. As we can see for many participants of the 'Work and Travel' program It has proved to be a key tool for navigating both the future and the opportunities of Kazakhstan as a country. Many people having visited foreign countries to broaden their horizons, could return to improve the life of their native home and use their knowledge to improve the country's economy, while others chose the 'American Dream' and stayed to work in a country with more favorable working conditions.

Discussion

Ledeneva (2014) explained that brain drain can be considered broadly as 'migration flows of qualified personnel working abroad for more than one year'. Brain Drain is a problem that causes Kazakhstan to lose young talents every year.

With the development of technology, young people are developing more and more and trying to find more favorable and convenient conditions for themselves in the future. Especially specialists who have already participated in major events as students, but cannot find a job due to the problems of high standards and low salaries in the country. Foreign investors often offer students more favorable conditions to work with them in their country, which also plays a role for students. The subject of this article remains new and unexplored to the end. Especially for Kazakhstan, which is facing this problem and still has not been able to solve it. This topic remains interesting, especially after the popularity of the "Work and Travel" program, but since the topic has become popular in Kazakhstan not so long ago, we can see few works related specifically to the program.

Programs such as 'Work and Travel' contribute to the growth of emigration. The popularity of this program and its more convenient way of obtaining a visa motivates students to try their hand and work abroad. It is worth noting that the number of willing participants in this program is growing, you can understand it by the growing number of companies and how these companies make their advertisements at universities. Unfortunately, for the future participants of the 'Work and Travel' program, the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election of 2024 may play poorly for them, since one of the reforms of the new president is to reduce the number of migrants and impose of harsh policies against them. It can be said that the 'Work and Travel' program has had a great impact on the brain drain problem in Kazakhstan. Will Kazakhstan be able to solve the problem of brain drain? It is hard to say, especially with the current problems in the country. The government must work to ensure that young people have more opportunities in the country and eliminate the level of corruption so that future specialists have a chance to prove themselves. Even many participants from the interviews point out the problem of the government, in particular, the problem of corruption, which affects their decision. Participant number 7 expresses his dissatisfaction: 'It is hopeless to work in Kazakhstan, since you can be fired not even because of bad work, but because some 'Bake/Sake' needs to push his son through and the youth, of course, do not like such an outcome'. If the government does not fix and improve conditions for students and more highly qualified specialists, and programs such as 'Work and Travel' and similar other programs will become more popular, then we can say that Kazakhstan will continue to provide young talents to other countries such as the United States, Russia and Europe.

Conclusion

This paper points out the multifaceted causes of brain drain in Kazakhstan, underlining the influence of the ‘Work and Travel’ program. According to the findings, the emigration of young, highly qualified specialists is driven by socio-economic factors such as low salaries, high corruption levels, and a lack of career growth opportunities. The exposure to diverse cultural experiences and higher earning potential abroad serves as an additional incentive for intellectual migration. While some participants return to Kazakhstan after studying or working abroad, many view foreign countries as their long-term choice for living and professional self-realization due to the more favorable living and professional conditions. Such cases only highlight the need to solve the systemic problems of the political and economic structure of Kazakhstan in the interests of retaining its labor forces.

In this context, the only way to prevent brain drain is by taking anti-corruption measures, improving working conditions, and creating a strong ecosystem of personal and professional development. Otherwise, Kazakhstan will lose part of its human capital in countries with more developed economies. Further research might be related to the development of specific actions aimed at decreasing intellectual migration and creating conditions that would help young professionals feel comfortable inside the country.

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Egemen Qazaqstan және Tengrinews.kz басылымдарында ЖИ тақырыбында жарияланған мақалаларға контент-анализ

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Аңдатпа

Бұл зерттеу Egemen Qazaqstan және Tengrinews.kz басылымдарында 2024 жылы жарық көрген жасанды интеллект (ЖИ) туралы мақалаларға контент-анализ жүргізу арқылы олардың негізгі тенденцияларын, мазмұндық ерекшеліктерін және қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы рөлін зерттейді. ЖИ-дың БАҚ-та жариялануы медиа репрезентация теориясы негізінде қарастырылады.

Зерттеу барысында ЖИ-дың БАҚ-тағы дискурсы екі негізгі бағытта дамитыны анықталды: біріншісі – технологиялық жетістіктер мен оның артықшылықтарын насихаттау, екіншісі – ЖИ-дың этикалық, әлеуметтік және экономикалық ықпалын талқылау. Egemen Qazaqstan басылымында ЖИ-дың мемлекеттік саясаттағы, білім беру мен этика салаларындағы рөлі жиі көтерілсе, Tengrinews.kz ЖИ-дың инновациялық және экономикалық әлеуетіне көбірек назар аударады.

Зерттеу әдісі ретінде сандық контент-анализ қолданылып, 2024 жылы жарияланған 18 мақала (әр басылымнан 9) талданды. Талдау нәтижелері ЖИ технологиялары туралы медиа материалдардың ақпараттық мазмұнын жүйелі түрде түсінуге, сондай-ақ қоғамда ЖИ технологияларына деген көзқарасты анықтауға мүмкіндік береді.

Кілт сөздер: жасанды интеллект, контент-анализ, БАҚ, медиа репрезентация, Egemen Qazaqstan, Tengrinews.kz.

Кіріспе

Жасанды интеллект (ЖИ) технологиялары соңғы онжылдықта әртүрлі салаларға еніп, адам өміріне тікелей әсер етіп жатыр. ЖИ-дың бизнес, денсаулық сақтау, білім беру және мемлекеттік басқару сияқты бағыттарда тиімділігі артып жатса да, оның этикалық, әлеуметтік және экономикалық салдары туралы сұрақтар да қатар көбеюде (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019). Бұқаралық ақпарат құралдары ЖИ туралы пікір қалыптастыруда маңызды рөл атқарады, өйткені БАҚ – технологияның артықшылықтары мен ықтимал қауіп-қатерлерін көпшілікке жеткізудің негізгі арналарының бірі (Zhang & Dafoe, 2020).

БАҚ ЖИ туралы ақпаратты қалай береді? ЖИ технологиялары қандай контексте сипатталады? Осы сұрақтарды қою арқылы журналистикадағы ЖИ дискурсын зерттеудің негізін таба аламыз. Мысалы, The New York Times, The Guardian, BBC сияқты халықаралық медиа алыптар ЖИ-ды негізінен

технологиялық жетістіктер мен инновациялық шешім ретінде көрсетсе, кейбір сараптамалық басылымдар оның жұмыспен қамту, деректер қауіпсіздігі, этика және саясатқа әсерін талқылайды (Brennen, 2020).

Жасанды интеллект БАҚ-та кеңінен талқыланып жүрген тақырыптардың бірі болғандықтан, оның дамуы, артықшылықтары мен ықтимал қауіптері жайлы ақпарат күн сайын жаңарып, қоғамда түрлі пікір қалыптастырып жатыр. Алайда ЖИ туралы материалдардың берілу тәсілі әрдайым объективті емес. Бұқаралық ақпарат құралдары жасанды интеллектті не адамзаттың болашағын түбегейлі өзгертетін технология ретінде асыра дәріптейді, не оны жаһандық қауіп ретінде сипаттайды. Осылайша ЖИ-дың БАҚ-тағы репрезентациясы көбіне әсірелеуге ұшырайды.

Қазақстандық БАҚ-та да ЖИ тақырыбына қызығушылық артып келеді. Egemen Qazaqstan, Tengrinews.kz, Kazinform, Informburo.kz сияқты жетекші ақпарат көздерінде ЖИ-дың еліміздегі цифрлық трансформацияға ықпалы, мемлекеттік басқару жүйесіндегі орны және қоғамға әсері туралы мақалалар жарық көрген. Соның ішінде Egemen Қазақстан және Tengrinews.kz басылымдары ЖИ тақырыбын 2024 жылы ерекше назарға алды.

Аталмыш басылымдар ЖИ-дың ел экономикасына ықпалын, білім беру және денсаулық сақтау салаларындағы жаңа мүмкіндіктерін, сондай-ақ оның этикалық мәселелерін талқылайды. ЖИ туралы жарияланымдар мазмұны көбінесе екі түрлі ұсынылады: позитивті (технологиялық жетістіктер мен олардың мүмкіндіктерін мадақтау) және негативті (этикалық мәселелер мен қоғамға әсер ететін қауіп-қатерлерін атап өту). Осы сияқты ЖИ-дың этикалық қолданылуы, деректер қауіпсіздігі, жұмыс орындарының қысқаруы және оның шешім қабылдау процестеріне әсері туралы мәселелер БАҚ-та жиі талқыланады (Brennen, 2020).

Бұл мақалада 2024 жылғы Egemen Қазақстан және Tengrinews.kz басылымдарында жарық көрген ЖИ туралы мақалалардың негізгі тенденциялары, мазмұндық ерекшеліктері және олардың көңіл-күйі талданады. Негізгі мақсат – БАҚ-тағы ЖИ туралы материалдардың қоғамда пікір қалыптастырудағы рөлін анықтау. Бұл талдау ЖИ технологиялары туралы қоғамдық пікірді дұрыс түсінуге және оларды тиімді коммуникация құралы ретінде пайдалануға мүмкіндік береді.

Әдебиетке шолу

Жасанды интеллект (ЖИ) технологиялары соңғы онжылдықта БАҚ саласында үлкен өзгерістер әкелді. Бір жағынан, ЖИ журналистикадағы деректерді өңдеу, жаңалықтарды автоматты түрде жазу және ақпарат тарату жылдамдығын арттыру үшін қолданылады (Brennen, Howard & Nielsen, 2020).

Екінші жағынан, ЖИ-дың дамуы ақпараттық қауіпсіздік пен этикалық мәселелерді де тудырды (Zhang & Dafoe, 2020).

ЖИ-дың БАҚ-қа әсерін зерттеген ғылыми еңбектерде ЖИ технологияларының медиа саласын түбегейлі өзгертіп жатқаны айтылады. Kaplan мен Haenlein өз еңбектерінде ЖИ-дың жаңалықтарды автоматты түрде жасау қабілетін талдап, оның журналистикадағы маңызын қарастырды. Сонымен қатар, Zhang & Dafoe зерттеулерінде ЖИ-дың БАҚ-та ақпарат тарату сипатына әсерін және қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы ықпалын атап өтті.

Brennen және оның әріптестері 2020 жылы жүргізген зерттеуде ЖИ журналистиканы толықтырушы құрал ретінде ғана емес, сонымен қатар қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырушы фактор ретінде де қарастырылады. БАҚ-тағы ЖИ туралы материалдар көбіне технологиялық жетістіктерге назар аударады, бірақ оның қоғамға әсері туралы сын-пікірлер де бар (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019).

ЖИ-дың БАҚ беттерінде көрініс табуы негізінен үш негізгі дискурстық бағытта сипатталады:

1. Технологиялық прогресс және инновация: ЖИ-дың экономикалық және технологиялық артықшылықтары, оның ақпарат өңдеудегі тиімділігі мен журналистерге көмегі айтылады.
2. Әлеуметтік және этикалық мәселелер: ЖИ-дың жұмыс орындарына әсері, жалған ақпарат тарату қаупі тарқатылады.
3. Құқықтық реттеу және саясат: ЖИ технологияларын бақылау қажеттілігі, заңнамалық шектеулер, ЖИ-дың саяси шешімдерге ықпалы жазылады (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019). ЖИ туралы БАҚ-тағы ақпараттың берілу сипаты осы дискурстардың қайсысы басым болатынына байланысты өзгеріп отырады.

ЖИ-дың БАҚ беттерінде жариялануын зерттеген Brennen және Kaplan & Haenlein еңбектерінде медиадағы ЖИ дискурсының әртүрлі факторларға байланысты өзгеретіні анықталған. Біріншіден, медианың саяси бағыты ақпараттың берілу сипатына ықпал етеді: кейбір БАҚ ЖИ-ды технологиялық прогрестің символы ретінде оң сипаттаса, басқалары оны әлеуетті қауіп ретінде көрсетеді. Екіншіден, басылымның мақсатты аудиториясы да маңызды рөл атқарады. Бизнеске бағытталған ақпарат құралдары ЖИ-ды экономикалық тиімділік пен инновациялық мүмкіндіктер көзі ретінде қарастырса, әлеуметтік тақырыптарға маманданған БАҚ оның жұмыспен қамту, адам құқықтары және этикалық аспектілерге әсерін талқылайды. Үшіншіден, ЖИ дискурсына аймақтық ерекшеліктер ықпал етеді. Мысалы, АҚШ пен Еуропада ЖИ-дың ғылыми және технологиялық даму мүмкіндіктері жиі айтылса, дамушы елдерде оның әлеуметтік ықпалы мен қатерлері басты назарға алынады.

ЖИ туралы ақпараттық материалдарда көбінесе этикалық және әлеуметтік мәселелер қозғалады. Brennen және оның әріптестері атап өткендей, ЖИ-дың БАҚ-тағы репрезентациясы көбінесе екі негізгі бағытта, яғни позитивті және негативті бағыттарда жүреді. Позитивті дискурста ЖИ-дың экономикалық өсімге ықпалы, бизнес пен инновациядағы рөлі, тиімділікті арттыру мүмкіндігі жатады (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019). Негативті дискурс: ЖИ-дың жұмыс орындарын қысқартуы, алгоритмдердің әділетсіздігі, жалған ақпарат тарату қаупі және жеке деректердің қорғалуы (Zhang & Dafoe, 2020).

ЖИ-дың БАҚ-тағы репрезентациясы жаһандық деңгейде әр түрлі сипатталады. Мысалы, америкалық және еуропалық басылымдар ЖИ-дың технологиялық мүмкіндіктерін кеңінен насихаттайды. Бұл аймақта ChatGPT, Google Gemini, OpenAI сияқты жасанды интеллект өнімдері кеңінен талқыланып, құқықтық реттеу мәселелері жиі көтеріледі. Zhang және Dafoe атап өткендей, Еуропалық Одақ ЖИ-ды құқықтық тұрғыдан шектеу мен реттеу мәселелеріне ерекше назар аударады. Азия елдеріндегі БАҚ көбінесе оның мемлекеттік басқару мен білім беру жүйесіне әсерін талқылайды. Жапония, Қытай және Оңтүстік Корея БАҚ-тары ЖИ-дың экономикалық тиімділігіне ерекше мән береді. Қытайда ЖИ “ақылды қалалар” жүйесінде және мемлекеттік басқаруда кеңінен қолданылады, ал жапон медиасында ЖИ-дың адам өміріне интеграциясы жиі қозғалады. Германия мен Францияда этикалық мәселелер мен құқықтық реттеу басты назарда (Zhang & Dafoe, 2020).

Қазақстандық медиада ЖИ-дың репрезентациясы енді қалыптасып келеді, десе де отандық БАҚ-та да аталған факторлардың барлығы дерлік байқалады. 2024 жылы Egemen Qazaqstan және Tengrinews.kz басылымдарында ЖИ-ға байланысты бірнеше мақалалар жарық көрді. Egemen Qazaqstan газеті ЖИ-дың қоғамға тигізер әсері, этикалық мәселелері және мемлекеттік реттеу қажеттілігіне көбірек мән берсе, Tengrinews.kz көбінесе ЖИ-дың экономикалық және технологиялық әлеуетіне назар аударады. Egemen Qazaqstan басылымы ЖИ-дың қазақ тіліндегі дамуы, оның мемлекеттік басқарудағы орны мен құқықтық реттеу мәселелерін жиі көтереді.

Бұл дискурста ЖИ-дың ұлттық мүддеге сәйкестігі мен оның елдің цифрлық трансформациясындағы рөліне ерекше мән беріледі. Ал Tengrinews.kz болса, көбінесе ЖИ-дың бизнес, инновация және технологиялық даму тұрғысынан мүмкіндіктерін қарастырады. Онда ЖИ-дың экономикалық тиімділігі, стартаптар мен IT саласындағы маңызы, сондай-ақ оның кәсіпкерлік пен жаңа жұмыс орындарын құрудағы рөлі жиі талқыланады. Осылайша әр түрлі БАҚ ЖИ-ды түрлі қырынан көрсетіп, аудиторияның көзқарасына әсер ететін медиалық дискурс қалыптастырады.

Мысалы, Egemen Qazaqstan басылымында “Жасанды зерденің ерекшелігі” атты мақалада (2024) ЖИ-дың болашақта білім беру және

мемлекеттік басқару жүйесіне ықпалы сипатталған. Ал Tengrinews.kz-тің “Жасанды интеллекттің дамуынан қорқу керек пе?” атты мақаласында (2024) ЖИ-дың мүмкіндіктері мен қатерлері салыстырмалы түрде қарастырылған.

Әдіснама

Бұл зерттеу жұмысы жасанды интеллект (ЖИ) туралы 2024 жылы жарияланған мақалаларды сандық әдіс, нақтырақ айтқанда сандық контент талдау әдісі арқылы жүргізеді (Krippendorff, 2018). Мақала медиа репрезентация теориясына негізделеді.

Зерттеуде қолданылған контент-анализ әдісі БАҚ материалдарындағы негізгі тенденцияларды анықтауға мүмкіндік береді (Krippendorff, 2018). Контент-анализ – мәтінді сандық және сапалық тұрғыдан талдау әдісі және ол зерттеліп отырған материалдың мазмұнын жүйелі түрде жіктеуге көмектеседі (Neuendorf, 2017).

Медиа репрезентация теориясы БАҚ-тың ақпаратты белгілі бір идеологиялар мен әлеуметтік құрылымдарға сәйкес қалай көрсететінін талдауға мүмкіндік береді (Hall, 1997). Осы тұрғыда БАҚ-тың ЖИ туралы репрезентациясы арқылы технологияға қатысты қоғамдық пікірге қалай ықпал ететінін талдайды. Зерттеу нысаны ретінде Қазақстанның жетекші басылымдары Егемен Қазақстан және Tengrinews.kz-те жарық көрген материалдар таңдап алынды.

Зерттеу деректерін жинау үшін 2024 жылы Егемен Қазақстан және Tengrinews.kz басылымдарында жарияланған, жасанды интеллектке қатысты мазмұнды қамтитын материалдар қарастырылды. Іздеу “жасанды интеллект” және “технология” кілт сөздері бойынша жүргізілді. Іздеу нәтижесінде әр басылымнан 9 мақала, жалпы алғанда 18 мақала таңдап алынды.

Сандық талдау негізінде мақалалар саны, ондағы жиі қолданылған сөздер мен негізгі категориялар есептелді. Кейін мақалалардың мазмұнындағы тақырыптық бағыттар анықталды (экономикалық ықпал, этикалық мәселелер, технологиялық жетістіктер). Контент талдау негізінде тақырыптар кодталып, негізгі категорияларға жіктелді (ЖИ-дың экономикаға әсері, этика мәселелері). Мақаланың жалпы көңіл-күйі (позитивті, нейтрал, негативті) анықталды (Neuendorf, 2017). Талдау нәтижелері кесте және диаграммалар арқылы көрсетілді.

Бұл зерттеу тек екі басылымды қамтитындықтан, оның нәтижелері Қазақстандағы барлық БАҚ-тың ЖИ туралы жарияланымдарын толық көрсете алмауы мүмкін. Сонымен қатар, деректер 2024 жылмен шектелген, демек уақыттан тыс өзгерістерді ескермейді.

Зерттеу нәтижелері

Зерттеу нысаны ретінде екі басылым арнайы таңдалды. Бас критерий — басылымдардың құрылтайшылары. Egemen Qazaqstan “Қазақ газеттері” ЖШС-ына қарасты республикалық басылым болса, Tengrinews — “Alash Media Group” медиахолдингінің құрамына кіретін, өзін жекеменшік арна санайтын медиа.

Зерттеу барысында Tengrinews басылымынан 9 мақала, теңгерімді сақтау үшін Egemen Qazaqstan басылымынан 9 мақала таңдап алынды (мақала категориясына сай келмейтіндері бар).


Tengrinews басылымы

Tengrinews.kz сайтынан “жасанды интеллект” кілт сөзі бойынша бары 9 мақала табылды. АІ тақырыбын ауқымды ашқан 3-4 мақала бар, қалған жарияланымдар ақпараттық сипатта берілген.

Мақалаларда жасанды интеллект технологияларының дамуына байланысты қорқыныш пен үміт мәселелері көтерілген. ЖИ-дің қазіргі даму деңгейі, мүмкіндіктері, қатерлері мен болашағы жайлы жазылған. Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті Қасым-Жомарт Тоқаевтың жасанды интеллектті қолдану қажеттілігі туралы пікірі және оны ұлттық даму бағытына енгізу туралы айтқандары, Қазақстан халқына үндеуінде айтқан жаңа идеяларды қабылдау, инновацияларды игеру және экономикалық даму жайы, елде жасанды интеллект жүйесін құруға қатысты бастамасы қамтылған. Сонымен қатар, жасанды интеллекттің туризм саласындағы рөлі мен оның саяхатшылар үшін пайдасы, туристерді тарту үшін ұсынған жаңа қызметі, 2024 жылы туристер арасында ең танымал елдер туралы жасанды интеллекттің болжауы жазылған. Қазақстанда жасанды интеллекттің қазақ тілінде сөйлеуі туралы мәселелер де көтерілген.

Талданған мақалаларда жиі ұшырасқан сөздер кездесті. Мәселен, “қауіп”, “қауіптер” деген сөздер 7 рет, “ақпараттық қауіпсіздік”, “этникалық, діни, әлеуметтік топтар” тіркестері 5 рет, “мүмкіндіктер”, “жалған ақпарат немесе фейк жаңалықтар” тіркестері 4 рет қайталанған. Қайталанған сөздер негізінде категориялар құрылды.

Диаграмма 1. Tengrinews.kz мақалаларында жиі қайталанған сөздер



Дереккөз: Автор

Талдау нәтижесінде мақалаларда жасанды интеллекттің қаупі мен оның ықпалына қатысты негізгі тенденциялар байқалды. Біріншіден, мақалалардың басым бөлігі ЖИ-дің дамуымен қатар оның ақпараттық қауіпсіздік пен әлеуметтік жанжалдарға ықпалын айтқан. Диаграммадағы ең жиі қайталанған сөз — “қауіп”. Бұл ЖИ-дің дамуымен бірге қоғамдағы қауіп-қатерлерге байланысты алаңдаушылықтың жоғары екенін көрсетеді. Мақалаларда “ақпараттық қауіпсіздік”, “әлеуметтік топтарға әсері” сияқты тіркестердің жиі қолданылуы да осыны растайды. ЖИ-дің кибершабуылдар, деректердің бұрмалануы, жеке мәліметтердің ұрлануы секілді мәселелерге ықпал етуі – мақалаларда талқыланған басты тақырыптардың бірі.

Екіншіден, фейк жаңалықтар мен жалған ақпараттың таралуының қоғамға және этникалық, діни қақтығыстарға әсері сөз болған. Талдауда “жалған ақпарат”, “фейк жаңалықтар” сөздері жиі кездескен. Бұл ЖИ-дың ақпарат таратуда жағымсыз әсерінің маңызын көрсетеді. Мақалаларда deepfake технологиялары, жалған жаңалықтарды тарату арқылы қоғамдық пікірді манипуляциялау, әлеуметтік және этникалық топтар арасында шиеленісті күшейту қаупі жиі сөз болған.

Оған қоса, жиі кездескен тенденция ретінде ЖИ технологияларын дұрыс пайдалану мен реттеу қажеттілігін атап өтуге болады. “Мүмкіндіктер” деген сөздің бірнеше рет қайталануы ЖИ-дың оң әсерін де көрсетеді. Дегенмен оны жауапкершілікпен қолдану, этикалық стандарттарды сақтау және заңнамалық реттеу қажеттігі баса айтылған.

Жалпы, мұндағы ЖИ туралы мақалалардың көпшілігі оның қоғамға ықпалы мен оны реттеу қажеттігін көтеретінін көрсетеді. Ақпараттық қауіпсіздік, әлеуметтік тұрақтылық және этикалық мәселелер – Tengrinews жарияланымдарында басымдық берілген негізгі аспектілер.

Egemen Qazaqstan басылымы

Egemen Qazaqstan басылымының сайтынан “технология” кілт сөзі бойынша 9 мақала іріктеліп алынды. Жасанды интеллект тақырыбында көбінесе сараптамалық мақалалар берілген.

Бұл басылымдағы мақалаларда жасанды интеллекттің мүмкіндіктері мен даму жайы жан-жақты қамтылған, ЖИ қолданысының артықшылықтары мен қатерлері тең дәрежеде көрсетіледі. Негізгі көтерілген тақырыптар – технологиялық прогресс пен этика мәселелері.

Мақалаларда жасанды интеллекттің қоғамдағы ролін, оның қолдану ерекшеліктері және білім жүйесіндегі әсері талқыланған. Қазақстандағы цифрлық үкіметтің дамуындағы ЖИ ролін; оны дамытуға арналған бес жылдық стратегияны, мақсат-бағыттарын қарастырған. Қазақстанда жасанды интеллектті дамыту үшін қажетті инфрақұрылым, кадр мәселелері мен деректер қауіпсіздігін, сондай-ақ қазақ тіліндегі ЖИ өнімдерін дамытуға арналған қауымдастықтардың бастамаларын сипаттайды.

Диаграмма 2. Egemen Qazaqstan мақалаларында жиі қайталанған тіркестер



Дереккөз: Автор

Іріктелген мақалаларда “қазақ тіліндегі ЖИ” тіркесі 10 рет, “деректерді талдау”, “мемлекеттік стратегия”, “құқықтық реттеу” тіркестері 8 рет; “алгоритм мүмкіндіктері”, “цифрлық трансформация”, “технологиялық даму” тіркестері 5 рет, “қазақша ЖИ жобалары”, “стартап экожүйесі” тіркестері 6 рет, “деректер қауіпсіздігі” тіркесі 7 рет қайталанған.

Кодтау негізінде мақалаларда жиі кездескен тіркестерден бірнеше маңызды тенденцияны байқауға болады. Оның алғашқысы — қазақ тіліндегі жасанды интеллектке ерекше назар. Ең жиі қайталанған тіркес – “қазақ тіліндегі ЖИ” (10 рет). Бұл қазақ тілінде жұмыс істейтін жасанды интеллект өнімдерін дамыту қажеттілігінің маңызды тақырыпқа айналғанын айқындады. Қазақстанда ЖИ технологиялары негізінен орыс немесе ағылшын тілінде дамып келеді, ал мемлекеттік тілде ЖИ жүйелерін жетілдіру – өзекті мәселе. “Қазақша ЖИ жобалары” (6 рет) тіркесінің жиі қайталануы да осы тақырыптың өзектілігін растайды. Қазақстанда қазақ тіліне негізделген ЖИ жобаларына қызығушылықтың артып, олардың дамуын қолдау қажеттігін көрсетеді.

Екінші тенденция — жасанды интеллектті заңды реттеу және мемлекеттік стратегия. “Мемлекеттік стратегия”, “құқықтық реттеу” (8 рет) тіркестерінің жиі қолданылуы ЖИ технологияларын дамытудың мемлекеттік деңгейде реттелуі керектігін көрсетеді. ЖИ технологияларын заңнамалық тұрғыда бекіту, этикалық нормаларды қалыптастыру, деректер қауіпсіздігін қамтамасыз ету секілді мәселелер мақала авторларының назарында болған. “Деректер қауіпсіздігі” (7 рет) тіркесі ЖИ-дың деректермен жұмыс істеу ерекшеліктері мен ықтимал қауіп-қатерлерін талқылау маңызын білдіреді.

Келесі бір тенденция — ЖИ-дың мүмкіндіктері мен стартаптар. “Алгоритм мүмкіндіктері”, “цифрлық трансформация”, “технологиялық даму” (5 рет) тіркестерінің жиі кездесуі Қазақстандағы ЖИ әлеуеті мен оның әр түрлі салаларда қолданылу мүмкіндіктері белсенді талқыланғанын көрсеткен. Сондай-ақ, “стартап экожүйесі” (6 рет) тіркесінің жиі кездесуі Қазақстанда ЖИ негізінде жаңа стартаптарды қолдау, инновациялық жобаларды дамыту маңызды екеніне меңзейді. Аталған тенденция мемлекет тарапынан ЖИ саласына инвестиция салу және кәсіпкерлер үшін жаңа мүмкіндіктер жасау қажеттігін айқындайды.

Жалпы, мақалаларда ЖИ-дың әлемдік даму тенденциялары мен Қазақстанда оны енгізу мәселелері қатар талқыланған. Авторлар Қазақстанның ЖИ саласында дамыған елдерден қалыс қалмауы үшін қандай қадамдар жасау қажеттігін саралаған. Egemen Qazaqstan мақалалары негізінен қазақ тіліндегі ЖИ жобаларын қолдау, ЖИ-ді заңды реттеу, мемлекеттік стратегияларды іске асыру, ЖИ мүмкіндіктерін пайдалану, стартаптарды дамыту және деректер қауіпсіздігі тақырыптарына бағытталған. Бұл

Қазақстандағы ЖИ саласының дамуында ұлттық ерекшеліктерге назар аударылып, оны заңдық және технологиялық тұрғыда қолдауға үлкен мән беріліп отырғанын көрсетеді.

Талқылау

ЖИ-дың БАҚ беттерінде жариялануы оның медиа индустриясындағы рөлін ғана емес, қоғамда қалыптасатын пікірлерді де анықтайды. ЖИ-дың БАҚ-тағы репрезентациясы туралы еңбектерді талдау көрсеткендей, ЖИ технологияларының жағымды-жағымсыз қырлары қатар беріледі. Tengrinews және Egemen Qazaqstan басылымдарындағы жасанды интеллект тақырыбын талдау барысында екі басылым да ЖИ технологияларының қоғамға ықпалын жан-жақты қарастырғаны көрінді. Басымдылық технология дамуы мен мемлекеттік саясатқа берілгенімен, әр басылым өзінше ерекшеліктерін көрсеткен.

Елдегі медиа нарықтың құрылымы, оның мемлекеттік және жекеменшік БАҚ-қа бөлінуі ЖИ туралы дискурстың ерекшеліктеріне әсер етеді. Egemen Qazaqstan қоғам мен этика мәселелеріне көбірек мән берсе, Tengrinews технологиялық прогресс пен экономикалық аспектілерді жиі қозғаған. Egemen Qazaqstan мақалалары бейтараптыққа жақын, ғылыми көзқарасты жиі қолданады. Tengrinews-та керісінше, ЖИ болашағы туралы оптимистік көзқарас ұсынады. Екі басылым да ЖИ-дың жұмыссыздық пен деректер қауіпсіздігіне қатысты ықтимал қатерлерін атап өтеді. ЖИ-ды дамытуға арналған мемлекеттік бағдарламалар мен стратегиялар екі басылымда да маңызды тақырып ретінде көрсетілген.

Екі басылым да мемлекеттік басқару мен цифрландырудың маңыздылығын баса көрсеткен. Tengrinews бизнестегі қолданылуына басымдық берсе, Egemen Qazaqstan білім беру және медицина салаларын жиі қозғайды. Tengrinews мақалаларында ЖИ технологияларының экономикалық және инновациялық әлеуеті туралы көбірек айтылады. Egemen Qazaqstan мақалалары жасанды интеллектің этикалық, құқықтық, және қауіпсіздік мәселелерін талқылауға ерекше көңіл бөлген.

Мақалаларды көңіл-күйі бойынша талдасақ, Egemen Qazaqstan мақалаларының 60%-ы бейтарап, 30%-ы оң, 10%-ы сақтық танытатын сипатта. Tengrinews.kz мақалаларының 70%-ы оң, 20%-ы бейтарап, 10%-ы ЖИ-дың ықтимал қатерлерін сипаттайды.

Қорытындылай келе, жасанды интеллект туралы дискурс екі басылымда да әртүрлі қамтылған: Tengrinews ЖИ-дың технологиялық және экономикалық аспектілерін алға тартып, оң көзқарас басым көрсетсе, Egemen Qazaqstan ЖИ-дың қоғамға әсері, этикалық мәселелер және мемлекеттік саясатқа көбірек мән береді. Екі басылымның материалдары ЖИ

технологияларының маңызын дәлелдей отырып, оның қауіптерін де көрсеткен. Контент-анализ әдісін қолдану арқылы ЖИ дискурсының негізгі тенденцияларын анықтау мүмкіндігі жоғары. Бұл зерттеу қазақстандық БАҚ-та ЖИ дискурсының қалай қалыптасып жатқанын, оның қандай аспектілері жиі талқыланатынын және ЖИ-дың медиа саласындағы болашағы қандай бағытта дамитынын анықтауға көмектеседі.

ЖИ-дың БАҚ-тағы репрезентациясының сапасын арттыру үшін бірнеше қағиданы ұстану қажет. Біріншіден, материалдар ғылыми негізді дереккөздерге сүйенуі тиіс. Екіншіден, ЖИ туралы ақпаратты бейтарап ұсыну маңызды. Оның артықшылықтары мен шектеулерін тең дәрежеде көрсету қажет. Үшіншіден, ЖИ туралы күрделі ақпаратты, терминдерді қарапайым әрі түсінікті тілмен жеткізу керек. Төртіншіден, фактчекинг механизмдерін күшейтіп, жалған ақпараттың таралуына жол бермеу қажет.

ЖИ-дың БАҚ-тағы репрезентациясы оны технологиялық серпіліс, жаһандық қауіп немесе құқықтық мәселе ретінде көрсетуге негізделген және ол уақыт өте келе өзгеріп отырады. Технология дамыған сайын, оның медиадағы бейнесі де жаңа қырынан қарастырылатыны анық. Сондықтан болашақта ЖИ туралы ақпараттың объективтілігі мен сапасын қамтамасыз ету маңызды болмақ.

Қорытынды

ЖИ технологиялары медиадағы ақпарат ағынын өзгертіп, деректерді өңдеу мен сараптауды жаңа деңгейге көтерді. Қазақстандық медиада бұл тақырып енді ғана қарқын алып келеді, дегенмен оның дамуы мен реттелуі туралы сапалы материалдар саны артып жатыр. Жасанды интеллект туралы жазу – қызықты әрі жауапкершілікті талап ететін жұмыс. Журналистика ЖИ-дың артықшылықтарын ғана емес, оның ықтимал қауіп-қатерін де ашық көрсетуі тиіс. Дегенмен ЖИ-дың ықпалымен жалған ақпараттың таралу қаупі де күшейіп келеді, сол себепті де оның реттелуі маңызды. Сенімді дереккөздерді пайдалану, ақпаратты түсінікті жеткізу және этикалық мәселелерді ескеру маңызды. ЖИ болашақтың технологиясы болғанымен, оны дұрыс қолдану және оның шектеулерін түсіну — журналистиканың бүгінгі міндеттерінің бірі. Сол арқылы қоғамның ЖИ-ды дұрыс түсінуіне және оны тиімді пайдалануына жол ашылады. Жасанды интеллект тақырыбын талдау технологиялық жақтан ғана шектелмейді, ол әлеуметтік, құқықтық және моральдық мәселелерді де қамтиды. Қазақстандық журналистикада ЖИ туралы сапалы сараптамалық материалдар көбейген сайын, қоғам бұл жаңа технологияны саналы түрде қабылдап, оның мүмкіндігі мен шектеулерін түсіне бастамақ. Ақпараттық қауіпсіздік пен деректердің құпиялылығын сақтау мәселесі де күн тәртібінен түспек емес.

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Әлеуметтік желінің билік шешімдеріне әсері (Шерзат Болат оқиғасының мысалында)

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Андатпа

Бұл зерттеу жұмысы Қазақстандағы әлеуметтік медианың билік шешімдеріне ықпал ету деңгейін қоғамда резонанс тудырған Талғардағы 16 жастағы жасөспірімнің оқиғасы мысалында зерттей отырып, Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру (Uses and Gratifications Theory) теориясы бойынша қарастырады. Зерттеу «Маңызды мәселерді талқылауда дәстүрлі БАҚ-қа қарағанда әлеуметтік желінің әсері басым ба» деген сауалға жауап іздеуге бағытталған. Осы мақсатта зерттеу жұмысы Шерзат Болаттың оқиғасы жөнінде әлеуметтік желілерде кеңінен таралған материалдарды талдай отырып, олардың билік шешімдеріне әсер ету деңгейін бағалайды.

Зерттеу барысында сандық және сапалық әдістер қолданылды. Алдымен, мәселені анықтау мақсатында әлеуметтік желілерде белсенді түрде пікір білдірген қолданушылардың жазбалары мен олардың оқырмандарының пікірлері сапалық контент-талдау арқылы қарастырылды. Сондай-ақ, халықтың ақпарат алу көздеріне жүгіну себептерін түсіну үшін 100-ден астам тұрғынды қамтитын сауалнама әдісі қолданылады.

Зерттеу нәтижелері әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы рөлін анықтап, олардың саяси шешімдерге ықпал ету мүмкіндіктерін және билік пен халық арасындағы жаңа коммуникациялық механизмдерді қалыптастырудағы маңыздылығын көрсетуге бағытталған. Зерттеу индуктивті әдіске негізделіп, қоғамда резонанс тудырған нақты оқиғаны талдау арқылы негізгі мәселелерді айқындауға бағытталған.

Кілт сөздер: әлеуметтік желі, билік, дәстүрлі БАҚ, мәселе.

Кіріспе

Қазіргі таңда әлеуметтік желілер мен жаңа медиа алаңдары қоғамның саяси процестеріне айтарлықтай әсер етіп, олардың динамикасын өзгертуде. Әсіресе, әлеуметтік желілердің ақпарат тарату жылдамдығы, қолжетімділігі және әртүрлі қоғам топтарының өз пікірлерін білдіру мүмкіндігі оларды саяси шешімдерге ықпал ететін маңызды алаңға айналдырды (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Әлеуметтік медиа арқылы көтерілген мәселелер тек қоғамдық пікірді қалыптастырумен шектелмей, сонымен қатар билік шешімдеріне де ықпал етеді. Бұл жағдай азаматтардың белсенділігін арттырып, қоғамдық пікірдің саяси процестердегі рөлін айқындайды.

2024 жылдың қаңтарында елімізде әлеуметтік желілерді пайдаланушылар саны 14,10 миллионға жетіп, бұл жалпы халықтың 71,5%-ын құрады. Алдыңғы жылмен салыстырғанда бұл көрсеткіш 2,25 миллион

қолданушыға артқан. Әлеуметтік желі пайдаланушыларының көбеюі ақпараттық кеңістікте белсенді пікір білдірушілердің санын арттырумен қатар, олардың көзқарастарын талдау арқылы қоғамдық пікірдің жалпы бағытын түсінуге мүмкіндік береді. Бұл пікірлер азаматтардың әлеуметтік мәселелерге көзқарасын көрсетіп, қоғамдық пікірді қалыптастырудың маңызды құралына айналып отыр

Қазақстанда әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы рөлін айқын көрсеткен оқиғалардың бірі – Шерзат Болаттың өлімі. 2024 жылдың 4 қазанында Алматы облысы, Талғар қаласында болған төбелес кезінде 16 жасар Шерзат Болат пышақ жарақатынан қаза тапты. Бұл оқиға қоғамда үлкен резонанс туғызып, әлеуметтік желілерде кеңінен талқыланды.

Алғашқы мәліметтер бойынша, төбелес тұрмыстық жанжалдан басталды деген болжамдар айтылғанымен, кейіннен оқиғаның себептері мен оған қатысушылар туралы әртүрлі мәліметтер пайда болды. БАҚ пен әлеуметтік желі қолданушылары оқиғаға «Хуторские» деп аталатын ұйымдасқан топтың мүшелері қатысқанын жазды. Ресми органдар бұл топтың тіркелмегенін мәлімдегенімен, қоғамда олардың әрекеттеріне қатысты күмән күшейе түсті.

Оқиғадан кейін көп ұзамай Шерзат Болаттың отбасына қысым көрсетілді деген ақпарат тарайды. 12 қазанда оның отбасының үйі өртеніп, Ішкі істер министрлігі бұл оқиғаны қасақана жасалған қылмыс ретінде қарастырды. Тергеу амалдары жүргізіліп, күдікті ретінде 11 адам қамауға алынды. Жергілікті билік өкілдері мен құқық қорғау органдарының әрекеттері әлеуметтік желілерде өткір сынға алынды. Қоғамдық қысымның артуы нәтижесінде Талғар қаласының әкімі, оның орынбасары және аппарат басшысы қызметінен босатылды.

Аталған жағдай әлеуметтік желілердің әділетсіздікке қарсы күрес құралына айналғанын көрсетті. Әлеуметтік желілерде азаматтық белсенділер, журналистер және блогерлер бұл мәселені белсенді түрде талқылап, билік органдарының назарын аудартуда маңызды рөл атқарды.

Бұл зерттеуде әлеуметтік желілердің саяси процестер мен билік шешімдеріне әсері нақты қандай деңгейде екенін анықтауға тырыстық. Әлеуметтік желілер арқылы қоғамның пікірін білдірудің саяси процестерге қалай ықпал ететінін, сондай-ақ билік пен халық арасындағы диалогтың жаңа құралдарын талдауды мақсат тұттық. Зерттеу жұмысының нысаны ретінде әлеуметтік желілерде белсенді түрде қатысатын, 10 мыңнан астам оқырманы бар азаматтардың Шерзат Болаттың қайғылы оқиғасына қатысты жариялаған жазбалары қарастырылады. Бұл жұмыс барысында 763 мың оқырманы бар қоғам белсендісі Айтбек Амангелді, 231 мың оқырманы бар «Журналистер одағының мүшесі» Жан Ахмадиев, 13,9 мың оқырманы бар белсенді Саида Таукелева, 98,5 мың оқырманы бар "Халық заңгері" Мейрман Шекеев және

56,4 мың оқырманы бар азаматтық белсенді Алпамыс Жарылқасынов сияқты тұлғалардың пікірлері мен ақпараттық жазбалары зерттеу объектісі ретінде таңдалды.

Бұл азаматтар Шерзат Болаттың трагедиясын әлеуметтік желі арқылы кеңінен таратып, халықты құлақтандырып, қоғамның назарын аударуға белсенді түрде атсалысты. Олардың жарияланымдары мен әрекеттері әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікірді қалыптастырудағы және саяси шешімдерге ықпал етуіндегі маңызды рөлін көрсетеді. Осы зерттеу арқылы әлеуметтік желілердің саяси процестер мен шешімдерге әсерін талдау және олардың қоғамдағы рөлін бағалау көзделеді.

Қазақстандағы әлеуметтік медианың саяси процестерге ықпалы қандай деңгейде? Әлеуметтік желілер қоғам пікірін қалыптастырып, билік шешімдеріне әсер ете ала ма? Билік пен халық арасындағы диалогтың жаңа құралы ретінде қарастырылатын әлеуметтік медиа саяси процестердің ашықтығына қалай ықпал етеді?

Бұл зерттеу осы сұрақтарға жауап іздеуге бағытталып, Шерзат Болат оқиғасына қатысты белсенді азаматтардың әлеуметтік желілерде жариялаған материалдарын сараптау арқылы әлеуметтік медианың билікке ықпал ету мүмкіндіктерін талдауды көздейді.

Теориялық негіздеме

Бұл зерттеу Қазақстандағы әлеуметтік медианың билік шешімдеріне ықпал ету жолдарын Шерзат Болаттың оқиғасы мысалында қарастырып, Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясы шеңберінде талдайды. Бұл тәсіл аудиторияның медианы жеке қажеттіліктерін қанағаттандыру үшін қолданатынын және осы үдерістің белгілі бір көзқарастар мен құндылықтарды қалыптастыруға әсер ететінін көрсетеді (Blumler & Katz, 1974)

Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясы бұқаралық коммуникация саласындағы маңызды тәсілдердің бірі болып табылады. Бұл теория 1950-1960 жылдары дамып, аудиторияның бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарын тұтыну себептерін зерттеуге бағытталды.

Шрамм, Лайл және Паркер (Schramm, Lyle & Parker, 1961) балалардың телевизияны пайдалану деңгейін олардың зияткерлік қабілеттері мен әлеуметтік ортасына байланысты қарастырды. Мендельсон (Mendelsohn, 1964) радионы тыңдаудың негізгі функцияларын анықтап, Герсон (Gerson, 1966) аудиторияны зерттеуде нәсілдік айырмашылықтардың маңыздылығын атап өтті.

1970-жылдарға дейін зерттеулер аудиторияның медианы пайдалану себептерін сипаттауға негізделді. Алайда, бұл теорияға бірнеше сын айтылды. Эллиотт (Elliott, 1974), Свенсон (Swanson, 1977) және Байби (Bybee, 1980)

оның ұғымдық негізінің нақты еместігін, түсініктерінің күрделілігін және аудиторияның медиаконтентті қабылдауын толық зерттей алмауын атап өтті (Лю, 2015).

Бұл сындарға жауап ретінде Кац, Гуревич және Хаас (Katz, Gurevitch & Haas, 1973) бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының әлеуметтік және психологиялық қажеттіліктерді қанағаттандырудағы рөлін жүйеледі. Розенгрен (Rosengren, 1974) аудитория медианы жеке ерекшеліктеріне және әлеуметтік ортасына сәйкес пайдаланатынын көрсетті.

Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясын (Uses and Gratifications Theory) теориялық тұрғыдан негіздеушілердің бірі швед ғалымы Виндал (Windahl, 1981) болды. Ол өзінің «Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясы: бетбұрыс кезеңі» атты еңбегінде бұқаралық коммуникацияны зерттеудегі дәстүрлі медиа әсерлеріне негізделген тәсіл мен жаңа бағыт арасындағы негізгі айырмашылықты атап көрсетті.

Дәстүрлі медиа әсерлері теориясын жақтаушылар коммуникациялық процесті бұқаралық ақпарат құралдары тұрғысынан қарастырса, пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясын зерттеушілер аудиторияның медиа тұтыну тәжірибесіне басымдық береді. Виндал бұл екі тәсілді бір-біріне қарсы қоюдың орнына, олардың ұқсастықтарына назар аударудың маңызды екенін атап өтті. Ол «теріс» ұғымын енгізе отырып, дәстүрлі медиа зерттеулері мен жаңа теориялық әдістерді біріктіру қажеттігін қолдады (Windahl, 1981).

Ғалымның пайымдауынша, коммуникациялық зерттеулерде тек аудиторияның медианы тұтыну себептерін зерттеумен шектелмей, медианың өзіне және оның қолданылу ерекшеліктеріне назар аудару зерттеу процесін тереңдетудің тиімді жолы. Виндалдың бұл көзқарасы аталмыш теорияны заманауи медиа зерттеулеріне сәйкестендіруге ықпал етіп, коммуникация саласындағы жаңа бағыттардың қалыптасуына жол ашты.

Қазіргі технологиялар пайдаланушыларға ақпаратты еркін таңдауға, контент жасауға және таратуға мүмкіндік беріп отыр. Осыған байланысты зерттеушілер бұл теорияны жаңа медиаға бейімдеп, аудиторияның интерактивті платформалардағы мінез-құлқын тереңірек түсінуге тырысуда (Sundar & Limperos, 2013).

Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясы әлеуметтік желілердің жеке тұлғалар үшін маңыздылығын, олардың медиа мазмұнын өз қажеттіліктерін қанағаттандыру мақсатында қалай пайдаланатынын түсінуге көмектеседі. Бұл теория әсіресе Шерзат Болат оқиғасы сияқты қоғамда резонанс тудырған мәселелерге қатысты әлеуметтік медиа арқылы жеке пікірін білдірген тұлғалардың мысалында, қоғамдық пікір мен саяси шешімдерге қалай ықпал ететінін жан-жақты зерттеуге мүмкіндік береді. Әлеуметтік желілердің әсері

әрдайым терең әрі көпқырлы болғандықтан, бұл теория олардың ықпалын нақтырақ және толықтай талдауға жол ашады.

Әдебиетке шолу

Әлеуметтік желілер және олардың қоғамдық пікір мен саяси шешімдерге ықпалы тақырыбы соңғы жылдары ғылыми зерттеулердің маңызды бағытына айналған. Әлеуметтік медиа кеңістігінде орын алған өзгерістер мен олардың саяси жүйеге ықпалы көптеген ғалымдардың еңбектерінде жан-жақты қарастырылған. Бұл зерттеуде әлеуметтік желілердің билік шешімдеріне әсер ету деңгейін түсіну үшін шетелдік және отандық зерттеушілердің еңбектері негізге алынған.

Алғашқылардың бірі болып, Елена Вартанова әлеуметтік желілердің саяси шешімдер мен қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы рөлін зерттеген. Оның «Әлеуметтік желілер: қарым-қатынастан билікке дейін» («Социальные сети: от общения к власти») атты еңбегінде әлеуметтік медиа жеке тұлғалардың саяси көзқарастарын қалыптастыратын құрал ретінде сипатталған (Вартанова, 2018). Осы тұжырымды одан әрі кеңейткен Дмитрий Бадовский «Әлеуметтік медиа және саясат: интернет әлемді қалай өзгертеді» («Социальные медиа и политика: как интернет меняет мир») еңбегінде интернеттің саяси процестерге ықпалын зерттеп, әлеуметтік медиа арқылы биліктің стратегияларын қалыптастыру ерекшеліктерін қарастырған (Бадовский, 2020).

Бұл бағыттағы маңызды зерттеулердің бірі – Андрей Руденконың «Интернет және билік: әлеуметтік желілер саяси шындықты қалай өзгертеді» («Интернет и власть: как соцсети меняют политическую реальность») еңбегі болған. Ол әлеуметтік медиа арқылы қоғамдық пікірдің қалыптасуы мен билік құрылымдарының өзгеріске ұшырау мүмкіндігін талдаған (Руденко, 2019). Өз кезегінде, Зейнеп Туфекчи «Twitter: Желілік қарсылықтың күші мен әлсіздігі» («Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest») атты зерттеуінде Twitter сияқты платформалардың саяси наразылықтар мен қоғамдық қозғалыстарды ұйымдастырудағы рөлін қарастырған (Tufekci, 2017).

Әлеуметтік медиа мен демократия арасындағы өзара байланыс мәселесін Персиль Натаниэль мен Такер Джошуа өздерінің «Әлеуметтік медиа және демократия: Ғылыми саланың жағдайы және реформалау мүмкіндіктері» («Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field, Prospects for Reform») атты еңбектерінде жан-жақты талдаған. Олар әлеуметтік медиа платформаларының демократиялық процестерге ықпал ету мүмкіндіктерін бағалап, олардың саяси ландшафттағы рөлін анықтаған (Persily & Tucker, 2020). Бұл зерттеу Клэй Ширкидің «Бәрі осында: Ұйымдасу үшін ұйымдардың қажетсіз күші» («Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without

Organizations») атты еңбегімен үндескен, өйткені Ширки әлеуметтік желілердің ұжымдық әрекеттерге ықпал ету әлеуетін зерттеп, олардың саяси белсенділікке әсерін қарастырған (Shirky, 2008).

Итан Цукерман «Қайта байланысу: Байланыс дәуіріндегі цифрлық космополиттер» («Rewire: Digital Cosmopolitans in the Age of Connection») кітабында цифрлық медианың халықаралық және қоғамдық байланыстарды өзгертуін зерттеген. Бұл өзгерістердің саяси шешімдерге ықпалы Мануэль Кастельстің «Ашудың және үміттің желілері: Интернет дәуіріндегі әлеуметтік қозғалыстар» («Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age») еңбегінде талданған тұжырымдармен сәйкес келген. Кастельс интернет пен әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық наразылықтар мен әлеуметтік қозғалыстарды ұйымдастырудағы рөлін, сондай-ақ олардың билікке ықпал ету мүмкіндіктерін сипаттаған (Castells, 2012).

Дэвид К. Перри өз еңбегінде «Әлеуметтік медианың саяси күші» («The Political Power of Social Media») әлеуметтік медианың саяси коммуникациядағы орнын талдаған. Ол әлеуметтік желілердің саяси белсенділікке ықпал ету мүмкіндіктерін қарастырып, олардың мемлекеттік басқару және саяси қозғалыстар үшін тиімді құрал екенін атап өткен (Perry, 2015).

Жоғарыда қарастырылған еңбектер әлеуметтік медиа мен саяси процестер арасындағы байланысты тереңірек түсінуге мүмкіндік берген. Олардың барлығы әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы және саяси шешімдерге ықпал етудегі маңызды рөлін растаған.

Зерттеу әдіснамасы

Қоғамдық пікірді талдау барысында сапалы контент-талдауға басымдық берілді. Бұл әдіс мәтіндік талдаудың мағыналық аспектілеріне негізделген. Клаус Криппендорф мәтінді зерттеу процесінің мағынаға негізделетінін ерекше атап өтеді. Оның айтуынша, мәтіннің мәні сандық көрсеткіштерге айналғанымен, зерттеу нәтижесі зерттеушінің түсіндіру қабілеті мен көзқарасына тәуелді. Криппендорфтың пікірі бойынша: «Мәтіннің мағынасы тек символдар жиынтығында емес, оны қабылдайтын адамның қалай түсінетіні мен қандай контексте қарастыратынында жатыр» (Krippendorff, 2004).

Осы тұжырымдама Шерзат Болат оқиғасына қатысты қоғамдық пікірдің мазмұны мен табиғатын сапалық және сандық тұрғыда зерттеуге негіз болды. Зерттеудің негізгі әдіснамасы сапалық сипатта болды және контент-талдау тәсілін қолдану арқылы аудитория пікірлерін талдау жүзеге асырылды. Пікірлердің жинақталуы #Шерзатүшін және #ЗаШерзат хэштегтерімен

қалдырылған мәлімдемелерден басталды. Бұл әдіс әлеуметтік желілердің билік шешімдеріне ықпал ету механизмдерін түсінуге мүмкіндік береді.

Зерттеу пайдаланушылардың пікірлерін талдай отырып, аудиторияның көзқарастары мен мүдделерін айқындауға ұмтылды (Naab & Sehl, 2017). Зерттеу аясында медиа контентті және әлеуметтік желі белсенділігін салыстыру мақсатында TengriNews ақпараттық платформасындағы қазақ және орыс тілдерінде жарияланған 10 мақала және әлеуметтік желіде белсенді, 10 мыңнан астам оқырманы бар бес пайдаланушының жазбалары мен оларға жазылған пікірлер іріктелді. Нәтижесінде, 1000 маңызды әрі талдауға жарамды пікір таңдалып, сапалы контент-талдау әдісі арқылы санаттарға жіктелді (Schreier, 2012).

Пікірлер кодтау бірліктеріне бөлініп, негізгі екі пікір анықталды (Drisko & Maschi, 2016). Зерттеу нәтижелері көрсеткендей, пайдаланушылар өз пікірлерін білдіру арқылы қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырумен қатар, билікке ықпал етуге де тырысады. Әлеуметтік желілерде пікір қалдыру, қолдау көрсету және жауап беру сияқты құралдар қоғамдық белсенділікті күшейтеді. Қазақстандықтардың #Шерзат үшін хэштегімен ауқымды флешмоб ұйымдастыруы зерттеудің маңызды мысалы болды. Қолданушылар жасөспірімнің фотосын жаппай бөлісіп, әділдік талап етіп, хэштегі қолдау платформасына айналдырды. Қазіргі таңда бұл флешмобқа шамамен 700 мың қолданушы қатысуда. Бұл әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікірді жүйелеу және кең аудиторияға тарату құралы ретіндегі рөлін көрсетеді.

Қосымша әдіс ретінде, халықтың ақпарат көздерін пайдалану ерекшеліктерін зерттеу үшін 100-ден астам респондент қатысқан сауалнама жүргізілді. Бұл сауалнама зерттелетін топтың көзқарастары мен тәжірибелерін сандық және сапалық тұрғыда жинақтап, талдауға мүмкіндік берді. Мұндай кешенді әдіснама қоғамдық пікірді зерттеуде тиімді тәсіл болып табылады, себебі ол әлеуметтік желі мен медиа контенттің өзара ықпалын және аудиторияның қоғамдық мәселелерге реакциясын кешенді түрде талдауға мүмкіндік береді.

Зерттеу нәтижелері

Зерттеу нысаны ретінде әлеуметтік желілерде Шерзат Болаттың өліміне қатысты ақпаратты белсенді түрде таратып, қоғамдық пікір қалыптастыруға ықпал еткен, 10 мыңнан астам оқырманы бар бес қоғам белсендісінің — Айтбек Амангелді, Жан Ахмадиев, Саида Таукелева, Мейрман Шекеев және Алпамыс Жарылқасыновтың жазбалары таңдалды. Зерттеу екі кезеңнен тұрды: бірінші кезеңде әр белсендінің жазбаларындағы пікірлер жеке-жеке талданды, ал екінші кезеңде барлық жазбаларға қалдырылған пікірлер біріктіріліп, олардың ортақ идеялары мен негізгі тақырыптары айқындалды.

Әлеуметтік желі қолданушыларының пікірлері сапалық контент-талдау әдісі арқылы кодталып, мазмұнды элементтер мен негізгі тенденциялар анықталды. Бұл әдіс пікірлердің терең мазмұнын түсінуге және олардың қоғамдағы құқықтық және саяси мәселелерге әсерін бағалауға мүмкіндік берді. Пікірлерді біріктіру барысында олардың жиілігі, мазмұндық мағынасы және қоғамдағы мәселелерге ықпалы қарастырылды.

Айтбек Амангелдінің әлеуметтік желісіндегі белсенділігі

Айтбек Амангелді Instagram желісінде Шерзат Болаттың өліміне қатысты 8 жазба жариялаған. 12 қазан күні жарияланған бейнехабарламасы 1,5 миллион қаралым, 1821 пікір және 3994 таралым жинап, кеңінен талқыланды [15]. Жазбаға қалдырылған пікірлердің сапалық контент-талдауы барысында оқырмандардың оқиғаға қатысты бірнеше негізгі көзқарастары анықталды. Алғашқы 200 пікірдің ішінде "Ашық сот" тіркесі 38 рет қайталанып, қоғамның құқықтық жүйенің ашықтығына деген жоғары сұранысын көрсеткен. Сонымен қатар, "Әділ шешім" тіркесі 41 рет, ал "Жазалансын" деген сөз 24 рет айтылып, оқырмандардың әділдікті қамтамасыз етуге және кінәлілерді жауапкершілікке тартуға деген талаптарын нақты көрсеткен (Кесте 1). Пікірлердің бір бөлігі Шерзаттың отбасына көңіл айту мен қолдау білдіруге бағытталған, бұл қоғамның ортақтасу мен моральдық қолдау көрсетуге дайын екендігін айқындады.

Кесте 1. Мейрман Шекеевтің әлеуметтік желісіндегі белсенділігі

Көрсеткіш	Сандық мән	Түсіндірме
Жарияланған жазбалар	8	Шерзат Болаттың өліміне қатысты жазбалар саны
Кеңінен таралған жазба күні	12 қазан	Ең көп қаралым жинаған бейнехабарлама
Қаралым саны	1,5 миллион	Жазбаның қоғамда үлкен резонанс тудырғанын көрсетеді
Пікірлер саны	1821	Қолданушылардың белсенділігі мен мәселе бойынша қызығушылығы
Таралым саны	3994	Ақпараттың таралу ауқымы
"Ашық сот" тіркесінің жиілігі	38 рет	Құқықтық жүйенің ашықтығына сұранысты білдіреді

"Әділ шешім" тіркесінің кездесу жиілігі	41 рет	Әділдікті талап ететін пікірлердің саны
"Жазалансын" тіркесінің кездесу жиілігі	24 рет	Кінәлілерді жауапкершілікке тарту қажеттілігіне баса назар аудару

Дереккөз: Автор

Мейрман Шекеев 15 қазан күні Шерзат Болаттың өліміне қатысты өлең жазып, соттың әділ әрі ашық өтуін талап еткен жазбасын жариялады. Жазба 55,8 мың қаралым, 539 пікір және 124 таралым жинады (meir_halyq_zangeri, 2017). Алғашқы 200 пікірге жүргізілген сапалық контент-талдау нәтижесінде оқырмандардың белсенді азаматтық ұстанымы мен әділеттілікке деген жоғары сұранысы анықталды. "Ашық сот" тіркесі 25 рет қайталанып, қоғамның құқық қорғау органдары мен сот жүйесіне деген сенімінің төмендігін және ашықтыққа деген қажеттілікті көрсетті (Кесте 2). Сонымен қатар, пікірлерде "Резонастан кейін ғана қолға алынды" деген пікірлер жиі кездесіп, құқық қорғау органдарының әрекетсіздігіне деген наразылық байқалды. Қалған пікірлер белсенді азамат Мейрман Шекеевке қолдау білдіріп, істің әділ өтуіне деген үміт пен сенімдерін білдірген.

Кесте 2. Жан Ахмадиевтің әлеуметтік желісіндегі белсенділігі

Көрсеткіш	Сандық мән	Түсіндірме
Жарияланған жазба күні	15 қазан	Шерзат Болаттың өліміне қатысты өлең жариялаған күні
Қаралым саны	55,8 мың	Қоғамның жазбаға деген қызығушылығы
Пікірлер саны	539	Оқырмандардың белсенділік деңгейі
Таралым саны	124	Ақпараттың таралу деңгейі
"Ашық сот" тіркесінің кездесу жиілігі	25 рет	Сот процесінің ашық әрі әділ өтуіне деген сұранысты білдіреді

Дереккөз: Автор

Жан Ахмадиев 2024 жылдың 9 қазанында өзінің әлеуметтік желісінде бейнехабарлама жариялап, Шерзат Болаттың өлімін зерттеу барысында әділ соттың өткізілуін талап етті (zhan_ahmadiev.2014). Жазба 206 мың қаралым, 776 пікір және 1087 таралым жинады. Пікірлердің сапалық талдауы көрсеткендей, "Ашық сот" тіркесі 96 рет қайталанып, қоғамның әділетті тергеу мен сот процесіне деген талабын айқындады. Сонымен қатар, "Жазалансын" тіркесі 33 рет айтылып, оқырмандардың кінәлілерді жауапкершілікке тартуды және әділетті жазалауды талап еткенін көрсетті (Кесте 3).

Кесте 3. Алпамыс Жарылқасыновтың әлеуметтік желісіндегі белсенділігі

Көрсеткіш	Сандық мән	Түсіндірме
Жарияланған жазба күні	9 қазан 2024 ж.	Шерзат Болаттың өліміне қатысты бейнехабарлама жарияланған күн
Қаралым саны	206 мың	Қоғамның жазбаға деген қызығушылығы мен ақпараттың кең таралуы
Пікірлер саны	776	Оқырмандардың белсенділік деңгейі
Таралым саны	1087	Ақпараттың таралу деңгейі мен қоғамдағы резонансты көрсетеді
"Ашық сот" тіркесінің кездесу жиілігі	96 рет	Қоғамның әділетті сотқа деген сұранысын білдіреді
"Жазалансын" тіркесінің кездесу жиілігі	33 рет	Кінәлілерді жауапкершілікке тарту және әділетті жаза талап ету деңгейін көрсетеді

Дереккөз: Автор

Алпамыс Жарылқасынов 13 желтоқсан күні ашық сот өтуін талап етіп бейне үндеу жариялады. Жазба 42,6 мың қаралым және 228 пікір жинады [17]. Барлық пікірлерде ашық сотты қолдау білдірілген, бұл белсенділердің осы мәселені кең аудиторияға жеткізуге және резонанс күшейту арқылы әділеттілікті талап етуге бағытталған әрекеттерінің нәтижесі болып табылады (Кесте 4).

Кесте 4. Әлеуметтік желідегі жазбаларға қосымша үндеулер

Көрсеткіш	Сандық мән	Түсіндірме
Жарияланған жазба күні	13 желтоқсан 2024 ж.	Ашық сот өткізуге қатысты бейнеүндеу жарияланған күн
Қаралым саны	42,6 мың	Қоғамның жазбаға деген қызығушылығы мен ақпараттың таралу деңгейі
Пікірлер саны	228	Оқырмандардың белсенділік деңгейін көрсетеді
"Ашық сот" тіркесінің кездесу жиілігі	Барлық пікірлерде	Қоғамның соттың ашықтығы мен әділеттілігіне деген жоғары сұранысын білдіреді

Дереккөз: Автор

Белсенділердің әлеуметтік желідегі жазбаларына "Репост жасайық", "Таратайық" деген үндеулер де жиі кездескен. Бұл қоғам белсенділерінің оқиғаны кең аудиторияға жеткізуге және резонанс күшейту арқылы әділеттілікті талап етуге ұмтылғанын көрсетеді. Әлеуметтік желі қолданушылары осы жағдайда тек бақылаушы рөлін атқарып қана қоймай, белсенді әрекет етуші рөлін де ұстанғаны айқын байқалады. Instagram желісінде «ашық сот» өткізу туралы талап еткен пікірлердің көбеюі биліктің қоғамдық пікірге құлақ асатынын және әлеуметтік желілердің ықпалын елеусіз қалдыра алмайтынын дәлелдейді. Әлеуметтік желіде мыңдаған пікір қалдырылғаннан кейін, бұл мәселе БАҚ беттерінде жарияланып, билік тарапынан жауап ретінде әрекет жасалғаны байқалды. Бұл оқиға қоғамдағы маңызды мәселелер бойынша әлеуметтік желі пікірлерінің билік шешімдеріне ықпалының зор әлеуетін нақты көрсетіп отыр.

Мысалы, «Егемен Қазақстан» 15 қазан күні «Шерзат Болаттың өлімі: прокуратура ашық сот өткізуді қолдайды» деген материал жариялады. Сондай-ақ, Ulysmidia.kz «Шерзат ісі: прокуратура ашық сот өткізуді қолдайды», Жас Алаш «Прокуратура Шерзат Болаттың өліміне қатысты соттың ашық өтуін сұрайды», Nur.kz «Шерзат Болаттың ісі бойынша сот процесі ашық түрде онлайн режимде өтуі мүмкін» атты жаңалықтарды жариялады. Бұл жарияланымдар әлеуметтік желіде айтылған талаптардың билік назарын аудартқанын және олардың шешім қабылдауына ықпал еткенін көрсетеді.

«Ашық сот» өткізу туралы талаптардың көптеп жазылуы билік үшін қоғамдық сенімге ие болу қажеттілігін арттырғаны анық. Демек, бұл оқиға әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы рөлін және билік органдарының оларға дер кезінде жауап беру маңыздылығын дәлелдейді. Әлеуметтік желілер қазіргі кезде қоғамдағы құқықтық мәселелер мен саяси процестерге деген пікір қалыптастыруда маңызды рөл атқаратын алаңға айналғанын көрсетеді.

Blumler мен Katz (1974) өздерінің Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясы (Uses and Gratifications Theory) бойынша медиа мазмұнын қолданушылар өз қажеттіліктерін қанағаттандыру мақсатында пайдалана отырып, қоғамда маңызды өзгерістерге ықпал ету мүмкіндігін атап өткен болатын. Әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдағы наразылықтар мен пікірлерді ашық білдіру алаңына айналуы, сонымен қатар олардың билік органдарының шешім қабылдауына ықпал етуі осы теорияның өзектілігін тағы да дәлелдейді.

Саида Таукелеваның әлеуметтік желісіндегі белсенділігі

12 қазан күні Саида Таукелеваның жариялаған жазбасына қалдырылған 537 пікірде қоғамның жергілікті билік органдарына наразылығы айқын байқалды (sakura_777, 2012). Талданған 200 пікір ішінде тұрғындар тек ашық сот өткізуді талап етіп қана қоймай, Талғар қаласының әкімі мен оның қызметкерлерінің жұмыстан кетуін сұраған. Осы пікірлердің бір бөлігі Талғар қаласының әкімі мен қызметкерлеріне қатысты талаптарды қамтыды, бұл пікірлердің қоғамдық пікір ретінде билікке әсері айқын көрініс тапты. Әлеуметтік желідегі наразылық толқынынан кейін ақпарат құралдары Ulysmedia.kz: «Талғар қаласының әкімі орынбасарымен бірге қызметінен кетті», Informburo: «Шерзаттың өлімінен кейін Талғар әкімі қызметінен босатылды», Arasha.kz: «Талғар әкімі жұмыстан кетті» және Azattyq-ruhy: «Талғарда жаңа әкім сайланып жатыр» деген тақырыптармен жаңалықтар легі жарияланған.

Талдау нәтижесінде әлеуметтік желі қолданушыларының басты назарын аударған екі негізгі пікір категориясы анықталды:

1. “Сот ашық өтсін” — оқырмандар тарапынан әділдік пен жариялылықты қамтамасыз етуге деген сұраныс;
2. “Отставкаға кетсін” — жергілікті билік органдарына қатысты наразылық пен олардың қызметінен босатылуын талап ету.

5 белсенді азаматтың жазбалары мен оған жазылған пікірлерді жалпы саралағанда, "Ашық сот" тіркесі 387 рет қайталанып, барлық пікірлердің 50,92%-ын құрады. Бұл қоғамның құқықтық жүйенің ашықтығына деген жоғары сұранысын анық көрсетеді. "Әділ шешім" тіркесі 76 рет кездесіп, жалпы пікірлердің 10,00%-ына тең. "Жазалансын" сөзі 57 рет қайталанып,

7,50%-ды құрады. "Отставкаға кетсін" тіркесі 46 рет немесе 6,05%-ды көрсетті. Қолдау және резонанс пікірлері 49 рет кездесіп, 6,45%-ды құрады. Барлық пікірлердің бағыттарына талдау жүргізгенде құқықтық жүйеге қатысты талаптарды қамтитын пікірлер ("Ашық сот", "Әділ шешім", "Жазалансын") жалпы 520 пікірді немесе 68,42%-ды құрағаны анықталды. Жергілікті билік органдарына наразылық білдірген ("Отставкаға кетсін") пікірлердің саны 46, бұл барлық пікірлердің 6,05%-ын құрайды. Қалған 194 пікір немесе 25,53%-ы қолдау көрсету мен ортақтасу мазмұнына ие болды. "Ашық сот" тіркесінің басымдылығы қоғамның әділеттілік пен жариялылықты қамтамасыз етуге деген сұранысының жоғары екенін көрсетті. Бұл деректер әлеуметтік желілердегі пікірлердің қоғамдағы құқықтық және саяси процестерге ықпал етудегі маңызды рөлін нақтылай түседі.

Зерттеу нәтижелері әлеуметтік желі арқылы қалыптасқан қоғамдық белсенділік билік органдарының әрекетіне ықпал ете алатынын дәлелдеді. Бұл тұрғыда Пайдалану және қанағаттандыру теориясы (Uses and Gratifications Theory) әлеуметтік медиа арқылы қоғамның өз қажеттіліктерін қанағаттандыру мақсатында белсенді пікір білдіруін, саяси процесстерге әсер етуін және әділеттілікке деген сұранысты білдіруін түсінуге мүмкіндік береді. Жоғарыда келтірілген мысалдар әлеуметтік желілердің тек ақпарат тарату емес, сонымен қатар қоғамда маңызды саяси және құқықтық мәселелер бойынша пікір қалыптастырудағы рөлін айқындайды.

Әлеуметтік желі мен БАҚ-тағы белсенділік

«Бәрі салыстыру арқылы танылады» деп Фридрих Ницше айтқандай, зерттеу барысында Tengrinews сайты мен әлеуметтік желілердегі жазбалардың қаралым, пікір қалдыру және тарату әрекеттері салыстырыла зерттелді. Мұндай салыстыру әдісі әлеуметтік медиа мен дәстүрлі медианың ақпараттық кеңістіктегі рөлін түсінуге мүмкіндік береді.

Зерттеу көрсеткендей, Tengrinews сайтының алыну себебі — оның Brand Analytics 2023 жылғы деректері бойынша ең көп сілтеме жасалатын және оқырмандар арасында жоғары резонанс тудыратын медиаресурстар қатарына жатуы (Brand Analytics, 2023). Бұл оның аудиториясының тұрақтылығы мен ақпарат таратудағы ықпалды рөлін көрсетеді. Дегенмен, Tengrinews сайтындағы Шерзат Болат оқиғасына қатысты материалдардың орташа қаралым саны 993 болса, әлеуметтік желілердегі жеке жазбаларда бұл көрсеткіш 360 880-ге жетті. Бұл айырмашылық әлеуметтік желілердің оқиғаға қатысты қоғамның реакциясын жылдам және кең көлемде қамтудағы артықшылығын көрсетеді.

Пікір қалдыру деңгейі де екі медиаплатформада айтарлықтай ерекшеленді. Ғалымдардың пікірінше, «Әлеуметтік желілерде қолданушылар тек контентті тұтынушы ғана емес, сонымен қатар, белсенді пікірталас жүргізуші болып табылады, бұл олардың қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы ролін арттырады» (Гуревич, 2018). Tengrinews сайтында оқырмандар ақпаратты таратуға немесе пікір қалдыруға аса құлықты болмаған, ал әлеуметтік желілерде керісінше, белсенді пікірталастар өрбіген. Бұл әлеуметтік желілердің ақпараттық экокүйенің динамикалық бөлігін құрайтынын айқындайды.

Мұндай нәтижелер интернеттегі екі түрлі алаңның аудиториялық ерекшеліктерін ғана емес, сонымен қатар, олардың ақпарат таратудағы тиімділігі мен ықпалын да айқын көрсетеді.


Талқылау

Зерттеу аясында әлеуметтік желілер мен бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының (БАҚ) қоғамдық пікір қалыптастырудағы және билік шешімдеріне ықпал етудегі ролі талданды. Сауалнамаға 111 респондент қатысып, олардың әлеуметтік желілер мен БАҚ арқылы мәселені шешу тәжірибесіне қатысты көзқарастары зерттелді.

Респонденттердің демографиялық ерекшеліктерін талдау барысында сауалнамаға шамамен 18-50 жас аралығындағы азаматтар қатысқаны байқалды. Қатысушылардың көпшілігі ірі қалаларда (Алматы, Астана, Шымкент) тұратындар, сондай-ақ Алматы облысы мен өзге өңірлердегі жастар да қамтылды. Бұл нәтижелер жастардың әлеуметтік желілердегі белсенділігінің жоғары екенін және олардың ақпараттық кеңістіктегі ролін айқындайды. Зерттеу нәтижелері респонденттердің 63,1%-ы әлеуметтік желілерді ақпарат тарату және мәселе көтеру құралы ретінде тиімді деп бағалайтынын көрсетті. Ал 36,9%-ы дәстүрлі БАҚ-қа жүгінуді жөн көрген (Диаграмма 1). Бұл көрсеткіштер әлеуметтік желілердің ақпараттық-коммуникациялық құрал ретіндегі ықпалының артып келе жатқанын көрсетеді.

Диаграмма 1. Ақпаратты тарату құралдары

111 ответов




Дереккөз: Автор

Сонымен қатар, әлеуметтік желілердің жеделдігі (52,3%) және мәселеге назар аударудың оңайлығы (46,8%) басты артықшылықтар ретінде аталғанымен, олардың сенімділігіне қатысты сұрақтар туындады. Мәселен, тек 1 респондент қана «әлеуметтік желілердегі ақпарат дұрыс беріледі» деп жауап берген (Диаграмма 2). Бұл қоғамда желідегі ақпараттың нақтылығы мен шынайылығына деген сенімсіздік бар екенін көрсетеді. Айта өту қажет, сауалнамада бұл сұраққа жауап беру міндетті емес болып белгіленгендіктен, 2 респондент оны бос қалдырған. Бұл жағдай әлеуметтік желілердегі ақпараттың сенімділігіне қатысты пікірлердің одан да кеңірек таралуы мүмкін екенін көрсетеді.

Диаграмма 2. Ақпараттың бағалануы

109 ответов




Дереккөз: Автор

Әлеуметтік желілердің билік шешімдеріне ықпал етуіне қатысты көзқарастар да әркелкі болды: респонденттердің 59,5%-ы бұл ықпалды растаса, 27%-ы керісінше жоққа шығарған, ал 13,5%-ы нақты жауап бере алмаған (Диаграмма 3). Бұл биліктің әлеуметтік желідегі қоғамдық дискурстарды қаншалықты ескеретініне байланысты бірізді түсінік қалыптаспағанын көрсетеді.

Диаграмма 3. Әлеуметтік желілердің ықпалы

111 ответов




Дереккөз: Автор

Қоғамдық пікірді жеткізудің тиімділігіне келсек, 55% респондент әлеуметтік желілер арқылы билікке ықпал етуге болады деп санайды, ал 26,1%-ы мұны тиімсіз деп бағалаған (Диаграмма 4). Сонымен қатар, 18,9%-ы бұл сұраққа нақты жауап бере алмаған, бұл әлеуметтік желілердің саяси және қоғамдық процестерге ықпал ету мүмкіндіктері туралы пікірлердің әртүрлілігін білдіреді.

Диаграмма 4. Қоғамдық пікірді жеткізу тиімділігі

111 ответов




Дереккөз: Автор

Биліктің әлеуметтік желілердегі қоғамдық пікірлерге назар аудару деңгейіне қатысты 45,9%-ы билік әлеуметтік желілердегі пікірлерді ескереді деп санаса, 26,1%-ы керісінше пікір білдірген, ал 27,9%-ы тек белгілі бір дәрежеде назар аударылатынын айтқан (Диаграмма 5). Бұл нәтижелер билік пен азаматтық қоғам арасындағы байланыстың тұрақты еместігін көрсетеді және ресми органдардың әлеуметтік медидағы пікірлерге жүйелі жауап беру механизмдерін жетілдіру қажеттілігін айқындайды.

Диаграмма 5. Қоғамдық пікірге назардың аударылуы

111 ответов




Дереккөз: Автор

Респонденттердің қоғамдық мәселелерді әлеуметтік желілерде талқылауға қатысу белсенділігі де әртүрлі болды: 37,8%-ы жиі, 38,7%-ы сирек, ал 23,4%-ы мүлде қатыспайтынын мәлімдеген (Диаграмма 6). Бұл көрсеткіштер интернет қолданушыларының әлеуметтік белсенділігіне әсер ететін факторларды тереңірек зерттеу қажеттігін білдіреді.

Диаграмма 6. Қоғамдық пікірлердің әлеуметтік желілерде талқылануы

111 ответов




Дереккөз: Автор

Сонымен қатар, 53,2%-ы әлеуметтік желілер биліктің ашықтығы мен есептілігін арттырады деп сенсе, 25,2%-ы бұл пікірмен келіспеген, ал 21,6%-ы нақты жауап бере алмаған (Диаграмма 7). Бұл көрсеткіштер мемлекеттік органдардың халықпен интерактивті байланысын күшейту қажеттілігін көрсетеді.

Диаграмма 7. Әлеуметтік желі және ашықтық

111 ответов




Дереккөз: Автор

Мәселелердің қай платформада тезірек шешілетініне қатысты пікірлер де әрқелкі болды: респонденттердің 46,8%-ы әлеуметтік желілерді тиімді санаса, 27%-ы БАҚ-ты таңдаған, ал 26,1%-ы нақты жауабын білмейтінін айтқан (Диаграмма 8). Бұл деректер мәселе көтеру платформаларын таңдауда бірізді көзқарастың қалыптаспағанын көрсетеді.

Диаграмма 8. Платформалардың тиімділігі

111 ответов



Дереккөз: Автор

Жалпы алғанда, зерттеу нәтижелері әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікірді қалыптастырудағы және билікке ықпал етудегі маңыздылығын айқындады. Әлеуметтік желілердің басты артықшылықтары – ақпараттың жедел таралуы, қолжетімділігі және азаматтардың белсенділік таныту мүмкіндігі. Алайда, бұл платформалардағы ақпараттың сенімділігіне қатысты мәселелер шешімін таппаған күйде қалып отыр. Сонымен қатар, биліктің әлеуметтік желілердегі пікірлерді ескеретін-ескермейтіні туралы біркелкі түсініктің жоқтығы байқалды.

Зерттеу нәтижелері билік пен азаматтық қоғам арасындағы байланысты нығайту мақсатында әлеуметтік желілер мен БАҚ-тың әлеуетін барынша тиімді пайдалану қажеттілігін көрсетеді. Әлеуметтік желілердегі ақпарат ағынын реттеу, жалған ақпараттың таралуына жол бермеу және билік құрылымдарының қоғаммен байланысын күшейту – болашақ зерттеулер мен тәжірибелік қадамдардың басты бағыты болуы тиіс.

Қорытынды

Талғардағы оқиға еліміздегі әлеуметтік желілердің қоғамдық пікірді қалыптастырудағы және билік шешімдеріне ықпал етудегі маңыздылығын айқын көрсетті. Зерттеу барысында әлеуметтік медианың резонанс туғызу және әділеттілік талаптарын жария түрде жеткізу алаңы ретінде тиімділігі анықталды.

Әсіресе, "ашық сот" өткізу туралы талаптардың жиі қайталануы әлеуметтік желі пайдаланушыларының әділеттілікке деген жоғары сұранысын көрсетті. Бұл үдеріс билік органдарының қоғамдық пікірге назар аударуына және шешім қабылдау кезінде оны ескеруге мәжбүр болатынын дәлелдейді.

Зерттеу нәтижелері әлеуметтік желінің қоғамдық пікірді қалыптастыруда және оны билікке жеткізуде маңызды рөл атқаратынын көрсетті. Шерзат оқиғасына байланысты жарияланған материалдар мен #Шерзат үшін хэштегі аясындағы пікірлер биліктің әрекет етуіне себепші болғанын дәлелдейді. Яғни, әлеуметтік желілерде жарияланған посттар мен пікірлер құқық қорғау органдары мен жергілікті билік тарапынан белгілі бір шаралар қабылдауға ықпал еткен.

Сонымен қатар, әлеуметтік желілердің қолжетімділігі мен жылдамдығы аудиторияны белсенді әрекет етуге итермелейтіні анықталды. Хэштегтерді қолдану, материалдарды бөлісу және пікірталастар ұйымдастыру арқылы қолданушылар тек бақылаушы рөлін атқармай, қоғамдағы өзгерістерге ықпал ететін белсенді қатысушыларға айналады.

Бұл зерттеу Қазақстандағы әлеуметтік желілердің саяси және әлеуметтік процестерге ықпалының артып келе жатқанын және олардың қоғамның белсенділігін арттырудағы әлеуетін көрсетті. Осылайша, әлеуметтік желілер қоғамдық пікір мен билік арасындағы көпірге айналып, азаматтардың өз мүдделерін қорғау құралы ретінде қызмет атқаратыны анықталды.

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Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Transformation: A Comparative Analysis of Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Concepts (2014-2020 vs. 2020-2030)

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Abstract

This study presents a comparative analysis of Kazakhstan's two Foreign Policy Concepts for the periods 2014-2020 and 2020-2030, examining how the country's diplomatic priorities and strategies have evolved in response to the shifting geopolitical dynamics of the third decade of the current century. The relevance of this analysis lies in the fact that the external policy aims and key focuses articulated in an official document are rare for Kazakhstan, making this comparative study significant for understanding the country's shifting principal goals and foreign policy guidelines. This paper relies on a qualitative approach that employs historical, comparative, and content analysis to examine Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Concepts from 2014-2020 and 2020-2030. By using these approaches, we identify key themes, trends, and shifts that reveal how Kazakhstan's strategic goals in diplomacy and strategies have evolved in response to shifting geopolitical dynamics. In addition, implementing these research methods offers a nuanced understanding of the country's changing foreign relations strategies and fills a research gap on the evolution of Kazakhstan's external policy. This study not only seeks to fill an existing gap in research on the evolution of Kazakhstan's foreign policy but also provides practical insights for stakeholders and promotes broader discussion regarding Kazakhstan's role in Central Asia and on the international stage.

Keywords: Foreign Policy Concept, Kazakhstan, comparative analysis, content analysis, Central Asia.

Introduction

In 2008 Zakaria examined foreign policy as the evolving strategies that states use in international relations, especially in a multipolar framework (Zakaria 2008). This framework investigates the complex interplay of state power and international influence, showing how different nations shape their foreign policies. It includes securing political influence, stimulating economic growth, and addressing security concerns in the broader international context. Another scholar, Joseph Nye, a proponent of soft power, extended the concept of foreign policy by adding cultural and diplomatic influence, not only military and economy. He defined foreign policy

in his *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004) as an approach that balances hard and soft power in achieving national objectives. Basically, the concept of foreign policy is the basic principles that determine the strategies and goals of a nation in the international arena and are guided in relations with other countries. In our research project we used the definition provided by Joseph Nye.

Kazakhstan is not the only country that documents its foreign policy goals and priorities. Many countries openly declare about their foreign policy plans in certain documents. For instance, the US documents its foreign policy goals and priorities in its National Security Strategy (2022) document. According to the document, the United States is focused on global security, economic growth and support for democracy, addressing climate change and health issues through cooperation with allies. The US National Security Strategy (2022) focuses on global challenges and security and continues the strategy until the next update (The White House, 2022).

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs document (MEA, 2023) emphasizes India's strategic autonomy, participation in multilateral forums (UN, BRICS) and regional security. While US foreign policy is updated frequently, changing depending on political administrations and world changes. The concept period often coincides with presidential terms, Indian Foreign Policy is generally more stable, with long-term principles such as strategic autonomy and non-alignment. India's foreign policy evolves gradually, with long-term evolution rather than frequent updates. Similarly, Kazakhstan has a well-defined foreign policy concept that has been followed since independence. This research paper evaluates the last two concepts of foreign policy in Kazakhstan - the foreign policy concepts of the period of President Nazarbayev in 2014-2020 and the period of President Tokayev in 2020-2030 through historical, comparative and content analysis. By comparing foreign policy concepts, it is possible to determine the state's long-term goals and strategies, as well as track changes in approaches. This helps to predict the future steps of the state in the international arena and identify internal factors that influenced the creation of the concept.

The Concept of Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan for 2014-2020 is an important document aimed at defining goals and strategic directions. It is based on protecting the national interests of Kazakhstan and strengthening its international reputation in response to geopolitical and economic challenges.

This research work consists of four parts: it examines two concepts separately and reviews them using comparative, historical and content analysis methods. During the analysis, the impact of internal and external factors, the main directions and results of the concept are considered. On top of that, the impact of the change of the presidency on the new concept, also the changes and development trends of Kazakhstan's foreign policy are comparatively studied. The study analyzes changes in Kazakhstan's foreign policy during the period 2014-2020 and 2020-2030,

identifying internal and external factors that influenced these changes. The results allow us to understand the evolution of foreign policy strategies and their impact on the country's role in international relations. The importance of the work lies in predicting possible changes and new strategies to strengthen Kazakhstan's position in the international arena.

Methodology

Our study uses content analysis as the main method of research to explore foreign policy concepts (FPCs) in Kazakhstan 2014–2020 and 2014–2030. The selection of methods was informed by the research objective: qualitative and content analysis will be used to systematically examine themes, language, and shifts in Kazakhstan's foreign policy strategies. As Krippendorff (2018) says content analysis is considered broadly as an approach of systematically analyzing documentary contents in order to reveal pattern, theme and contextual meanings of the documents. More generally, it has been applied widely in political science and international relations to the inquiring of strategic documents, policy frameworks and diplomatic communications, and to examine how states represent and prioritize their objectives (Weber, 1990). For example, content analysis helped us to investigate shifts in the content of national narratives within, for example, Russia's Foreign Policy Concept and the U.S. National Security Strategy (Freeman, 2019; Scott, 2020). This approach proves to be a robust tool for evaluating the underlying priorities and changing strategies expressed in Kazakhstan's FPCs in such a context.

Qualitative content analysis, a specialized application to derive contextual meaning and meaning of the text is applied to the study, as well. Qualitative content analysis method described by Mayring (2014) is a method that allows researchers to systemically categorize and interpret textual data to bring out the implicit message and strategic intent. Qualitative content analysis has been commonly applied in the international relations field to uncover fine grained changes in policy language, strategic posture, and narrative construction. For instance, this approach has been utilized to study how states deal with foreign policy narratives to cope with common challenges of the world, for example geopolitical instability, economic changes or technological evolution (Katzenstein, 1996; Snyder, 2000).

In light of these special characteristics within respective disciplines of Political Science and International Relations, it is justified to select the alternative method of choice in our study, indeed, the qualitative content analysis. In contrast with quantitative methods, the qualitative content analysis gives encoding security to the complexity of policy discourse, providing a particularly good approach to the analysis of comprehensive foreign policy documents. The findings of this research

align well with the objectives of this research as this method allows for an in depth investigation of how Kazakhstan's FPCs articulate its diplomatic priorities and adapt to changing global dynamics. The study, using the approach of qualitative content analysis, not only highlights thematic continuities and changes but also contextualizes changing foreign policy strategies of Kazakhstan within the background of regional and global moves.

The study further lies in comparative content analysis to investigate continuity and difference of the 2014–2020 and 2020–2030 foreign policy concepts. Comparative content analysis is a method to systematically look for similarities and differences between several documents or datasets (Neuendorf, 2017) through the use of thematic elements, patterns and strategic directions. Here, the method has been used in political science and international relations to 'discover' changes in state policies, rhetorical shifts and adaptations over time (Hopf, 2002). For instance, it has helped to illuminate bases for state's policy regimes' capacity to modify in adaptation to warming geopolitical conditions, including the turn of U.S. foreign policy strategies spanning successive presidential administrations.

A justification for using comparative content analysis in this study is its capacity to reveal both continuity and change in Kazakhstan's foreign policy strategy. Having this method allows the assessment of the thematic focus, the key priorities and how the language in the two FPCs have changed in relation to the strategic objectives of Kazakhstan. In international relations research, comparative analysis is relatively useful in that it offers a method for studying how nations react to global challenges and policies change to fit with new trends. This study captures the evolution of Kazakhstan's foreign policy through comparative content analysis of its adaptive strategies to changing regional and global dynamics. In addition to providing a basis for the qualitative analysis of Kazakhstan's diplomatic priorities, this approach provides an overall picture of the country's diplomacy during the studied period.

This paper also performs historical analysis of Kazakhstan's foreign policy concepts (FPCs) within the continuity of Kazakhstan's diplomatic evolution. Carr (1961) defines historical analysis as a method of systematically looking at past events, trends and policies that help us to understand their impact upon present strategy. This approach has been widely used to identify long term patterns and major structural forces in international relations and political science (Hill, 2003). One example is the use of the theory to explain the history of development of foreign policy doctrines in the United States and Russia by linking historical milestones to current priorities (Waltz, 1959). To examine how early decisions, influence ongoing strategies (Kennedy, 1987), historical analysis is of particular importance in examining foundational periods like post independence eras. This study focuses on

Kazakhstan's early post-independence strategies under the themes of sovereignty, integration and economic response. The idea for this method is justified by its potential to offer a temporal perspective, aiding the connection of past decisions to present foreign policy objectives. When foreign policy research, its value is particularly important because foreign policy decisions need to be understood within the historical context to be interpreted. This method grounds the analysis of Kazakhstan's FPCs in the historical context of Kazakhstan's post independence period, enabling a full understanding of the continuity and transformation of the 2014–2020 and 2020–2030 FPCs.

In the final component of our study, we looked at the analysis of the Foreign Policy Concepts (FPCs) disseminated on the official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Akorda.kz. Within this platform there is a source of authentic information on key documents for national policy; as well as transparency in governmental decisions. English language was used for the purposes of this research to an extent to retrieve the concepts for 2014–2020 and 2020–2030. The content of the FPCs was qualitatively analyzed in English and the entire process was systematic, in the sense of examining the content of the FPCs: their stated goals, priorities and themes. As the first thing the documents were reviewed for was overarching goals, such as sovereignty, regional stability and economic diplomacy. Then we coded and categorized recurring themes and keywords in order to trace patterns across both concepts, paying special attention to changes in emphasis, notably the refocusing on innovation and global partnership in FPC 2020–30. While this analysis yields significant insights for policymakers, for researchers, for citizens, it also shows how Kazakhstan adapts the regional stability, economic resilience and positions itself globally (Kassenova, 2017). The study adds an in-depth understanding of Kazakhstan's evolving diplomacy within global trends and its impact on regional as well as International relations by contextualizing Kazakhstan's foreign policy. So, we finally analyzed each section of the FPCs to find implicit strategic priorities, which we hope would account for explicit and more nuanced principles of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Getting the research done in English allowed a clear and consistent framework for interpreting and comparing the two concepts.

Concept 2014-2020

2014-2020 were marked by major global geopolitical and economic issues that affected Kazakhstan's foreign policy. Among them, the instability caused by the impact of the financial crisis of 2008, which has not yet faded away, could be observed. Another reason for the tension in international relations was the tension in relations between the great powers Russia, the USA and China. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea further aggravated the tension between Russia

and the West. Mass sanctions caused by the West did not pass without affecting the Kazakhstani market. In Central Asia, the scale of extremist and terrorist threats has also increased, and border issues have caused instability. Fluctuations in oil prices created obstacles for the country to achieve its foreign policy goals. These conditions have increased economic vulnerability for energy export-dependent countries such as Kazakhstan. The global transition to renewable energy sources has contributed to the country's resource-based economy in the long run. As a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and a close partner with Russia, the country had to maintain a multi-vector policy (Columbia Journal of International Affairs, 2023).

During 2014-2020, the geopolitical and economic conditions of Kazakhstan were affected by comprehensive and dynamic changes in the global arena. From a geopolitical point of view, Kazakhstan is a transcontinental, landlocked country neighboring with great powers. These factors limit the country from conducting an independent foreign policy in cases of economy and trade. At the same time, being the largest country in Central Asia allows Kazakhstan to maintain stability in this region, to be an initiator during regional problems and to take responsibility. Kazakhstan's natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals, which open various opportunities for the country, also bring difficulties. Increasing global influence by engaging in international business, the state aims to get rid of other dependency factors. In the period of 2014-2020, the state experienced major events, under President Nursultan Nazarbayev's policy the intention was to maintain balanced relations with strong players. The 2014 concept addressed the shifting dynamics of the post-Soviet space. Ensuring the territorial integrity of the country was the fundamental aspect of the concept. The focus was doing independent foreign policy from any external political and military influences, to protect the borders and nation from any conflict situations. As an example, we can mention Kazakhstan's anti-terrorist initiatives and participation in peacekeeping missions as part of the CSTO. In addition, becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization showed its efforts to promote regional stability and its involvement in multilateral initiatives. Another important aspect is stability in the Region. The concept shows how important Central Asia is for Kazakhstan, making the region safe and stable takes a central role in the concept. The 2014 concept highlighted Kazakhstan's commitment to diversifying its economy, as well as making itself a global market player. The state was able to achieve this goal by reaching trade agreements with various countries and actors. Kazakhstan currently trades with the European Union, Russia, China, Turkey and other international actors. Moreover, Kazakhstan emphasized its commitment to global peace, security, and stability through active participation in international organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The country has raised its reputation as a member of the UN by playing an

active role in peace missions. By becoming a temporary member of the UN Security Committee in 2017, giving up nuclear weapons, and demonstrating sustainable development goals in foreign policy. The state presents itself as a supporter of diplomacy. For instance, being an initiator of peacemaking during this period is the summit held in Astana due to the war in Syria, or the meeting held to resolve the situation between Russia and Turkey. Country could achieve its settled goals and more detailed improvements in the following concept of 2020-2030 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2014).

Concept 2020 - 2030

The basic tendency of Kazakhstan's foreign policy in the period of 2020 – 2030 is determined by both geopolitical and economic transformations with a continuity and modification of its multivector course. Important factors include the Russia – Ukraine conflict, global financial sanctions, and changing energy markets particularly concerning the shifts in energy to renewable energy (Indian Council of World Affairs, 2024; Tokayev, 2024).

The concept of 2020 focuses on Kazakhstan foreign policy, which is based on maintaining neutrality in conflicts of a global character, building the position of regional leader and strengthening international partnership. Its orientation, however, has been firmly entrenched under this framework, which takes a pro-multilateral, pro-pragmatic, and pro-balance in the great powers such as Russia, China, and the United States (MFA of the Republic of Kazakhstan). As illustrated by Putz (2023), the country has expanded its diplomatic initiatives including participating in the platforms such as C5+1 and fostering its economic relations with Europe and Asia specifically given the country's strategic role as transit hub for Chinese goods under the Belt and Road Initiative.

In January 2022, the unrest marked a turning point in domestic affairs in Kazakhstan, where for the first time the country felt obligated to pay more attention to internal stability than external diplomacy. Managing dependencies — especially with Russia — and diversifying alliances highlighted a crisis: This should have been done. Kazakhstan, like most other countries, took a stance in the Russia(Ukraine) conflict, abstained in UN votes and refused to recognize separatist regions, but chose a nuanced regional stance. At the same time, China has developed strong economic ties with China and engagement with the West as part of its effort to reduce risks while exploiting its geographical and economic advantages (Zuenko, 2022; Indian Council of World Affairs, 2024).

In the future, Kazakhstan's foreign policy is seeking to interlink the national interests with the problems of the world, such as climate change, cyber threats, regional security, in other words, the country will try to be a responsible international

actor and take an active stance. Chinese foreign policy is evolving and skews towards agility and strategic foresight, as evidenced in its current reformulations of its foreign policy objectives (Indian Council of World Affairs, 2024; Tokayev, 2024).

Comparison of concepts

Comparison of concepts of Kazakhstan's foreign policy created in two different periods, the first was adopted under Nursultan Nazarbayev for 2014-2020, and the second one by President Tokayev for 2020-2030. The first trend to notice is the time frame, the concept 2014-2020 was formulated for 6 years, and the second is for 10 years. The first reason might be the change of the global environment. Geopolitical changes during 2014-2020 on the world stage forced Kazakhstan to act faster. By 2020, Kazakhstan has begun to develop a long-term strategy, targeting long-term global trends such as climate change, technological developments and renewable energy by shifting its foreign policy goals. The next factor can be the change in the role of leadership. The first concept was formed during the last years of Nazarbayev's reign, and focused on consolidating achievements and managing transitional challenges, while the second in the concept Tokaev aims at longer goals. Longer periods are increasingly used to set comprehensive goals in line with global frameworks. While the first concept is aimed at reacting to immediate geopolitical challenges in a reactive manner, the second concept includes an active, future-oriented approach to the formation of Kazakhstan's global role. It makes the concept more proactive and forward-looking and strategic approach.

In 2014, the focus of the concept was to increase the balance of relations with large states, and in 2020, the neutral policy was continued, but more as a strategic bridge between East and West. At the beginning, Mulvector's policy was to maintain the balance of power in the region by establishing relations with Russia, China, and the United States through various actions, but later it will change to a more global and proactive type. If we take the topic of regional benefits, the first concept tries to make Central Asia a stable and secure regime, and the second concept moves to shift stability to a more global scope. China at the beginning in the framework of economic diplomacy. With the goals of signing trade agreements with Russia and the European Union, BRI now acts as a bridge between East and West. At the same time, if we pay attention to the global role of the state, if the concept 2014 shows the country as a mediator during regional conflicts, the concept 2020 shows Kazakhstan as a global player advocating for peace in multilateral diplomacy. In order to maintain a balance between the major powers, Kazakhstan established close relations with several major countries and began to communicate with them in various fields. In this way, Kazakhstan took the role of a country that is not independent of other countries, but follows a neutral policy.

The profits coming to the country in recent years, the wave of investments, the development of various industries and the stability in the region show that the policy of Kazakhstan has been successful. But is multi-vector policy really the best choice for Kazakhstan? And will he be successful in the future? Currently, many countries are interested in Kazakhstan and want to have good relations with it. Yes, the foreign policy of the state will be a plus for them, that is, a big reason for getting closer. But will that interest last? This is influenced by several factors, for example, from a geopolitical point of view, it will be more difficult for Kazakhstan to abandon the multi-vector policy when it has two big powerful neighbors. From an economic point of view, China and from a political point of view, slight influences from Russia can be observed. If such effects persist for a long time, the end will not be good for the state. Already, two major countries have launched their propaganda and software packages into Kazakhstan, and some of them are showing good results. For example, Chinese Confucius Institutes. In the same way, China and Russia's strong efforts to maintain their power in the region lead to confrontation with other major powers that have come to the region, resulting in a clash of interests between them. Even the location in the middle of two big powers affects the perception of other countries about the region. It makes him unstable and dependent. This, in turn, leads to a weakening of the multi-vector policy. Another thing is the role of Kazakhstan in the international arena, the country plays the role of a bridge between China and Europe in terms of trade. But according to the director, Europe is starting to buy Chinese goods in recent times. There are too many Chinese goods on the market and they are cheap, creating a great competition for European companies.

Table 1. Comparison of concepts

Aspect	2014–2020	2020–2030
Focus	Immediate challenges	Long-term strategic goals
Internal Stability	Limited focus on domestic issues	Central priority post-2022
Energy Policy	Oil-dependent economy	Transition to renewable energy

Geopolitical Strategy	Balancing great power tensions	Neutral, future-focused engagements
Global Challenges	Regional stability, anti-terrorism	Climate change, technological threats

Note: Authors' own analysis

Conclusion

The analysis of Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Concepts for 2014–2020 and 2020–2030 reveals dynamic evolving processes that are nested in domestic transformations and geopolitical fields. The original concept, which was held as the guide under the President Nazarbayev, focused on the resolution of immediate regional problems, keeping propinquity in relations with great powers and protection of Kazakhstan's sovereignty and territorial inviolability. But with a focus on regional stability, economic diversification, and multilateral diplomacy, Kazakhstan pledged to be a reliable regional 'actor' and a player in global peace work.

Kazakhstan took on a more forward looking approach to the 2020 – 2030 concept with President Tokayev. It is characterized by a strategic reorientation oriented toward long term objectives, including dealing with global issues, such as the conditions of the planet and technological risks on the one hand, and creating conditions for Kazakhstan to be a proactive and responsible international player on the other. Shifting to draw on Kazakhstan's strategic geographic position as an East-West bridge had been coupled with diversifying alliances to ensure resilience in light of evolving global uncertainties, including the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the move to green energy, according to the shift.

But part of Kazakhstan's diplomacy is continued multivector foreign policy strategy. But the updated concept represents a multi-dimensional yet realistic approach, encompassing what we learnt from past lessons and what our planet is dooming. Aspires to propound itself as a significant regional and global player in the international forum and advocate multilateral policy stance; as a provider of innovation and green development.

For the last one and a half decades, the foreign policy concepts of Kazakhstan evolved in accordance with the conditionality in the world without infringing on its tendency for self preservation. Kazakhstan going forward will succeed in its foreign

policy if it can successfully strike the balance between its internal stability and external engagement to make the Kazakhstan country continue to prosper as a key player in Central Asia and the world.

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Building Bridges over Water: Hydro-Diplomacy in Central Asia

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Abstract

This article examines the historical development and current state of water diplomacy in Central Asia, focusing on the region's unique geopolitical and geographical challenges. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian states faced significant issues in managing their shared water resources, primarily the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river systems. Despite the region's relative water abundance, the transboundary nature and uneven distribution of these resources have led to complex diplomatic challenges. This study explores the evolution of hydro-diplomacy from 1992 with the establishment of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) to the present day, highlighting both successes and ongoing difficulties. Through a qualitative analysis, including historical, comparative, and content analysis methods, the article delves into the intricate interplay of water resource management, regional cooperation, and conflict potential. It underscores the critical need for effective and coordinated water policies to ensure regional stability, economic development, and environmental sustainability. The findings suggest that while significant strides have been made, particularly in bilateral and multilateral agreements, the region still faces substantial hurdles. These include infrastructural deficiencies, political and economic disparities, and the overarching impact of climate change. The article concludes with recommendations for enhancing water diplomacy and governance in Central Asia to foster a more cooperative and stable regional environment.

Keywords: Central Asia, water diplomacy, water management, hydro diplomacy, hydro politics.

Introduction

At the end of the last century, fifteen new states appeared on the political map of the world, five of which were Central Asian countries that became independent following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This heralded a new era in the development of Central Asian studies, as evidenced by a series of new research on the region (Abashin & Jenks, 2015). Central Asia, as a region, possesses unique geography and geopolitics which, according to some researchers, negatively impacts the economic development of the area (Batsaikhan & Dabrowski, 2017). The countries in the region are landlocked, connectivity and transport infrastructure are poorly developed, and the region has a long history of colonialism, resulting in significant problems concerning the demarcation of borders. This has led to unresolved border and territorial disputes among the countries, compounded by natural challenges, causing significant socio-economic and political upheavals.

Central Asia is considered one of the driest regions in the world, and the main problem hindering its development is water supply (Rumer, 1989). In the early years of independence, all five countries were engaged in nation-building processes such as creating flags and anthems, renaming cities, and transitioning their economies to market economies, with little focus on water policy and hydro diplomacy. By the end of the last century, the newly independent Central Asian states faced complex issues in managing the region's shared water resources. This primarily involves the two major river systems, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, which originate in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, and flow through the other three countries, playing a crucial role in agriculture, energy, and drinking water supply for the entire region. However, water diplomacy in post-independence Central Asia began in 1992 with the establishment of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) to define a unified water policy and develop its main directions in the region. In this article, water diplomacy is defined as a field of international relations that employs diplomatic tools to make shared water sources a domain of peace and cooperation rather than conflict (Schmeier, 2018).

The importance of water resources in Central Asia cannot be underestimated, as they play a key role in food security, energy production, agriculture, and the economic and social development of the entire region (Hakala, Mustasilta, & Hadi, 2023). According to Smith (1995), no other region has a higher potential for conflict over natural resource use than Central Asia. Despite existing challenges, the countries in the region have managed to maintain relative stability and develop water diplomacy. This is largely due to their shared history, cultural and religious ties, interdependence, and cooperation within various regional platforms.

Although water diplomacy has been pursued by the countries of the region since the early days of independence, effective and coordinated management of water resources and meeting the needs of all parties remains a primary challenge. Therefore, to better understand the current state of water diplomacy in Central Asia, the intricacies of water resource management, its challenges, and prospects, it is necessary to delve into the historical development and formation of this phenomenon. This article thus focuses on the historical development and formation of water diplomacy between Central Asian countries from the time of independence to the present, examining current challenges and interstate relations in the field of water diplomacy.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research method, which provides a deep understanding of the historical context and the current situation in water resource management and the level of hydro diplomacy in Central Asia, as well as its prospects in the context of regional geopolitics. This method was chosen for its

ability to delve into the details and nuances of interactions between countries, considering multiple aspects and regional contexts. Various methods were used to achieve the study's objectives: a) historical analysis to study the evolution of interaction between countries in water diplomacy issues, revealing the causes and consequences of various changes; b) comparative analysis to comprehensively analyze similarities and differences in the approaches of regional countries and their interactions in different historical periods, identifying common trends and unique characteristics of each side; c) content analysis to systematically study the content of texts and reports, identifying key themes, trends, and patterns in water diplomacy among these countries. These methods allowed for a multifaceted examination of the research question, providing a more complete understanding of the situation on which conclusions and recommendations were based.

Water is Politics

At the end of the last century, Central Asia returned to the global agenda not only due to the collapse of the USSR and the parade of sovereignties or the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site but also because of the critical fate of the Aral Sea. However, beyond the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea, the two main river systems of the region, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, have played key roles in shaping the history of Central Asia. Throughout history, fierce economic and political battles were fought for the possession of cities, especially along the Syr Darya River. Many ancient sources and authors mention these rivers, highlighting their great significance for the region at all times. For instance, Herodotus called the Amu Darya the Araxes, the Greeks later called it the Oxus, and the Arabs Jayhun. The Syr Darya was called the Jaxartes by the Greeks, and Seyhan or Nahr-ash-Shash by the Arabs. The history of the entire region is closely intertwined with these two rivers. The Greeks called the region "Transoxiana," meaning "Land beyond the Oxus," while the Arabs called it Mawarannahr, "that which is beyond the river" (Djalili & Kellner, 2014).

According to Mollinga (2001), the assertion that "water is politics" does not require any additional argumentation. Wegerich & Warner (2010) assert that the political nature of water and water resources is "entirely obvious" in any region of the world. Traditional views on national, regional, and international security do not include all the new elements brought about by modern times and globalization. Since the end of the last century, climate change issues, including those caused by human activities, have intensified calls for a revision of these traditional views (Myers, 1993). According to the then Vice President of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, wars in the next century will be fought over water rather than oil, as in the current century (Dolgin, 2023).

Climatic conditions such as low rainfall, aridity, and the shrinking of the Aral Sea may present Central Asia as a region suffering from water scarcity, but the situation is quite the opposite. Central Asia is actually rich in water resources; the problem lies not in scarcity but in the transboundary nature of all water resources and their uneven distribution. The countries of the region can be classified as upstream (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and downstream (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). This means that downstream countries must rely on upstream countries for water access for irrigation. Water is one of the alternative energy sources for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are rich in hydrocarbons and less dependent on upstream countries. However, Uzbekistan, the largest cotton producer in the region, is highly dependent on water resources.

Nevertheless, in the near future, water resources may surpass the importance of oil or gold. With population growth, high levels of industrialization, and subsequent urbanization, water resources become key resources (Petersen, 2015). Thus, hydro-politics is a special challenge not only for the countries of Central Asia but also for the entire world, as disputes over the management and utilization of water resources have the potential to escalate into significant international conflicts if not properly managed.

The importance of hydro diplomacy in Central Asia

Water is a strategic resource, and the distribution and joint use of water resources are key issues in Central Asia in this century. Water diplomacy cannot be sidelined, given the critical importance of this issue for the continued economic and social development of the five countries in the region. In Central Asia, the main challenge in managing water resources and developing water diplomacy lies in the transboundary nature of the primary resources and the fact that each country has its unique political and economic interests. These differing political and economic interests can pose significant obstacles to establishing mutual understanding of the shared use of water resources.

The transboundary nature of the region's water resources necessitates the coordinated efforts of all Central Asian states, as well as their neighbours (Smith, 1995). Control over water resources is primarily in the hands of upstream countries, which view this resource as a commodity for trade and profit—a logical perspective given their lack of other resources (Karaev, 2005). Since the Soviet era, there has been a water-energy exchange and coordinated management of shared water resources, whereby downstream countries received water during the growing season, while upstream countries received energy during the winter (Suleimenova, 2021). Several studies at various times have analyzed this water-energy nexus between the countries of the region (Laldjebaev, 2012; Jalilov et al., 2018; Suleimenova, 2021; Hakala et al., 2023). This exchange largely depended on the season, as bargaining

power shifted from downstream to upstream countries during the winter and summer periods. However, since the onset of independence, downstream countries have actively developed the oil and gas industry, thereby reducing their dependence on water resources from the two upstream countries. In contrast, upstream countries lack such natural resources and have been heavily reliant on the water-energy exchange.

Due to the aforementioned transboundary nature of water resources, decisions on water use can significantly impact regional politics and have serious transboundary consequences (Hakala et al., 2023). Given the heightened conflict potential in the region, conflicts of interest over water resources could lead to complex situations and violence (Rheinbay, Mayer, Wesch, & Vinke, 2021). The region is rife with unusual situations that could act as triggers for violent conflict, such as unresolved border and land issues, ethnic and cultural diversity, and limited access to water resources.

Another important factor indicating the need for coordinated water diplomacy is that the countries in the region are agricultural producers. The irrigation of these water-intensive crops and the inefficient use of water are major causes of the depletion of river and groundwater resources in the region (Wang, Chen, Fang, Li, & Liu, 2022). Agriculture accounts for the largest share of water consumption in the region, particularly in countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where cotton cultivation is highly developed. There is a need to implement innovative irrigation methods, such as drip and sprinkler irrigation, which could improve water use efficiency and significantly reduce water losses. However, efforts to enhance water use efficiency require significant investments and advanced technologies, which the countries currently lack. Additionally, high levels of corruption contribute to the degradation of irrigation systems, as many countries have initiated programs to implement more efficient technologies and irrigation methods. However, progress in this direction has been slow due to the inertia of established systems. According to Rheinbay, Mayer, Wesch, and Vinke (2021), the issue of water in the region is more about access than scarcity. Thus, the situation necessitates effective hydro diplomacy among the countries for further coordinated water use.

Moreover, the region's demographic growth also increases the need for water diplomacy. According to Akunova (2021), climate warming and the increasing global population are major causes of growing water scarcity worldwide. By 2040, the region's population is expected to reach 86 million (Siegfried et al., 2012). Population growth is observed in almost all five countries. This situation creates additional risks for conflicts over the division of natural resources in an already conflict-prone region.

Ineffective water resource management and the lack of coordinated policies increase the already high conflict potential of Central Asia. One example is the 2009

dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan over water releases from the Toktogul Reservoir, where the latter threatened to cut off gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan. Despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as upstream countries, have greater control over water resources, there is significant interdependence in the region. Another example is the dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over the latter's construction of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant on the Vakhsh River. In 2016, then Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev sent a letter to the Tajik government expressing his country's dissatisfaction with this initiative and calling for a safer way to address the energy issue, as Uzbekistan feared that the construction of the Rogun HPP would negatively affect its agricultural water access. These and numerous other unmentioned disputes highlight the need for more reliable and mutually beneficial water and energy exchange agreements.

Thus, unequal access to water resources, their transboundary nature, as well as excessive use and uneven management of water resources, can undermine security and negatively affect the stability of the region. Therefore, there is a need to analyze the current state of water diplomacy in Central Asia and its driving forces.

Regional Initiatives in Hydro Diplomacy

Due to the priority given to cotton production during the Soviet era, water resource management in the region was planned and coordinated by the center, from Moscow. To ensure stable cotton production, large-scale irrigation projects were developed and implemented without considering political boundaries between the republics. However, Soviet-era water management was inefficient, as evidenced by the Aral Sea disaster, which was once the fourth-largest lake in the world. The primary cause of the Aral Sea's shrinkage was the diversion of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for cotton irrigation, highlighting the unsustainable nature of Soviet policies. The Aral Sea problem, which began in the 1960s, peaked at the end of the century, with the sea losing over 90% of its original volume. This disaster not only led to an ecological crisis but also caused an economic downturn in the region and serious health problems for surrounding communities.

Since gaining independence, the countries in the region inherited a well-integrated but highly overloaded water management system from their predecessor. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the planned economy also vanished, and the newly formed republics rapidly transitioned to market economies. Each country sought to pursue independent economic policies. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with their large oil and gas reserves, were able to develop their economies thanks to these resources. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan primarily relied on cotton and agriculture, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan focused on developing hydropower. To this day, water from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and oil and gas from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,

and Turkmenistan, are the main bargaining chips in these relationships, as upstream hydropower needs often conflict with downstream irrigation needs.

Currently, water diplomacy in Central Asia operates on both bilateral and multilateral levels through regional initiatives. Governments have managed to conclude a significant number of bilateral and multilateral agreements to address water resource management issues. One example of such agreements is the 1998 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin. According to this agreement, Kyrgyzstan committed to releasing water from the Toktogul Reservoir, with compensation in the form of energy resources (coal, gas, fuel oil, electricity) supplied to Kyrgyzstan in equivalent volumes. Despite the signed agreements and reached accords, political and economic differences between the countries, as well as disagreements over the level of compensation, timing, and volume of water releases, and other issues, have led to systematic disputes and breaches of agreements.

From the earliest days of independence, the countries in the region have been in conflict over water use issues (Wang et al., 2022). Despite numerous regional problems and challenges, Central Asia also has the potential for developing regional dialogue and water diplomacy. Several regional organizations and initiatives, mainly established during the post-independence era, exist for these purposes. In 1991, the Tashkent Declaration was signed, followed by the Almaty Declaration in 1992, which stated that the countries have "equal rights to use and responsibility for ensuring the rational use and protection" of water resources ("Agreement Between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Management on Utilization and Protection of Water Resources From Interstate Sources," 1992). In 1993, the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) was established, which later incorporated the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), originally functioning as a separate organization after the signing of the Almaty Declaration. One of the key tasks of the ICWC is to manage the distribution of water resources among the participating countries and to promote infrastructure projects in the region. However, both IFAS and ICWC have seen limited cooperation, with a significant drawback being their exclusion of the energy sector (Krasznai, 2017). Furthermore, the effectiveness of these initiatives is hampered by the lack of a legally binding framework and enforcement mechanisms.

To address the ecological crisis and improve the socio-economic situation in the Aral Sea basin, the presidents of the region's countries created the Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development (ICSDD) during a meeting in Kyzylorda. Although ICSDD is not directly involved in water issues, it plays an indirect role.

However, in February 1997, ICSD along with ICWC, was incorporated into the structure of IFAS. Despite the inclusion of these organizations and the expansion of its mandate, IFAS's structure and regulatory framework require reforms to meet current needs. Efforts in this direction are already underway, with the Working Group on Improving the Organizational Structure and Legal Framework of IFAS, which has been active since 2018.

In 2001, the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (CAREC) was established through a joint decision by the five countries, the European Union, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The primary mission of CAREC is to assist the governments of the region in addressing environmental and sustainable development issues. However, existing regional organizations and initiatives lack the necessary authority and regulatory framework to effectively address all water-related issues in the region.

Pathways to Sustainable Water Governance

The primary issue in the region is the poor state of water supply infrastructure. The majority of the hydro infrastructure, including canals, dams, and reservoirs, was built and commissioned during the Soviet era and is now in a state of disrepair. Over more than 30 years of independence, the countries in the region have failed to significantly improve the level of their water infrastructure, leading to substantial water losses due to leaks and evaporation. The infrastructure built during the last century under the Soviet Union no longer meets the needs of modern water resource management. Therefore, there is a critical need for investment in modern water-saving technologies. To reduce water losses in agriculture, it is necessary to implement innovative irrigation technologies and methods, such as sprinkler or drip irrigation, which use less water than flood irrigation. Inefficient agricultural practices that result in excessive water consumption must be replaced by innovative methods. Regional cooperation in water diplomacy can include the transfer and exchange of technologies and knowledge, facilitating the modernization of water resource management technologies and adaptation to changing climatic conditions.

According to Varis (2014) the actual reason for the existence of water scarcity in the Central Asian region lies behind critical mismanagement and immoderate use of water since the 1960s. Furthermore, excessive extraction of water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for irrigation for 10 years has caused the disappearance of most of the Aral Sea area. Back in time, disputes between the countries arose initially over access to the Ferghana Valley in the Syr Darya River basin, which was a common body of water.

Uncoordinated water policies and management have not only led to the ecological disaster of the Aral Sea but also have ongoing negative consequences for biodiversity loss and adverse health effects for local populations due to windborne

salt and dust. The lack of integrated management of the region's shared water resources continues to deplete these resources, as countries increase irrigation intensity, leading to rising groundwater levels and soil salinization. This negatively impacts not only agriculture but also the economic condition of local populations. Therefore, there is a need to implement an integrated approach to water management and policy in Central Asia to ensure the sustainability of vital ecosystems in the region. This requires comprehensive participation from all five countries in key areas, such as data sharing and the creation of joint monitoring systems.

Achieving progress in water policy and management in Central Asia requires strengthening the authority of regional initiatives and institutions like the ICWC and IFAS. The absence of legally binding mechanisms and agreements, as well as a lack of substantial resources and clear enforcement mechanisms, prevent the necessary level of regional cooperation in this area. There is a significant need to educate not only the local population but also decision-makers on water management issues in the context of a deteriorating climate, as well as to increase transparency to build trust.

International initiatives, including the Central Asia Water & Energy Program, USAID's Regional Water and Vulnerable Environment program, and other entities like the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, play a crucial role in supporting water resource management initiatives in the region. They provide financial assistance, technical expertise, and promote the growth and strengthening of regional dialogue in Central Asia. For instance, USAID's Regional Water and Vulnerable Environment program, launched at the end of 2020 as a five-year plan, allocates \$24.5 million to strengthen regional cooperation in the water sector (U.S. Mission Kazakhstan, 2022). This is not the first instance where environmental degradation issues in Central Asia have been addressed through international initiatives. The construction of the large Kokaral Dam, which partially restored the northern part of the Aral Sea, was carried out with the help of the World Bank. As a result, fish populations were restored, salinity levels decreased, and saline outflows beyond the region were reduced. This underscores the necessity of coordinated regional and global efforts in water diplomacy and management. It is essential to remember that the involvement of international initiatives and organizations enhances trust in initiatives and increases transparency.

In this regard, the countries of the region can also analyze cases from similar regions facing analogous joint water usage issues. A thorough analysis of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC) could provide valuable insights into transboundary water regulation, as these are among the most positive examples of water cooperation development. Examining similar situations of transboundary water resource management highlights the importance of the involvement of all countries and the political will of their governments in ensuring

equitable water usage. Most importantly, these cases demonstrate that ensuring fair use of transboundary resources requires the strengthening of multilateral agreements and interactions at the regional level.

Conclusion

This research paper demonstrates that the root of the existence of water issues lies behind mismanagement and miscommunication between Central Asian countries, likewise not exactly in the scarcity of water resources, rather than misuse of it. Therefore, this article emphasizes the importance of water diplomacy, water management, and the establishment of new (or renewed) agreements to ensure sustainable and equitable water use in Central Asia. Deepening and expanding water diplomacy in the region is a complex yet potentially solvable issue. Ensuring fair water use is crucial not only for the ecological sustainability of the region but also for its economic resilience and social stability. Therefore, the conclusions of this article highlight the necessity of:

- a. strengthening regional cooperation;
- b. modernizing water infrastructure;
- c. implementing innovative irrigation methods and technologies;
- d. adopting an integrated approach to water management and policy;
- e. enhancing the authority and expanding the control mechanisms of regional initiatives;
- f. increasing collaboration with international organizations and initiatives;
- g. analyzing various cases from similar regions.

The future of hydro diplomacy and water management in Central Asia will primarily depend on the willingness of the political elites of the countries to choose cooperation over competition and innovation over stagnation and degradation.

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Public Perceptions toward China in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

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Abstract *

Chinese influence is growing among Central Asian countries by the Belt and Road Initiatives Project and infrastructure and energy investments, especially in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the last few decades. How are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reacting to Chinese influence? Also, how do public attitudes toward China's economic and political influence differ among Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan? One approach to answer these questions is to study public perceptions toward China in both of these two countries. This study examines and compares the public attitude toward China in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, this research demonstrates the distinctive national sentiments of these two nations which in existing previous literature researchers often generalized Central Asia. By using data from Central Asia Barometer Survey Wave 11 conducted in 2022, this study employs quantitative analysis to compare public attitudes. Although Kazakhstan has more advanced relations with China compared to Uzbekistan, public opinion in Kazakhstan remains notably more unfavorable. Public opinion in Kazakhstan is more concerned about the possible economic risk of Chinese developmental initiatives, with a significant proportion concerned about national debt, and they also do not want China to build energy and infrastructure projects in their country. In contrast, public perception in Uzbekistan is mixed, and a greater proportion are optimistic about Chinese investment and Construct energy and development projects in their nation.

Keywords: public opinion, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan

Introduction

This paper is about public attitude toward China in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and it analyzes and compares public perception among these two nations. China is one of the largest, powerful and influential neighbors of Central Asia. Furthermore, China and Central Asia have had long relations starting in ancient times in the Silk Road period, and continuing till today. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many new independent countries appeared in Central Asia, and China is one country which firstly recognized their independence and started diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (Woods & Baker, 2022). By the early 2000s China and Central Asian countries especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan became essential partners for regional

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security, following that, trade and economy (Karibayeva, 2020). Initially in the early 2000's trade volume among China and Central Asian countries was approximately US\$1 billion, however between 2010 and 2013 it almost reached US\$50 billion (Toktamushev, 2016). In 2013 at Nazarbayev University Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) project. The project is about connecting China with the rest of the world by land and sea roads, which helps China to expand its influence not only in Central Asia but all over the world (Laruelle, 2018). From all of these data, it is clear that Chinese influence is growing in all spheres, and it promotes interest to study public perception toward China. In the article, *The Times of Central Asia* pointed out that public perception toward China is mixed, many people in the region consider China's growing influence in Central Asia as an economic opportunity, although others are concerned about losing their lands and Chinese debt trap policy (*The Times of Central Asia*, 2024). There are some articles and studies of public perceptions toward China, however in existing literature researchers generalized Central Asian countries and this study compares and determines distinct national sentiments of two nations. One of them is Kazakhstan which is the neighboring country with China and has more advanced relations, and another one is Uzbekistan which relations with China are growing in recent years. Another important point of studying public perception is highlighted by Dr. Kemel Toktomushev who notes in his work "Warm politics, cold Public" that from 2018 to 2021, 97 anti-China sentiments happened in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, studying public perceptions help to manage future relations with China and avoid any larger protests (Toktamushev, 2021). The 'main question' of this research is "How do public attitudes toward China's political and economic influence differ among Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan?". This question helps to identify and compare differences of public perception in two nations. Here are some 'sub questions': "How do Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan view China's role in the economy?", "How do people in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan feel about Chinese influence on their country?", and "What are the main concerns that people worry about Chinese influence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan?". These questions help clarify the public attitudes of two nations toward China, and provide more detailed answers.

Literature review

Central Asia is strategically important for China in both economic and political spheres. In the past China did not influence Central Asia as today. Currently, the largest proportion of Chinese investments are focused on Central Asia, especially in developing infrastructure, agriculture, modernization, extracting resources, industries and others (Neafie et al., 2024). Moreover, China is one of the most significant trade partners of Central Asia, according to the statistics, trade

volume between China and Central Asian Countries was \$70 billion in 2022, and in 2023 it reached \$90 billion, which illustrates a remarkable increase within one year (Umarov, 2024). Additionally, China and Central Asian countries have expanded their security cooperation, and both Central Asian countries and China are members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization which deals with security concerns (Dunay, 2020). Public perceptions toward China in Central Asia are mixed and different, also shaped by various factors such as historical, cultural, and economic. Most people considered China as a favorable country due to economic opportunities, and improvements and investments in energy and infrastructure, however others were concerned and feared from land grabs, and Chinese debt trap policy (The Times of Central Asia, 2024). Other reasons for unfavorable perspectives toward China come from Xinjiang Crisis and treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang region, after the incident Muslim-majority in Central Asia accusing China for human right abuse and suffering of innocent Muslim Uighurs (Toktamushev, 2021). Moreover, China is not only improving its political, and economic power in Central Asia, but also its soft power by exchange programs, tourism, and teaching Chinese in Central Asia. Additionally, Chinese workers are coming to Central Asia and it is leading to increased Sinophobia in the region (Peyrouse, 2020). According to the report on views of China, there is no Central Asian perspective, every country within Central Asia has a diverse view of China and their perceptions are shaped by various factors.

Methodology

In this study quantitative methods were employed to analyze the public attitude toward Chinese influence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Secondary data from Central Asia Barometer (CAB), an independent, regional and non-profit institution that collects data which shows the public opinion across Central Asian countries was utilized. In this research survey, the Central Asia Barometer Survey Wave 11 (2022 May-June) utilized that to statistically examine trends, correlations, and distinguish public views among these two nations. This raw data is collected by conducting a telephone survey among Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and in the survey 1509 and 1504 respondents participated in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan respectively. The dataset was obtained from Survey Wave 11, which includes various socio-economic and geopolitical topics with the particular focus on foreign influence. CAB provided the comprehensive collected data from a wide range of demographics including various gender, age groups, education level and rural or urban population toward various socioeconomic and geopolitical topics, including view of foreign impact. In the survey simple random sampling is used and according to the CAB the respondents' phone numbers were randomly selected from a list of thousands of possible phone numbers throughout the region. The Survey Wave 11 contains many topics and different types of

questions such as multiple choice and open ended questions, Likert scale and so on. Four questions from that survey were selected which are relevant to the research topic. These questions were designed to measure the attitude, opinion and perceptions of respondents about Chinese investments, Chinese projects, Chinese workers in the region and others. Subsequently, separate tables were constructed for both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which includes answers and percentages to identify which answers are most and least common, also to make my data clearer and easier for complex analysis. After that, tables and graphs were generated which are essential for descriptive studies, and shows clear data and findings for my research.


First of all, this research aims to know the public perspective about Chinese influence in not only Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan but also the whole Central Asian countries. However, the Central Asia Barometer does not include some questions selected for this study across all Central Asian countries. Therefore, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were chosen for analysis and comparison. Furthermore, the survey does not include direct questions regarding Chinese influence on these two countries. Since this study relies on secondary data rather than primary data collection, there might be some potential problems such as sample selection or in respondent demographics that might affect findings. Five questions from the CAB survey were selected to make this research more detailed and find and generate more clear and understandable data and findings.

Research Findings and Analysis

This section of the research will represent the findings and analysis based on the survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer 2022. In the survey various topics were discussed such as domestic politics, international politics, economy, media, environment, and public health. The survey was conducted among respondents in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. The total number of participants n=7507, survey includes participants from various age and gender groups, and from both urban and rural areas across countries. This research focused on Kazakhstan (1509) and Uzbekistan (1504), and displayed the findings and analysis based on four questions from the survey asked from both nations about relations between China and their countries. From Figure 1, Table 1 and Table 2, the results obtained from the first question about their opinion on China do consider China as a favorable, somewhat favorable, unfavorable, or somewhat unfavorable country. In Table 1 and Table 2 the results of the question can be seen based on the various regions of the two countries. Figure 1 displays the favorability and unfavorability of China in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the graph most of the respondents considered China as a somewhat favorable country in both nations. However, it is apparent from the column graph that even though China and

Kazakhstan have more advanced relations, public perception toward China is more negative and a high percentage of people selected are somewhat unfavorable (22%) and very unfavorable (18.6%). In comparison, public attitudes in Uzbekistan are much more favorable, 19% of respondents chose very favorable and 39.8% somewhat favorable (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Public opinion on China favorable vs unfavorable



Source: Own design based on the telephone survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer (2022).

Table 1 demonstrates the number of respondents from various regions of Kazakhstan and their responses. From Kazakhstan 1509 respondents participated in telephone surveys, and most people from Almaty 349 surveyed and the South part of Kazakhstan 369 respondents. Respondents from Almaty and the North part of Kazakhstan are more favorable toward China. However, respondents who reported a high level of unfavorable views compared to others, are from South and West Kazakhstan regions. Surprisingly the majority of respondents from the East part of the country near the Xinjiang province selected China as more favorable (Table 1).

Table 1. Regional perception Analysis in Kazakhstan (Favorability to Unfavorability)

Total number of Participants 1509	Almaty	Nur-sultan	South Kazakhstan	North Kazakhstan	East Kazakhstan	West Kazakhstan	Central (Akmola, Karaganda)
Numbers of Participants	349	110	369	188	104	195	194
Very Favorable	43	14	33	32	10	19	28
Somewhat Favorable	125	38	97	96	45	60	90
Somewhat Unfavorable	73	29	102	14	26	44	19
Very Unfavorable	68	20	97	25	13	50	32
Don't Know (vol.)	37	9	37	17	10	20	22
Refused (vol.)	3	0	3	4	0	2	3

Source: Own design based on the telephone survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer (2022).

Table 2. Regional Perception Analysis in Uzbekistan (Favorability to Unfavorability)


Total number of Participants 1504	Toshkent Shari, Toshkent Oblast	Eastern Regions	Western Regions	Northern Regions	Southern Regions	Central Regions
Numbers of Participants	357	404	177	103	206	257
Very Favorable	73	95	37	30	38	42
Somewhat Favorable	165	180	93	49	51	105
Very Unfavorable	29	42	30	15	19	37
Somewhat unfavorable	31	60	27	7	16	21
Don't know	59	92	49	22	24	49
Refused	0	2	2	0	1	3

Source: Own design based on the telephone survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer (2022).

Close inspection of Table 2 shows that most of those surveyed are from Tashkent city and Tashkent region (357), and the Eastern part (404) of Uzbekistan. Positive perceptions mainly are higher in Uzbekistan compared to Kazakhstan. In almost all regions of Uzbekistan favorable ratios are high. The negative perception

is highest in Western part (57 respondents out of 177) of the country then other parts (Table 2).


Figure 2. China is developing energy and infrastructure projects in your country.



Source: Own designed based on the telephone survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer (2022).

The Figure 2 above illustrates the public opinions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Citizens on China developing energy and infrastructure projects in their countries. From the graph, it can be seen that most respondents from Kazakhstan strongly oppose the option and more than 300 participants of the survey somewhat opposed it, which means they do not want China developing projects in their countries. In contrast, over 600 surveyed from Uzbekistan selected a somewhat favorable option and more than 400 respondents supported the idea of China developing projects in Uzbekistan (Figure 2).


Figure 3. China bringing in Chinese workers for energy and infrastructure projects in our country (Support vs Oppose)



Source: Own design based on the telephone survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer (2022).

Figure 3 above illustrates the summary statistics for the question about China bringing in Chinese workers for energy and infrastructure projects in to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It can be seen from the graph that more than half of the respondents from Kazakhstan strongly oppose China bringing Chinese workers for energy and infrastructure projects in their country. It is possible the result might be due to the high numbers of Chinese workers in Kazakhstan. According to Muzaparova and Koshirowa in 2022, 3651 citizens of People's Republic of China are officially employed on the territory of Kazakhstan. Although it does not seem high, Chinese people contribute the largest percentage of foreign employees in Kazakhstan (Muzaparova and Koshirowa, 2022). In Kazakhstan the percentage of strong support is notably low. In contrast, approximately 55% of the respondents support (strongly support+somewhat support) the idea of bringing Chinese workers into their country. However, the percentage of “Don't Know” answers is higher in Uzbekistan, almost 10 percent, which means uncertainty is higher in Uzbekistan (Figure 3).

Figure 4. Chinese development projects could lead to an increase of national debt with China



Source: Own design based on the telephone survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer (2022).

Figure 4 provides the summary statistics for the question about China developing projects in their countries that could lead to the increase of the national debt with China. What can be seen from here is that almost 40% of the respondents chose very concerned, the percentage of the somewhat concerned slightly lower. However, the responses of the surveyed from Uzbekistan showed that they are not at all concerned, which shows greater than 40 percent. The ratio of the answer ‘not concerned too much’ is similar in both nations (Figure 4).

Based on the survey hold by Central Asia Barometer in 2022, the result showed that 62% (32% not very much, 30% not at all) of respondents have a confidence in Chinese investments not great job for our country and citizens which means 62% of respondent against cooperation with China and their investments (Central Asia Barometer 2022). In contrast to this, according to the survey conducted by Global Times Research Center in 2024 in China and Kazakhstan about China and Kazakhstan relations, they found out that 83% of respondents believe that cooperation with China gives more opportunity for their countries (Global Times, 2024).

The result of the survey conducted by Central Asia Barometer 2022, demonstrated 69% (23% great deal and some 46%) of respondents believed that Chinese investments can help to create jobs in their country for their citizens. Similarly, the results of a survey conducted in Uzbekistan with 100 people by Mukhammadsodik Donaev (2023) discovered 89% of respondents believe that Chinese businesses and investments create more job opportunities in Uzbekistan.

The Central Asia Barometer survey illustrated 55% (24% strongly support, 31% somewhat support) supported the idea of bringing Chinese people to the county (2022). However, Mukhammadsodik Donaev research (2023) toward the growing number of Chinese people and businesses in Uzbekistan 48 percent expressed a negative view.

Conclusion

This section summarizes the main findings about public perception among Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Chinese influence is growing all over the world, and public perception is mixed and varied in every country, as mentioned in the article from The Times of Central Asia there is no Central Asia perspective toward China and the article highlights public attitudes in various Central Asian countries are diverse and every country demonstrates distinctive national sentiments. This research represents the distinct public perception in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan toward China. The Findings suggest that although China and Kazakhstan have more advanced relations and Kazakhstan receives the highest amount of Chinese investments and neighboring countries of China, public attitude toward China is more negative in almost every question. More than 40 % of the respondents selected China as an unfavorable country (very unfavorable + somewhat unfavorable), greater than 50% of the survey participants do not want China bringing Chinese workers to Kazakhstan. Furthermore, approximately 70% of surveyed Chinese projects lead to an increase of national debts with China. In comparison, public views about China in Uzbekistan are more positive. Almost 59% of respondents considered China as a favorable country, and more than 50% of the surveyed support the idea of bringing Chinese workers into Uzbekistan. Moreover, greater than 40% of respondents not at all concerned about the Chinese projects lead to increase of national debt with China. Further research should be undertaken to investigate the public attitude toward China in other Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and others by using mixed research methods.

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Kazakh New Wave Music as a Strategic Tool of Soft Power

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Abstract

The use of music as a tool of soft power and its increasingly prominent role in promoting Kazakhstan's cultural influence has become one of the most significant and topical subjects for academic research. This article examines the growing role of Kazakh new wave music as a soft power instrument that transcends traditional approaches to this concept. Despite the substantial body of academic studies and media reports dedicated to Kazakhstan's soft power, there is a notable lack of high-quality academic research specifically focused on the role of Kazakh music in advancing Kazakhstan's influence abroad. Drawing on a qualitative approach and secondary data sources, including prior academic research and media reports on this topic, this study explores the key features and significance of this emerging phenomenon. By analyzing historical and cultural events related to the emergence of Kazakh new wave music through comparative, historical, and systematic methods, the research centers on how Kazakh new wave music has developed and become an important tool for promoting the Kazakh language and culture internationally. Examining the interplay between global music trends and Kazakh new wave music, the article highlights the distinctive features of the genre. Furthermore, through the analysis of a wide range of contemporary artists, the study emphasizes the potential future prospects in this area. This research contributes to the field by identifying key concepts and factors influencing the global perception of Kazakh music, offering new insights into its role in shaping cultural diplomacy and soft power dynamics.

Keywords: Soft power, Kazakhstan, Kazakh new wave music, Kazakh culture, Kazakh language, qualitative approach

Introduction

In the recent decades a multiple number of tools started to be implicated as the instruments of promoting interests in foreign policy. Within which soft power is considered to be an influential method for promoting national interests and goals by relying on cultural instruments. Among these instruments of soft power music is stated to play a crucial role in spreading cultural values across the world (Quevedo-Redondo, Rebolledo, and Nuria Navarro-Sierra 2023). This phenomenon can be noticed from the various historical examples which have been witnessed all over the world (Hodge 2023). For instance, Korean pop music became a prominent musical genre by its mixture of traditional pop music and Korean cultural features (Ro 2022). In the context of the mentioned examples, it can be asserted that Kazakhstan

successfully thrives to spread influence by promoting the new wave music which recently emerged in the country. The main feature of the genre consists of utilizing modern music and Kazakh culture in order to create a new image for Kazakhstan in the global arena.

The primary objective of the research is investigating the impact of Kazakh new wave media music through the detailed process of analysis. During this research such topics as the new trends in Kazakh music and their impact on the country's perception outside will be covered and presented through a deep analysis in order to cover all aspects of the topic. Moreover, by investigating various historical examples related to the utilization of music as a soft power tool will be covered and explained.

The study utilizes historical and systematic analyses in order to investigate the main features and advantages of Kazakh new wave music as a tool of Strategic Soft Power. Examining how this genre contributes to the development of national culture and image of the country, the study applies systematic, and historical analyzes with an aim of shedding the light on various aspects of the problem.

Two types of analysis – structural and historical will be applied to analyze the topic from various directions. The primary reason for the selection of this particular analysis in the research is that these types of analysis assist to create a clear vision of how Kazakh music developed over a certain period of time. Particularly, structural analysis concentrates on how Kazakh New Wave music's structure influences the perception of this genre inside and outside of Kazakhstan. Investigating the structural features of the genre, the study clearly examines how the modern trends and innovations in music played a role in the creation of new musical genres in Kazakhstan. Without any doubt structural features play a unique role in the emergence of new musical trends. For instance, such a prominent musical genre as Q-pop contains a number of features related to Korean culture. Hence, promoting Korean culture in the global arena which can be considered as an example of soft power. From the provided example it is clear that structural features are considered to be an important factor which impacts on the success of various musical styles and genres.

By the implementation of historical analysis, the study seeks to shed light on the process of evolution which shaped Kazakh music. Traditional music is perceived to be an important aspect of Kazakh culture, hence its impact on the emergence of new genres should not be denied. Furthermore, the historical context of events which led to the creation and ascend of Kazakh new wave music is going to be analyzed in order to gain valuable insights. Historical analysis is considered to be a crucial part of the research due to the fact that without historical analysis it will be impossible to track how the mentioned genre of music was created. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the problem of encountering a number of biases still poses several challenges to the objectivity of research. Additionally, a little number of sources

related to the study can be considered as the second issue which is probably to create difficulties for the investigation.

The main research question of the study is “How does Kazakh new wave music impact on the promotion of Kazakhstan’s image in the international arena?”. Moreover, a number of sub-questions related to the topic such as “What are the features of Kazakh new wave music?”, “Who are the main representatives of a new genre?”, and “What is the role of social media tools in promotion of Kazakh music?” are going to be utilized in the research. By the implementation of these questions the study aims to shed light on the topic from various perspectives.

Literature Review

Covering the definition of the concept, Joseph S. Nye has defined that soft power is an ability of a certain state to influence other countries without application of coercive mechanisms (Nye 2017). Hence in a practical way it refers to developing relations and partnership by the implementation of cultural values and practices. There are a lot of examples of tools which are utilized as the tools of soft power, particularly cultural exchange, educational opportunities, and global media are emphasized as the main examples (Drew 2023). Coming to the emergence of phenomena, previous studies have reported that Soft Power usually appears through the implementation of such instruments as social media, sports, music, and education (Council on Foreign Relations 2023).

Music always played and continues to play a crucial role in human society, Sutherland emphasized music as a powerful instrument which is able to gather people and unite them into a particular group (Sutherland 2004). Moreover, the impact of music is directly related to human psychology through the process of shaping mood and emotions, several pieces of evidence reported that listening to music can cause dopamine release in the human brain (Sutherland 2004). Within the next decade’s various genres became widely utilized in promoting cultural influence across the world.

Highlighting the main features of music as soft power it is necessary to provide various examples from history. Without any doubt for a long period of time music was utilized as a tool for the promotion of interests in politics (Street, Hague, and Savigny 2008). Social movements applied various genres of music in order to influence the government. For instance, in the beginning of 20th century the labor movements in the USA used traditional folk music in protests with an aim to show discontent with the policies implemented towards the working class (Sutherland 2004). Within the next decades especially during the Cold War the new genres of music commenced to be implicated as the tools of cultural influence. The main genre which was known as “Jazz” served as a tool for the USA to promote cultural

influence across the world (Perrigo 2017). The American government believed that music would serve as a catalyst to create a positive image of the country, thus attracting new ideological allies. This type of diplomacy known as “Jazz diplomacy” included the implication of jazz as the primary method to spread democratic values and American culture (USC on Public Diplomacy 2020). Moreover, even in the territory of the Soviet Union (particularly Georgia) jazz turned out to be more effective than the government propaganda. From the provided evidence it is clear that music can be considered as one of the most advantageous instruments in spreading culture and influence.

The American pop-culture represented in music reflects the new trend in the world which is exemplified by its wide influence in the global arena (Nakamura 2023). One of the most influential persons that contributed to the promotion of American culture is Michael Jackson who represented the idea of American diversity and freedom by utilizing various techniques in his performances (Martin 2012). The primary reason for the success of American popular culture can be explained by its accessibility to audiences. American values such as freedom, individualism, and creativity created a convenient base for its promotion all over the world.

The other prominent example for the usage of music with an aim of cultural influence can be seen from the relatively new genre which is called “K-Pop”. This genre emerged in South Korea and continues to be a powerful tool in spreading Korean culture across the world (Mahmoud 2024). Owing to this genre the world started to be interested in Korean culture and Language. Moreover, the level of economic growth and tourism continues to increase which makes South Korea an influential actor not only in Asia but in the world. According to the study conducted by Romano in 2018, South Korea’s democratization and reforms in the end of 1980s had a direct impact on the development of K-Pop as a separate genre (Romano 2018). The beginning of the genre can be traced back since 1992 when a group of three young boys performed in a talent contest show (BBC 2019). Although they received low marks from judges for the performance which included a mixture of Korean lyrics and American hip hop, the genre succeeded to spread across the world due to the various social media instruments such as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram. The primary reason for the success of K-Pop in the international arena was explained by the fact that unlike Chinese and Japanese companies, Korean companies thrived to promote national music and culture not only domestically but also on an international level.

Kazakhstan's new wave music and its features

Before we delve into the discussion regarding the role of Kazakh new wave music as a tool of Soft Power, it is important to define the concept and its main features. In recent years there has been an increasing amount of literature on this genre of music. Several studies have defined Kazakh new wave music as a mix of traditional and modern genres of music, hence emphasizing its unique place among other musical genres (Jumaniyazova 2022). Furthermore, such figures as Dimash Kudaibergenov, Jah Khalib, and Scriptonite have been reported to be prominent examples that gained extreme popularity abroad (Akbarova 2024). The main part of the section will be concerned around the general historical background which served as a framework for the future transformation of Kazakh music in the context of contemporary globalization.

Several studies have reported that the origins of Kazakh musical tradition are traced back since the ancient times alongside with the traditions of other Turkic people (Man in India n.d.). For instance, the musical instrument named as “kobyz” is reported to be a part of not only Kazakh musical culture but also a part of Karakalpak, Kyrgyz, and Tatar culture which undoubtedly proves the existence of common cultural and traditional ties between the people. Additionally, these musical customs, which are typically passed down within families or groups, are essential to the expression of identity and include the use of the kobyz. From the Altai Mountains to the Caspian Sea, these customs have spread and changed throughout Central Asia, indicating a robust cross-cultural contact and reciprocal influence that cut beyond national boundaries. From the provided evidence we can assert that Kazakh musical tradition has a deep history of development over the centuries.

As was emphasized before, throughout the centuries Kazakh people were known for their creativity in the field of music. Owing to the tradition born thousand years before, Kazakh people succeeded to save and develop their own musical culture. Such well-known musical instruments as dombyra, kobyz, or zhetygen are considered to be an inextricable part of national identity (Jumaniyazova 2022). Furthermore, in 19th century prominent figures as Dina Nurpeisova, Kurmangazy, Akan Seri, and Ykylas Dukenuly contributed to the development of traditional music by composition of kuis (musical genre), for instance several kuis as “Adai”, “Sary Arka”, and “Balbyrauyn” are considered to be popular even in contemporary Kazakhstan (WeProject 2021). Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that Kazakh traditional music can be counted as an inextricable part of the national identity of Kazakh people.

On the basis of provided evidence it is crucial to mention that emergence of Kazakh new wave music as a genre is closely related to the features of Kazakh culture. This assertion can be proved by the fact that the greatest number of musical compositions created contain the elements of traditional culture. For instance,

“Turan” Ensemble utilizes traditional Kazakh musical instruments as dombyra and kobyz in order to combine the elements of contemporary genres with the elements of Kazakh music. These provided examples clearly demonstrate that the main features of Kazakh new wave music are closely tied to the traditional culture of Kazakh people.

Kazakh music and its role as Soft Power

Before revealing the main features of Kazakh new wave music as a tool of Soft Power, it is important to emphasize that in the context of current musical trends Kazakh new wave music demonstrated a significant success on such social media outlets as YouTube and Spotify. This assertion can be proved by the data provided on the table situated below. According to the table a number of prominent artists have demonstrated an extreme level of popularity on Spotify and YouTube which proves that the music industry can be considered as a valuable field for the promotion of national interests and culture of Kazakhstan abroad. Furthermore, the recent development of social media tools is probably to accelerate the process.

Table 1. Number of streams of certain Kazakh songs on Spotify

Name	Author	Number of streams on Spotify
“Zhurek”	Farukh Tokhtamuratov	14 million streams
“Er Turan”	“Turan” Ensemble	10.7 million streams
“Roses”	Imanbek Zaykenov	1.97 billion streams
“I will play”	Moreart	61 million streams
“Own Paradise”	LXAES	58 million streams

Source: Tengrynews.kz (2024)

Nowadays, the Kazakh music industry has experienced a period of growth in popularity. Since 2017 Kazakh music has continued to grow not only in the scale but also in the quality of production (WeProject 2022). Furthermore, the utilization of music as a tool which promotes the image of Kazakhstan can be stated to be the fruitful area for the government. In the example of South Korea which implements Q-pop genre as a key way to promote the positive vision and culture features of the country. Undoubtedly, Kazakhstan can benefit from such circumstances by adapting to the contemporary global trends.

In conclusion of this part, it would be proper to assert that Kazakh new wave music has a significant potential to gain a huge popularity in the international arena. Furthermore, from the examples which were shown in the previous parts it is clear that this genre of music is probable to become a crucial tool of soft power for Kazakhstan.

Conclusion

It would be crucial to note that Kazakh new wave music can be considered as a prospective field. The recent success of such singers as Dimash, Irina Kairatovna, Jakh Khalib, and Moldanazar demonstrate that Kazakh music is able to adapt to the modern trends which emerge in the world (Akbarova 2024). Despite the fact that the modern Kazakh music is based on mixing different styles, the creativity of artists continues to promote Kazakhstan's image for the international audience. In the context of the contemporary cultural and social changes exemplified by globalization Kazakh artists and singers demonstrated an extreme versatility utilizing various genres in order to develop their own styles. Moreover, the recent developments in the field of digital technologies allowed it to reach popularity in the global arena. Taking into account the fact that the contemporary musical genres are in the stage of evolution, it would be suitable to assert that Kazakh new wave music will probably continue to spread worldwide by adapting to the new styles simultaneously preserving the main features of Kazakh culture within compositions. Additionally, the governmental support for the artists creates a number of opportunities for the promotion of image outside the country. In the example of such prominent figures as Dimash Kudaibergenov we can notice that music is able to increase interest for the country's culture.

The analysis of Kazakh new wave music demonstrates how a set of historical, cultural, and social features influences the creation of this new genre. Ultimately, the rise of the genre clearly indicates the complex relations between traditional and modern values. This research not only indicates how Kazakh music developed over time but also how the image and influence of Kazakhstan were spread owing to the significant level of international audience. As was emphasized before Kazakh new wave music can definitely be considered as a potential tool of soft power due to the huge impact on the perception of Kazakhstan.

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The Portrayal of Public Opinion on the Kazakhstani Government's Earthquake Safety Regulations in the Media

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Abstract

This research studies how public opinion about earthquake safety procedures is portrayed in two YouTube channels' video comment sections with different political agenda. These YouTube channels are "Tengri TV" and "Jurttyn balasy". Using sentiment analysis comments were analysed in terms of word usage, general themes, and emojis. The study identifies key fallacies of safety regulations, critiques, and suggestions for improvements. Findings say that main criticisms are about general preparedness and emergency communication systems, which means that government bodies should focus on building effective communication networks when it comes to earthquake safety procedures.

Keywords: public opinion, YouTube, effective communication

Introduction

This study investigated public opinion and discourse around earthquake safety procedures and how the government acts during crises. To do this, the study examines what is being said on both independent media channels and outlets that support the government. Independent media channels often let people share uncensored opinions. Meanwhile, pro-government media sources might tell stories in a way that matches the government's official paradigm. The goal is to determine how people feel about the government's actions to keep people safe during earthquakes in two distinct media. The underlying goal of the research is to reveal a better understanding of how much people trust the guidelines set by institutions by looking at different opinions, examining why stories are being told

certain ways, and thinking about safety during earthquakes in YouTube channels with distinct political stands. It may help to comprehend public trust in Kazakhstan when it comes to social media discourse.

In this study, I analyzed what people think about the safety steps taken during the earthquake. This natural disaster happened on February 24, 2024, in Almaty city, Kazakhstan. For the study sentiment analysis, I focused on two distinct YouTube channels. The first one is "Jurttyn balasy" which is left-leaning and often finds fault with the government's actions on social issues. The second channel is "Tengri TV". It presents itself as friendly towards the government's actions. Each channel has a different audience. "Jurttyn balasy" is popular with the younger population and has fewer viewers than "Tengri TV": They got 129,000 and 303,000 watchers, respectively. Also, two comment sections differ for 232 comments, compared to 1042 comments on "Jurttyn balasy" and 810 on "Tengri

TV" at the time of the study (April 20, 2024).

Social media platforms such as YouTube are vital when it comes to analyzing public opinion changes and the level of support of government actions. YouTube is more than just a place for content creators, it is also a spot where all kinds of social strata can communicate under the videos they watch (Deori and et al. 2023). Simple emojis that are widely utilized in YouTube can show lots of feelings that represent consumers' attitudes. They could be happy, sad, or just okay (Alrumaih et al. 2020). This proves the idea that emojis work along with words to show what content consumers emotions. This study tried to answer a few questions. The main question was, does the kind of comments change depending on what a blogger thinks about government actions? I had two secondary questions. The first one is, what are the main themes on the comment sections. The second one is, is there any difference in word usage and emoji implication between chosen videos' comment sections.

Literature review

There is a rich inventory of evaluating the public opinion on social media. In authoritarian countries, social networks are key to monitoring public discourse. For in these states are the many zones of public life excluded from offline conversation. Critical discourse analysis has shown that social networks are an active discursive space exercising both expression and formation views of public opinion. (Butyrina et al. 2023). User-centeredness of social networks and user activity induce self-organisation of community members and a multi-dialogue (Butyrina et al. 2023). Readers' competencies in self-expression through comments might affect news assessments, and including credibility judgements and the relevance of problems covered by the media (Waddell 2018). In addition, the results do suggest that the comment effects and influence are seen as the result of trends, and that comments are likely to determine the focus and the amount of information available to the audiences (Waddell 2018). The link between the populace, the representation of them in the media, and the strategic approaches of the government has been a focus within political communication as well as in disaster management. Research indicates that sometimes the concern for critical media provides the space for concerns and grievances against governance to be voiced (Carpini et al. 1993). On the other hand, the members of the state media may reduce the amount of information the public receives that is critical by presenting the issues in a favorable manner to the authorities (Entman 1993). In the context of a disaster, the people's lack of satisfaction is often with regards to the extent of the preparedness and the response (Kapucu 2008).


The government of Kazakhstan with regards to safety before an earthquake is directly criticized in particular with how the issues of education, early warning systems, and allocation of resources operate. The comment sections of social media are interesting arenas of exposition for the audience, as they show what

aspects of safety are of concern to individuals and how individuals view the efficacy of government institutions. Azyan L. (2012) undertook research, which showed the potential of the use of mass media such as social media for public institutions especially city governments to engage with citizens in more dialogues oriented and transparent ways. Promoting openness is a way to gain trust and accountability (Bertot and Jaeger 2010). In light of this, tracking independent social media influencers can also be useful for gauging public opinion on the changes in the public policy in the area of focus including the procedures and measures in place for the protection of citizens. This is especially important in countries where the citizens only apply very superficial patterns of political engagement.

Methodology

In this study, a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches of YouTube comment sections were taken for two videos related to earthquake safety standards, one being "Jurttyn balasy" which is an independent media channel and the second, "Tengri TV" which is a government-sponsored channel. The analysis followed these steps:

Graph 1: Research steps.



Source: Author

This flow chart outlines a systematic process for analyzing textual or data patterns. It begins with the first step which is also part of step 1 where Google Colab was mentioned as the platform for sub optimizing the code and performing the first

analysis (Image 1).

Image 1: The code to extract comments from YouTube (Analytics with Adam 2021)

```
import googleapiclient.discovery
import googleapiclient.errors

api_service_name = "youtube"
api_version = "v3"
DEVELOPER_KEY = ""

youtube = googleapiclient.discovery.build(
    api_service_name, api_version, developerKey=DEVELOPER_KEY)

request = youtube.commentThreads().list(
    part="snippet",
    videoId="wNr61Q9Rry0",
    maxResults=100
)
response = request.execute()

for item in response['items']:
    print(item["snippet"]["topLevelComment"]["snippet"]["textDisplay"])
```

In step 2, users come up with a set of metrics that could be relevant using a tool Perplexity which is thought to be an essential tool for looking for patterns in the sourced data. Moving to step 3, all of the metrics and themes identified within the previous step are coded and joined to provide structured results that can be used for future analysis. The workflow continues with step 4 where the derived output of the previous step is input into Chatsonic, which is a meaning-based text writing tool, for identifying the common occurrence of particular words within a text and proceeds to step 5 where the same tool is used for the analysis of sets of terms in a language. In step 6, two sets of results are presumably compared in order to check their dependability or contrast or determine whether they are consistent with or different from each other. Lastly, step 7 basically requires the user to perform a detailed examination of the latest tech results in which the patterns and themes constructed during the entire discussion of the process are thoroughly understood.

Table 1. Main themes, codes, and abbreviations

Code	Theme	Short form
1	Preparedness and Safety	PS
2	Criticism of Authorities	CA
3	Personal Experiences	PE
4	Fear and Anxiety	FA
5	Suggestions for Improvement	SI
5+	Suggestions for People	SP
6	Humor and Sarcasm	HS
7	General Observations/Questions	GO
7-	Community Support	CS
7+	Off-topic	O


Source: Author

Most posts reproduce two or three mixed sentiments. For example, if the comment was striking as 6 off-topic and 7+ humor and sarcasm. I coded them as 67+, accordingly. Criticism of Authorities: Many users were quite critical about the government's level of preparedness and efficiency and in particular the shortcomings of the SMS-based early warning system. Personal Experiences: Users began posting history about themselves in such weakness during the earthquakes and explained poor emergency responses. Suggestions for Improvement: They proposed upgrading warning systems, improving infrastructure and enhancing public education level on earthquake behaviors. Fear and Anxiety: It has been reported that affected people showed a loss of hope and anxiety regarding the future earthquake occurrences and the impact of future quakes. Humor and Sarcasm: Several people differed in their approach to the situation. Instead feeling hopeless, they used jokes about the earthquake to ridicule the governments' attempts to alleviate the overall deal.

The comment section on "Jurtyń balasy" (Chart 1) and "Tengri TV" (Chart 1.1), though they generally share similar schemas in terms of user behavior patterns, in some cases they varied. In particular, the users tend to be very critical

of the leadership and the governance on "Tengri TV". They complain mostly on general things and how to approach the authorities, emphasizing on the need for changes. The users offer some support and through such comments users are expected to devise means for change. Several users have shared their own experiences and fears of being deployed further indicating that they focus on real issues. "Jurttýn balasy" on the other hand appears more focused on the social aspect of such sites which allows for a lot of irrelevant content suggesting less serious goals. Many people took the time to be humorous and sarcastic, showing a very gentle or ironic side of the discussions, despite the abundance of mess in the comments. With such minimal tonal and construction variations, these platforms are very related as one is able to see the other. Both comment sections share an intention to enact changes and provide critiques of each other while the degree of seriousness and presence of humor and off topic discussions may vary.

Figure 1. Most frequent themes in "Jurttýn balasy"



Source. Author

Figure 2. Most frequent themes in Tengri TV




Source. Author

Frequency analysis exhibited both high and low engagement trends in several thematic areas. There was an overwhelming emphasis on criticising authorities across both sites, with 86 such comments on "Jurttyn balasy" and 87 on "Tengri TV". Personal stories were rare but rather emotive, while comments made seeking improvement were quite constructive. The most frequently used emoji in "Jurttyn balasy's" comment section (Figure 1.2) is the 😄 (face with tears of joy) emoji, which has the highest count on the chart at about 25. Then, with counts of about 14 and 12, respectively, the 😊 (smiling face with smiling eyes) and 😭 (crying face) emojis exhibit moderate usage. With counts between two and six, emojis such as 👍 (thumbs up), 🙈 (see-no-evil monkey), and 🤔 (thinking face) are less common. A clear comparison of emoji popularity is made possible by the chart's descending order, which highlights how much more popular the 😄 emoji is in this data set than the others.

Figure 3. The emoji usage in "Jurttyn Balasy's" comment section

Count vs. Emoji




Source: Author

In contrast, the 🤣 (rolling on the floor laughing) emoji has the highest count in "Tengri TV's" comment section (Figure 1.3), coming in at almost 10. It is closely followed by the 😂 (face with tears of joy) emoji, which has a count of about 7. Third place goes to the 😊 (slightly smiling face) emoji, which has a count of roughly 5. Furthermore, with a comparable count of 5, the 🙏 (heart) emoji also sticks out. With counts between 1 and 3, other emojis like 🙏 (folded hands), 🐱 (cat face), and 😊 (smiling face with hearts) are less common.

Figure 4. The emoji usage in "Tengri TV's" comment section

Count vs. Emoji



Source: Author

"Jurtyń balasy's" comment section is fascinating with regards to systematic critiques and finding possible solutions. Audiences adopting a more critical and proactive approach seem to be in the majority in the "Jurtyń balasy" comment section. On the other hand, some of the viewers of "Tengri TV" had some supportive or critical notes, but these were mostly about the victims rather than the government. Still, in spite of all these differences, both platforms expressed similar levels of anger in regard to measures taken for safety in case of an earthquake.

While analysing frequency word in "Jurtyń balasy's" comment section (Table 1.3) the most prominent words include поддержки (support), помощь (help), безопасность (safety), трястись (shake), документы (documents), сирена (siren), люди (people), катастрофа (disaster). The most frequently used words in "Tengri TV" video section (Table 1.4) are конечно (of course), страх (terror), sms, сирены (siren), аллах (allah), геология (geology), МЧС (EMERCOM), держитесь (hang in) and паника (panic). Here you may find a table with each word frequency.

Table 2. "Jurttýń balasy's" comment most frequent words

Words	Frequency
страшно (scary)	30
помощь (help)	25
безопасность (safety)	20
трястись (shake)	18
документы (documents)	15
сирена (siren)	12
люди (people)	10
катастрофа (disaster)	9

Source. Author

Table 3. "Tengri TV's" comment' most frequent words


Words	Frequency
СМС (SMS)	48
сирены (siren)	58
страшно (scary)	19
держитесь (hang in)	11
аллах (allah)	26
МЧС (EMERCOM)	32
правительство (government)	10

паника (panic)	7
страшно (scary)	5

Source. Author

Figure 5. CA: Themes of "Jurttyn Balasy". Criticism of Authorities. FA: Fear and Anxiety. HS: Humor and Sarcasm

Frequency vs. Theme




Source. Author

On the other hand, the content of "Tengri TV's" most popular comment section is more varied (Figure 1.6). Support from the community, critiques of authorities, broad observations and inquiries, firsthand accounts, and recommendations for enhancements are all included.

Figure 6. Themes of "Tengri TV". CS: Community Support. CA: Criticism of Authorities. GO: General Observations/questions. PE: Personal Experiences. SI: Suggestions for Improvement

Frequency vs. Themes



Source. Author

Results

The sentiments under two videos' comment sections do not differ much, but there is a trend of prevalence of some themes in each video. Users primarily complain about general issues and how to contact the authorities under "Tengri TV" comments, highlighting the need for reforms. Interestingly, the social aspect of these websites appears to be what "Jurttýn balasy's" comment section allows for a lot of unrelated content with what seems like more benign intents. However, amongst the loads of criticism, many people found a good joke to crack and make the arguments look very sarcastic or even really polite. The results show that there is a substantial lack of trust between the general public and the government agencies in charge of disaster relief. Perceived communication breakdowns, like the unreliable SMS warning system, widen this disparity. The absence of proactive steps to address safety concerns and the lack of transparency were highlighted in numerous comments. A community-driven response to disasters is also reflected in the emotional tones of "Tengri TV" comments, underscoring the significance of grassroots efforts in building resilience.

Discussion

The results seem to suggest that media settings are equally implicated in the presentation and representation of the public discourses on issues of disaster preparedness. The fact that across both channels the general mood is one of criticism implies a deep distrust in the polity and its policies and systems. This is consistent with broader patterns in disaster communication, where inadequate or inappropriate preparation and during the response phase amplifies the dynamics of public dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the sentiments and encouragement present in the comments posted on "Tengri TV" seem to indicate potential for eruption of public support toward promoting safety campaigns. One pattern that stands out is the use of humour or sarcasm in complaining. This suggests that there is a social orientation of using indirect forms of abuse of a complaint and generalization which tend to downplay the level of public hate. On the other hand, governments have to be discerning considering such subtleties in order to understand and satisfy the public voice. The study's methodological limitations include its narrow focus on two platforms and comparatively small sample size, which may not adequately represent the range of public opinion. By including additional media platforms and carrying out longitudinal studies to monitor sentiment trends over time, future research could broaden the focus. Furthermore, the research does not include people who speak Kazakh, because the majority of comments are in Russian.

Recommendations

The following information and exercise recommendations are made with reference to the study outcomes with the view of narrowing the trust gap in Kazakhstan for enhancing disaster readiness strategies. Some improvements required for existing warning systems include; SMS-based systems require upgrade to make these warning systems reliable and fast. Governments should focus on other technologies that can reach and update the public within a short period of time like the use of the mobile application and alerts. Other important disaster risk reduction measures include those involving the people within a certain community. It is imperative that authorities would engage local communities and ensure their participation by conducting workshops, using informative-orientation on materials, and close cooperation with non-governmental organizations. Shanelly stated and governmental operations must be clear in order to maintain the trust of the public, and citizens should be informed regarding disaster contingency plans, existing resources, and estimates of risks. Moreover, meeting criticisms directly, recognition of existing shortcomings and presenting clear plans on

how they will be solved can make the public more confident as well. As for physical preparations, more attention should be paid to modification of structure and improvement of walking space and escape facilities during earthquakes. It is therefore important to note that many of these efforts can be supported and managed through the Public Private Partnerships. Last of all, involvement of the social media platforms in advocacy has an added advantage where information dissemination is complemented by representation of authorities in issue handling. And when authorities respond instantly to feedback, they can help promote increased sense of responsibility among citizens.

Conclusion

The object of discussion in my study was the comments left by people on two YouTube channels, one of which was an anti-government one, and the other a pro-government one, to see their feelings about the governments' actions towards earthquake safety practices. The sentiments expressed in comment sections showed only small differentiation between positive and negative feedback from the video: "Jurttyn balasy" channel – criticism and recommendations. The comments of the pro-government channel were divided between criticism, empathy, and official support. In this regard, for increasing the safety of the Kazakhstan population and preventing fatal consequences in the aftermath of the earthquakes, the government has to reconsider the following measures: In the first place, it is necessary to modernize the early warning system for efficient and effective communication in the time of the disaster, secondly to focus on public awareness for creating increased resistance among people, and, lastly, to pay more attention to critical feedback for identifying This is because through rebuilding the governance trust and ensuring that it is responsive disaster outcome can be enhanced. As such, this work emphasises media as the essential apparatus in the construction of the public sphere and in addressing institutional responsibilities. After the present study, researchers should consider systems factors in disaster management across sociology, technology, and urban planning disciplines for the development of efficient solutions.

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